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Discussions of various connections between human beings and nonhuman animals in 
moral philosophy, for example in “animal ethics”, are dominated by a certain 
philosophical approach. This standard approach is characterized by philosophical 
assumptions about the nature of reason and argument on questions of morality and value. 
Assumptions like these tend to assimilate good thinking about value to a narrow 
interpretation of “reason” which stresses rational argument and justification. This 
interpretation of what discussions about the value and nature of human and animal life 
should look like naturally leads to the creation of theories, such as the various theories of 
animal ethics proposed in utilitarianism, rights theory, and virtue ethics. In the field of 
animal ethics, three well known philosophers who advocate one or other of these theories 
are Peter Singer, Tom Regan, and Rosalind Hursthouse. It has also been common in the 
standard debates about animals, from the 1970’s onwards, for philosophers to accept that 
an “objective” understanding of the mental lives of animals is most comprehensively 
provided by modern science, including ethology and evolutionary theory. 
 
In philosophy, and in significant parts of society, views on the relations between humans 
and animals have changed over recent decades. There is a greater tendency to take animal 
life more seriously than in the past. Parts of science and mainstream philosophy have 
lately tended to the view that human beings and animals differ only in degree and not in 
kind. Even philosophers who wish to defend the idea that humans are different in kind, 
often occupy the same ground as their opponents by turning to ethical theory to justify 
their views about human importance.          
 
In another part of philosophy, an alternative approach to these questions has emerged. 
Two prominent philosophers in the Wittgensteinian tradition - Cora Diamond and, more 
recently, Raimond Gaita – have written on the connection between human beings and 
animals. This approach seriously questions the presuppositions of the philosophers who 
stand on more mainstream ground. The general position worked out by Diamond and 
Gaita claims that there is indeed a difference in kind between human beings and animals; 
but it also offers a means of exploring the question that, far from accepting the 
assumptions that the mainstream view and many of its critics rely on, has yielded, and 
promises to continue to yield, new and creative insights.  
 
At the same time, there has been a great deal of interest in the human-animal question 
from the domain of literature. In particular, the recent work of J.M. Coetzee has 
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stimulated both public and philosophical interest in animality. The sort of work that 
Coetzee has produced has both put some life back into the debate about animals, and has 
attracted the attention of philosophers from this alternative Wittgensteinian tradition, who 
are interested in the connection between philosophy, science, and literature. In fact, 
Coetzee’s work on animals has also aroused the interest of philosophers in the more 
mainstream tradition. Such philosophers typically have a different view of the role of 
literature and science in philosophy than those who have been influenced by 
Wittgenstein. 
 
This thesis examines the nature of the various elements of this topic as just outlined. In 
particular, it tries to lay out the general parameters of the mainstream assumptions and 
those of the alternative Wittgensteinian position, mostly as this has been developed by 
Cora Diamond and Raimond Gaita. The aim is to clarify what is philosophically at stake 
in basic ethical questions about humans and animals. As the thesis argues, attending to 
certain fundamental questions about human and animal life is a precondition of 
addressing more explicitly moral questions about them. The thesis concludes by arguing 
that Gaita’s view, which focuses on issues of meaning and on a responsiveness to both 
human and animal life that is disciplined by a range of critical concepts, in the most 





This thesis is about the sort of meaning or sense that, in the Western tradition of moral 
philosophy, can be made of animals, of human beings, and of animals and human beings 
together. Human life is often partly understood by a contrast with animal life, both when 
people attempt to show its special nature and significance, and when they try to stress its 
similar and continuous nature and significance as compared with other creatures. Here we 
see the project of seeking to find the ways in which we humans are, and are not, animals 
too. I will consider some of these endeavors in this thesis. In significant part,  I also want 
to see how a detailed and particular sense of what it is for human beings to be (or to fail 
to be) a distinctive kind of animal affects – indeed crucially affects – a sense of the nature 
and significance of nonhuman animal life. 
 
In recent times there has been a change in attitudes towards nature and our place in it, and 
towards animals and our relations with them. A variety of ethical perspectives on animals 
has emerged. Increasing momentum and complexity has gathered in these emerging 
perspectives from the 1970s onwards, in the wake of other “progressive”, and to various 
degrees successful, social movements and changes. Outside philosophy and other 
academic and intellectual circles, there have been a number of forces driving these new 
views on animals. One is concern over worsening environmental damage and the 
intensification and increasing scale of the use of animals. Another is a deepening wonder 
at the lives of animals, a wonder and an engagement that is often felt in an audience that 
no longer directly harms or uses them. There is also now a tendency to place greater 
importance on relationships with “companion animals” than has happened in the past – 
some animals are increasingly felt to be “members of the family”. The modern interest in 
animals is seen in television and literature, and in the work of scientists and naturalists 
like David Attenborough, whose programs for several decades have nurtured an 
appreciation of the marvels to be found in the natural world. The influence of these social 
changes on attitudes to animals is clearly of substantial importance.    
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In academia, and philosophy specifically, there have also been changes in the ways 
animals are perceived. These changes have no doubt been influenced by changes in our 
culture. But, interestingly, they have also fed into the wider society (Peter Singer says 
that on the question of the treatment of animals philosophy has instigated rather than 
followed change1). Whereas in the 1950s it was preoccupied with conceptual analysis, 
philosophy is now much more involved in questions of “practical ethics”. Furthermore, 
not only does philosophy continue to a significant extent to look to science as a model of 
thought or reason, it has also come to be more open to the deliverances of science. It is 
now common to see philosophical arguments in ethics, and other areas like philosophy of 
mind, making use of scientific findings. In general, the subject of philosophy has become 
more receptive to forms of naturalism. And this has affected moral philosophy. For 
example, some moral philosophers think that more attention should be paid in ethics to 
the fact that human beings are animals and must live and flourish according to their 
animal natures.       
 
The nature of reason and its application in ethics is debated. Some hold that reason itself 
is independent of feeling. Others hold that ethical thinking not only is associated with, 
and influenced by, our affectively constructed selves but is partly and necessarily 
constituted by them. Many philosophers, including some of those who are sympathetic to 
the second view, tend to say that rational argument can help determine how we should 
behave towards animals and humans and, furthermore, that it can help show which 
ethical or moral “theory” we should accept and live by. The conflict in normative ethics 
between utilitarianism, rights theory, Kantianism, contract theory, virtue theory and so 
on, is well known. Those engaged in this “Battleground of the Theories”, as it has 
sometimes been called, believe that reason can, more or less (depending on the 
understanding of reason offered), demonstrate the soundness of one or other theory 
against the others.  
 
                                                 
1 In the preface to M. Calarco and P. Atterton (eds), Animal Philosophy: Essential Readings in Continental 
Thought, (Cornwall: Continuum, 2004).  
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The rejection of this battleground, however, can go with the view that it badly 
misrepresents the nature of the ethical. This can occur for different reasons. For example, 
some philosophers in the post-modernist tradition question the standards of argument and 
objectivity in much “analytic” philosophy, and lately have devoted some attention to the 
comparison of human and animal life.2 These alternative approaches will not be 
considered in any detail in this thesis.   
 
In the analytic tradition, Bernard Williams has argued in Ethics and the Limits of 
Philosophy that a concentration on theory-making moralistically limits our conception of 
value by reducing it to value of one single variety. Williams is referring to the 
preoccupation philosophers have with actions, obligations, and duties – with what we 
“ought to do”. For this reason he prefers to speak more broadly of the “ethical” rather 
than of “morality”; and he speaks disparagingly of the “morality system”3. I shall largely 
follow his nomenclature in this thesis.      
 
Another reason for rejecting theoretical argument is that thought about morality and value 
generally bears little resemblance to how it is portrayed. Dale Jamieson divides the 
standard philosophical methods of theorizing into two types. “Foundationalism” declares 
that our ethical beliefs can be justified or rejected by displaying their “logical relations” 
with “other beliefs that themselves are in no need of justification”4. “Coherentism” says 
roughly that ethical beliefs “can be justified only by their relation to other beliefs”5 which 
people, as ethical beings making ethical judgments, actually have. For these 
methodologies, and indeed for any attempt to find a “defensible set of moral beliefs, 
convictions, dispositions, and purposes”, the search “must begin midstream”6, according 
to Jamieson. We “must begin as well as end”, Jamieson says, “with moral intuitions” 7 
that is, with ethical beliefs, convictions, dispositions, and so on. Even foundationalists, he 
                                                 
2  See, for example, Cary Wolfe,  Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2003); M. Calarco & P. Atterton (eds.), Animal Philosophy: Essential Readings in 
Continental Thought (London: Fourth Estate, 1993). 
3 B. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana, 1986)  
4 P. Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), p.480. 
5 A Companion to Ethics, p.482. 
6 A Companion to Ethics, p.483. 
7 A Companion to Ethics, p.483.  
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is saying, cannot simply ignore the nature of our ethical practice and our ways of 
discussing matters of value. Theorists have to work with ethical language and behavior as 
they find it, even when their conclusions and methods depart substantially from ordinary 
life. What they may say, of course, is that our pre-theoretical intuitions and beliefs have 
not been properly argued for. We therefore need to step back and subject them to 
reasoned or rational argument. And theory, say the theorizers, may be what we need for 
that.      
 
The premise of any theoretical enterprise must be that ethical thought is obedient to 
cognitive standards which do not fatally misrepresent the nature of what is to be justified. 
For example, a theory cannot import logical attributes into ethical beliefs and arguments 
which in reality have no role there; or it does so at the cost of introducing a fantasy of our 
life with questions of value. Furthermore, it cannot simply overlook forms of thinking 
which do in fact play a major role in life. Were it to do so, it would unreasonably 
generalize one or other ostensible form of thinking across the whole range. Moreover, it 
might miss those forms of thought which are more compelling and serious. Indeed, it 
might pass over modes of thinking which, while they are conditioned in ways that make 
them appear to some people far too contingent and limiting, are really the only ones that 
will allow us to see things the way they are. 
 
In opposing ethical theorizing of the sort that is supposed to lead to objectively justified 
theories, some philosophers claim that there has been that precise problem: certain 
genuine cognitive standards have been overlooked or rejected. Of course we must, they 
think, step back and subject judgments made in the midst of living to serious critical 
scrutiny. And we must be open to other descriptions of ethical life. But there are, in their 
view, methods of doing that that do not rest on blinkered assumptions, or resort to 
theories that stand on the same battleground of rational conflict.     
 
Those who are drawn to the construction and defense of moral theory tend at some level 
to aspire to a model of reason that is very different from the ideals of thinking preferred 
by philosophers who are skeptical about the place of theory in ethical reflection. The 
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point of view of the universe, the view from nowhere, the impartial observer – these 
phrases represent the first kind of model or image of sound thinking about value. Those 
who reject this ideal may express their preferences for alternative models in various 
ways. Some, for example, speak of an educated and discerning imagination, or of a 
developing and mature ethical sensibility; others speak of intelligent emotions. Still 
others talk about the critical concepts involved in thinking about significance and 
meaning. In this thesis, I shall be interested in following out the implications of thinking 
that goes on in a realm not only of theory-making, but, in contrast with that, in a certain 
realm of meaning    
 
In the course of pursuing these implications, I will often return to the views of a leading 
figure in modern moral philosophy, especially as it is concerned with animals. Peter 
Singer’s lifetime work has been instrumental in bringing the question of animal life to 
serious philosophical and social attention. In doing so, Singer has sought to live up to his 
basic belief that the “chief task” of philosophy is “to question the basic assumptions of 
the age” and to think through, “critically and carefully, what most of us take for granted”8 
- not the least of which is the “complacent, unargued assumptions of the moral 
insignificance of nonhuman animals”9. The example of Peter Singer and his work allows 
us to see clearly one view about the nature of reason and about the place it should have in 
working out our proper relations with other human beings and animals.  
 
Singer is squarely of the tradition that holds that reasoning about ethics is best modeled 
on the point of view of the universe as opposed to “our own point of view”10. For Singer, 
reason has a particular character. “Brain power”, he writes, is “our specialty”; a “peculiar 
ability” that is “like an escalator, leading upward and out of sight”11. It might begin in 
ordinary life, but it possesses a logic that can take us far beyond it, even to a place where 
it “creates tension with other aspects of our nature”12. Importantly, it can do so because, 
                                                 
8 P. Singer, Animal Liberation (London: Pimlico, 1995), p.236. 
9 Animal Liberation, p.241. 
10 P. Singer, Writings on an Ethical Life (Salisbury South: Griffin Press), p.267.  
11 Writings on an Ethical Life, p.264. 
12 Writings on an Ethical Life, p.265. 
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while it may, and indeed must, be pressed into operation by the engine of our affective 
and social nature, reason itself operates independently of that nature.  
 
Singer believes “that the case for Animal Liberation is logically cogent, and cannot be 
refuted”13. That belief underpins his confession in the preface to the 1990 edition of 
Animal Liberation that he expected more people who read the book to convert to 
vegetarianism. Of course, as he points out, there were always going to be too many social 
and psychological obstacles for this dream to become a reality:  
 
It is characteristic of an ideology that it resists refutation. If the 
foundations of an ideology are knocked out from under it, new foundations 
will be found, or else the ideological position will just hang there, defying 
the logical equivalent of the laws of gravity. In the case of attitudes to 
animals, the latter seems to have happened…The moral attitudes of the 
past are too deeply embedded in our thought and our practices to be upset 
by a mere change in our knowledge of ourselves and of other animals.14  
 
Yet Singer’s disappointment is informed by his firm belief that the escalator of reason 
can triumph over human weakness, carrying us above the narrow perspective forced 
relentlessly upon us by our subjective interests. And he believes it can do so by refuting 
our prejudices and the inevitable bad arguments they encourage. So his arguments about 
animals appeal to 
 
reason rather than to emotion or sentiment. I have chosen this path, not 
because I am unaware of the importance of kind feelings and sentiments of 
respect towards other creatures, but because reason is more universal and 
more compelling in its appeal. Greatly as I admire those who have 
eliminated speciesism from their lives purely because their sympathetic 
concern for others reaches to all sentient creatures, I do not think that an 
                                                 
13 Animal Liberation, p.244. 
14 Animal Liberation, pp.211-12. 
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appeal to sympathy and good-heartedness alone will convince most people 
of the wrongness of speciesism.15   
 
Without at this stage going into the details of his philosophy, it is worth taking a brief 
look at a belief that helps explain Singer’s confidence in his position, and his sense that 
many of the arguments put up over the decades against it either betray desperation or can 
in any case be refuted16. In the Afterword to A Companion to Ethics17, Singer (as the 
volume’s editor) sets out the reasons for his optimistic belief that there can be a genuine 
convergence in ethical judgment. It seems fair to say that he thinks the sort of 
convergence that is on the horizon is not a contingent convergence in opinion, but rather 
a kind of objective or rational agreement in belief.   
 
According to Singer, human nature “has its constants and there are only a limited number 
of ways in which human beings can live together and flourish; indeed…some of the 
features common to the nature of human beings in different societies are common to the 
nature of any long-lived, intelligent social mammals, and are reflected in our behavior as 
they are reflected in that of other primates”18. But more important for the possibility of 
non-accidental convergence is his assessment, and that of many of his contributors, 
concerning the features of ethical argument that go beyond “reasoning about matters of 
taste”19.  
 
Singer says that “a better understanding of the nature of ethics would at least make it 
easier for us to see what kind of answer that question [of how we ought to live] might 
need to have”20. And centuries of thought about the nature of ethics, he judges, is leading 
to a convergence in understanding of the nature of good and bad argument and reason in 
that realm. He considers how the meta-ethical views of many of his contributors - on such 
topics as realism, intuitionism, universal prescriptivism, and subjectivism – start from 
                                                 
15 Animal Liberation, p.243.  
16 Animal Liberation, p.238. 
17 P. Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp.543-545.   
18 A Companion to Ethics, pp.543-544. 
19 A Companion to Ethics, p.544. 
20 A Companion to Ethics, p.544. 
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“quite different places”, yet they all seem “to be heading in the same direction”21. The 
direction is towards a common view about the nature of “reasoning under certain 
idealized conditions”22 in ethics. Those ideal conditions are essentially the ones that limit 
“subjective” interference and permit the untrammeled operation of “rationality” in this 
domain.  
 
The major meta-ethical question for Singer is whether this general conception he has of 
reason has specific application to ethics. On this question, the apparent convergence at 
the meta-ethical level fortifies Singer in his feeling that a convergence at the normative 
level is possible. “The objectivity of morality”, he suggests, “comes down to the 
possibility that if we were all reasoning under such conditions, we would reach the same 
conclusions”23. So he thinks that careful and critical thinkers, under ideal conditions, can 
converge upon a view that his own arguments about humans and animals have been 
either refuted or vindicated. And indeed, the majority of the arguments that have either 
favored or attacked Singer’s position have stood on the same ground as a matter of fact as 
his own. Singer’s position is notable in the way it carefully tries to keep any assumptions 
down to a minimum – especially those that smuggle in “subjective” feelings and emotion. 
Consequently, his methodology has been consistent and his some of his arguments 
apparently hard to refute. 
 
The ground occupied by Singer and others can be spelled out here very briefly; later, we 
can dwell on “speciesism” and other topics. Singer thinks that the notion of equality 
between human beings and nonhuman animals is not based on factual or actual equality24. 
Nonetheless, his basic ethical principle, the principle of the equal consideration of 
interests, entails that a being’s actual or factual characteristics fundamentally govern its 
moral status. Cora Diamond long ago pointed out that, in regard to Singer’s arguments 
about the ethical treatment of humans and animals, “the only tool used in them to explain 
                                                 
21 A Companion to Ethics, p.544. 
22 A Companion to Ethics, p.545.  
23 A Companion to Ethics, p.545. 
24 Animal Liberation, p.5. 
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what differences in treatment are justified is the appeal to the capacities of the beings in 
question”25.  
 
Diamond’s seminal essay “Eating Meat and Eating People” was published in the journal 
Philosophy in 1978, at the start of the modern animal rights movement. Her early 
warning that Singer and Tom Regan had chosen a wrong and ultimately self-defeating 
means of improving and revising our ethical understanding of human and animal life 
went largely unheeded. That their general approach to this question was the one that took 
root in philosophy is illustrated in the fact that David DeGrazia’s book, Taking Animals 
Seriously, praised by Singer for being a “fine study of the field”26 (and also for 
suggesting the strength and longevity of his position), does not seriously address 
Diamond’s style of philosophy. 
 
Two key points underpin Singer’s confidence in his anti-speciesist position. The first is 
that the ethical principle of equality is embedded in ethical language per se and in the 
principles we presently wield against other forms of discrimination like racism; the 
principle can anyway, he argues, be justified by spelling out a “rational basis” of ethics, 
which can perhaps be derived from a standpoint of universalized self-interest. The second 
key point is that human prejudice and ignorance has led to blindness regarding the actual 
capacities of other animals and the way the principle of equality engages with the features 
it has determined as morally relevant and non-arbitrary. Another area of facts that is often 
ignored is the way animals and humans are treated and especially the way they suffer. 
Consequently, Singer provides numerous detailed facts about the lives of unfortunate 
humans and animals in a good many of his books. 
 
                                                 
25 C. Diamond, The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy and the Mind (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 
1995), p.322. 
26 P. Singer, Writings on an Ethical Life (Salisbury South: Griffin Press 2000), p.xix. 
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These two points form the premises of Singer’s and Cavalieri’s The Great Ape Project. 
As this project’s founders, they write in the preface that the “core of this book is an 
encounter between ethology and ethics”.27 To a large degree the book examines 
 
how we humans have sought to emphasize the differences between us and 
them, and to play down the similarities. Ethics appears on the scene, 
putting the data about apes together with our own rhetoric about the basis 
of equality between humans. This points towards the goal of this entire 
enterprise: a reassessment of the moral status of chimpanzees, gorillas and 
orangutans and the acceptance of some nonhuman animals as persons.28         
 
Singer has argued at length against the misguided intrusion of science, in particular 
sociobiology, into ethics; in regard to the great ape project he insists that “ethics 
subsumes ethology” 29 and thus defeats the unjustified tendency to moral conservatism 
present in “evolutionary” ethics”30. It is from philosophy going back at least to the 
Enlightenment31 that we discover “a rational ethic” that challenges “the moral 
significance of membership of our own species”32. However, despite his debt to Hare’s 
conceptual analysis of moral language, Singer is friendly with modern science and with a 
kind of naturalism about the conclusions we can draw in ethics. For instance, he thinks 
that we “should not focus on the fact that we are human beings, but rather on the fact that 
we are intelligent beings with a rich and varied social and emotional life” that we “share 
not only with our fellow humans, but also with our fellow great apes”33. Science has 
helped to demonstrate this. 
 
                                                 
27 P. Cavalieri & P. Singer (eds.), The Great Ape Project: Equality Beyond Humanity (London: Fourth 
Estate, 1993), p.2. 
28 The Great Ape Project, p.2. 
29 The Great Ape Project, p.2. 
30 The Great Ape Project, p.2. 
31 The Great Ape Project, p.308. 
32 The Great Ape Project, p.5. 
33 The Great Ape Project, p.1. 
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Because of his attitude toward science, and his unprejudiced view about the nature of the 
animal world, Singer is generous in the capacities he is prepared to attribute to animals. 
In regard to The Great Ape Project, for example, he is sympathetic to a range of 
controversial claims about ape language, intelligence, intersubjectivity, and emotion. 
Many of the other philosophers whose views appear in this thesis are similarly 
sympathetic to such claims. At the present time, of course, the nature of animal life and 
animal capacities is controversial.  
 
This brings us to a position which will be adopted in this thesis. In discussing questions 
of the sense we can make of the relation between human and animal life, I will be 
exploring a position which is critical of many of these philosophers. But, it is important 
to note, the nature of this criticism is usually not dependent upon skepticism about their 
factual descriptions of animal characteristics and their ways of living. In other words, the 
critical engagement with these philosophical views will not significantly turn on the 
suspicion that they are far too charitable in their attributions of capacities and properties 
to animals.  
 
Furthermore, an alternative approach to the nature of animal and human capacities and 
properties will be outlined. That approach is not seriously at odds with what many of 
these philosophers are prepared to attribute to animals. It does, however, contain an 
epistemological approach to such questions that is most certainly at odds with theirs. This 
approach stems from Raimond Gaita’s discussions in books like The Philosopher’s 
Dog34.  
 
In that book, Gaita criticizes the almost universal philosophical view that our 
understanding of the kinds of lives that animals and humans have depends upon the 
spectator’s point of view. The spectator, it is often said, must draw inferences or 
construct theories from the data which indirectly provides evidence for “mental states”. 
                                                 
34 R. Gaita, The Philosopher’s Dog (New York: Random House, 2005). While I will explore this alternative 
approach, I will not directly be concerned with addressing seriously skeptical views, like those of Donald 
Davidson, about animal beliefs and desires. That endeavor is not necessary for an engagement with 
mainstream ethical views about animals and humans which are not seriously skeptical.                 
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Moreover, The Philosopher’s Dog is critical of the view that the nature of animal and 
human life – the human condition and the animal condition, perhaps – can be 
exhaustively understood in terms of “facts”. Gaita thinks that certain descriptions of 
animal and human life must have a particular sort of meaning if they are to be true to 
what they seek to describe. The sort of meaning they must have, in his view, is a meaning 
that is crucially different from the meaning of strictly factual descriptions. Gaita calls this 
area of thought and description “the realm of meaning”. This “realm of meaning”, and the 
critical concepts that characterize this form of understanding, will be discussed at some 
length in the opening chapters of this thesis.  
 
It was The Philosopher’s Dog that sparked my interest in an alternative way of 
understanding human and animal life. This involves standing on a different kind of 
ground to the ground occupied by philosophers who are attracted to ethical theory and to 
a narrower conception of ethical argument. Many of the philosophers who address the 
topic of animal and human life stand on this battleground of the theories. This thesis aims 
to examine what can be made of animal and human life when the approach of these 
philosophers to the question is rejected. In particular, it will study what can be made of 
the topic by taking seriously reflection about meaning. The opening exposition will 
prepare us for a different sort of discussion about the kinds of individuals which humans 
and animals are.   
 
However, the position to be staked out does not rely on discarding the general forms of 
thought praised by Singer and others. On the contrary, it welcomes and requires them. 
Nor does it entail that certain facts about animals – e.g. their intelligence, mortality, and 
vulnerability - are irrelevant. Being clear about certain facts may be crucial for this other 
approach. I shall be looking, for example, at how sensitivity to the facts of animal life – 
such as the sorts of feeling and awareness they can have – might become part of the 
“surface-and-response dependent” concepts that can be used to describe their reality. 
 
Clearly, the methodologies of philosophers like Diamond, Gaita, and Stephen Mulhall 
have been influenced by the later work of Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein’s influence is 
 19
evident in what these thinkers have to say about our understanding of humans and 
animals. This applies both to what we ordinarily think of as straightforwardly factual 
understanding, and even more importantly, to the type of understanding that concerns 
ethics and meaning. 
 
Wittgenstein’s legacy lies behind Cora Diamond’s claim that philosophy 
“characteristically misrepresents both our own reality and that of others, in particular 
those ‘others’ who are animals”35. Part of the task of this thesis is to review and compare 
the style of modern philosophy that, according to Diamond, misrepresents these realities, 
and the style of philosophy that, in the opinion of thinkers like Gaita, may take us beyond 
the misrepresentations - misrepresentations which, of course, presently dominate the field 
of “animal ethics”. One step, then, in exploring this field’s philosophical possibilities, is 
to review and compare the dominant perspective with this other less well known and 
accepted one. 
 
                                                 
35 C. Diamond, ‘The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy’ in S. Cavell et al, Philosophy 
and Animal Life (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), p.57. 
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PART  I 
 
Chapter 1 : The Realm of Meaning 
 
Most contemporary philosophers believe that there are forms of critical reflection upon 
ethical matters which are exercises in reason, in thinking well, and, even if only in a weak 
sense, in arriving at truth. Of course, words like objectivity, reality, and truth can be used 
in different ways. Peter Singer, for example, does not think that ethical reflection is about 
what is true or objective for all thinking creatures. But he wants to say that ethical 
judgments can be objective and true in another sense that goes beyond the mere 
“outpouring of our emotions”1. 
 
The contemporary philosophers appearing in this thesis share the position that the process 
of forming ethical views can be a cognitive activity, aimed at distinguishing appearance 
and reality, and seeing things as they are. Bernard Williams says that such thinking is 
aimed at “getting it right”2. “Philosophy”, Williams also says, “is the extension of our 
ordinary concerns by other means”3. One of philosophy’s aims is to reflect upon what it 
is to think well or badly about the concerns we have in the ethical dimension of our lives. 
In this chapter and the next I will give an exposition of Raimond Gaita’s understanding of 
what such thinking comes to. Such understanding is explicated by Gaita in terms of what 
he calls the “realm of meaning”.  
 
We may start the exposition with something obvious. It is a fact about our lives as human 
beings that we are often moved by things we read, hear, discuss, or witness. When we are 
affected or touched, by art or by someone’s words or example, we sometimes say that we 
now see matters more clearly and with greater depth. We may be moved in different ways 
- the ethical ideas we encounter may fill us with wonder or joy or a sense of imaginative 
                                                 
1 P. Singer, The Expanding Circle (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981), p.85. 
2 B. Williams, Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, A.W. Moore (ed.) (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press), p.202. 
3 Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, p.206. 
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adventure4. Or they may horrify and shake us. And so on. Regardless of the way in which 
we are affected, such experiences and responses may, we often think, lead to greater 
insight and understanding and help us make sense of things. In other words, the events, 
people, and cultural products that so excite and engage us can prompt us to make 
cognitive claims. That is a recognizable phenomenon of human life and is not generally 
in dispute. But there is, of course, much disagreement about the nature of these claims 
and whether they are, or can be rendered, truly cognitive. “Since the time of Socrates”, 
Gaita writes, “the West has been preoccupied with the distinction between legitimate and 
illegitimate persuasion”5. The question of how we should step back from what moves us 
to critically examine our most intimate “ordinary concerns”, and to separate proper 
conviction or understanding from mere persuasion, is a controversial question in 
philosophy.    
 
Many philosophers share an assumption about critical reflection upon our ethical 
experiences. The mainstream assumption is that reason consists, to put it briskly, in 
rational argument. Cora Diamond describes this sort of thinking as essentially involving 
“because” arguments or in “therefore-arguments”6. These are arguments that aim to 
provide a rational basis or grounding for a position that at first may only have moved us. 
What makes something a rational argument on this understanding is that it can be 
understood by rational thinkers independently of the particular affective aspects that go 
into being moved, and with more or less independence, to use words of Singer, from the 
“relics of our cultural history”7. The assumption here says that reason, objectivity, or the 
truly cognitive involves and permits removing from the manner or form in which it was 
presented an argument or proposition which can then be assessed, as Rosalind 
Hursthouse puts it, under “a neutral specification”8. Such “propositional” arguments are 
those which are to be assessed independently of the precise way in which they first did, 
                                                 
4 C. Diamond, The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy and the Mind (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1995), p.309.  
5 R. Gaita, The Philosopher’s Dog (New York: Random House, 2005), p.100. 
6 S. Cavell et al, Philosophy and Animal Life (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), p.80. 
7 P. Singer, ‘Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 9, no. 4, 1980, p.326. 
8 R. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.229. 
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or in which they might, engage our attention. This is to regard a certain range of 
responsiveness to ethical claims as different and separate from cognitive appraisal.  
 
Philosophers who share this view may import different details into their understanding of 
good thinking, but there is an underlying idea that is the same. Singer argues that in order 
to eradicate from our critical reflection partial attachments and anything else that can be 
described “merely as a subjective preference”9, we should aim for the model of the 
“impartial spectator or ideal observer”10. The impartial spectator’s thinking is undistorted 
by ordinary human concerns and interests. While the idea of the impartial spectator may 
be invoked as an anti-egoistic model of the basic ethical idea that all people or all 
interests - and not just my own interests or those of my kin - are of equal ethical 
importance, it also functions as a model of thinking unhampered by our “wonder, joy, 
sympathy, disgust, horror”11 and by a range of other affective responses. Other familiar 
images of this ideal are the ‘Archimedean point’12 and the ‘view from nowhere’. 
Amongst many philosophers there is an ideal of reflection which, wholly or in significant 
part, welcomes theorizing and encourages us to recast “our ordinary concerns” from “a 
humanly recognizable form”13 to a less humanly engaged form.  
 
Raimond Gaita’s elucidation of a “realm of meaning” – a realm which includes morality, 
but like Williams’ notion of the “ethical” goes beyond it - identifies a very different 
conception of reason and discursive argument. Because in this thesis I will be exploring 
the distinctive contribution of Gaita’s ‘realm of meaning’ to philosophical perspectives 
on humans and animals, the idea needs to be spelled out in some detail.  
 
Gaita’s way of putting the basic assumption he is challenging is that reason requires 
“extracting plain cognitive content”14 from the manner of presentation of ethical ideas to 
a “tone free zone” in order to rationally assess it. And unlike the cognitive understanding 
                                                 
9 The Expanding Circle, p.110. 
10 P. Singer, Practical Ethics (2nd ed.) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.12. 
11 Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, p.147. 
12 R. Gaita, A Common Humanity (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 1999), p.249. 
13 Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, p.206. 
14 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.101. 
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Gaita argues is possible in the realm of meaning, understanding according to this 
traditional version of reason is possible independently of what moves, affects, or engages 
us. That is why such ideas and arguments may, and, to minimize risk, perhaps should be, 
shifted to a zone in which there is no question of “tone” or “style” – or at least to a zone 
where tone or style is less salient and where the presentation is minimally poetic and 
eschews emotive expression and “fancy literary form”15. This is a tradition which holds 
that:  
 
legitimate persuasion appeals to the head rather than the heart, to logic and 
reason rather than emotion. Suspicion of storytelling and of poetry, as 
forms of powerful but illegitimate persuasion, often goes with that way of 
drawing the distinction. Art may delight us, but if it is to teach us, if it is to 
show us how the world is, then it must extract plain cognitive content from 
the form that often beguiles, dazzles, and seduces us.16       
 
The traditional philosophical understanding of what we typically call rational activity has 
been criticized. Stephen Mulhall contends that philosophers cannot “call upon a 
universally accepted conception of rationality”17 because the nature of rationality is 
“essentially open to question”18. Alice Crary suggests we need a “wider conception of 
rationality”19 than philosophers, with their narrower idea of a rational “argument”20, 
generally appreciate. According to such philosophers, Crary informs us, rational moral 
understanding must be independent of “any tendency to engage a person’s feelings”21. 
Crary’s conception would recognize the possibility of moral judgments which necessarily 
depend upon a propensity to “engage our sensibilities”22 and emotions being genuinely 
rational. She thinks it is a condition of that being the case that the wider conception of 
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(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), p.7. 
18 The Wounded Animal, p.7. 
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rationality “necessarily presupposes that certain sensitivities or propensities are internal 
to all rational capacities”23. If that were not so, she argues, then ethical discourse, and so 
the wider conception of rationality, could not count as “bona fide rationality”24. Crary 
criticizes Bernard Williams for denying that ethical thought is “rational in a full-blooded 
sense”25 and for arguing in favor of the “narrower” conception in his book Ethics and the 
Limits of Philosophy. For Williams, she says, ethical thought which involves a grasp of 
the “thick” ethical concepts requires certain sensitivities, but the necessary engagement of 
our sensitivities must result in “distortions that undermine its status as rational”26. 
Unfortunately, we are told, Williams (willingly) “commits himself to the idea of a 
standpoint, free from any contribution from sensibility” from which bona fide rational 
claims can exclusively be made.27      
 
However, Williams has also acknowledged that his idea of an “absolute conception of the 
world”28, to which scientific thinking may sometimes aspire, might not be “attainable” or 
even “coherent”29. What his idea is meant to suggest is that there is a kind of 
understanding, exemplified in some parts of science, which is “to the largest possible 
extent independent of the local perspectives or idiosyncrasies of enquirers”30. Such an 
enquiry may be “vindicatory” in the sense that enquirers from different times and places 
may agree that progress has been made or an argument has been won. For example, 
Newton could in principle agree that Einstein had refined and improved his laws of 
gravity and motion. That is because they agree on what should count as vindication and 
because vindication is in principle independent of variable local and personal conditions 
of appraisal. Williams’ idea reminds us that ethical understanding is more heavily 
dependent than some other domains of thought on “our own perspective, our peculiar and 
local ways of apprehending things”31.  
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Importantly, Williams warns us not to draw the rather natural conclusion that the absolute 
conception is “somehow better than the more perspectival representations”32. Ethical 
thought by its very nature requires “concepts and explanations that are rooted in our more 
local practices, our culture, and our history, and these cannot be replaced by concepts 
which we might share with very different investigators of the world”33. Moreover, 
Williams believes that the narrower conception of reason, which picks out a very 
different form of understanding, is consistent with a wider and bona fide conception of 
reason or more simply of “getting it right”.      
 
It is, perhaps, clearer to say that the concepts of reason and getting it right – trying to see 
things as they are - encompasses more than rationality. Mulhall’s reference to “questions 
of inferential validity in the context of assertion and argument”34  is suggestive of the 
concept of rationality as we commonly take it, a concept that is also readily contrasted 
with irrationality. With that sense in mind, it is clearly possible to agree with Singer that 
the amoralist or Martian of the philosophical imagination need show no defect in 
rationality (and perhaps, given some of the unresolved and controversial aspects 
commonly admitted of any moral theory, even by its proponents, the fictitious egoist who 
keeps it simple might display a superior rationality).  
 
Furthermore, Gaita’s position does not require acceptance of Crary’s contentious 
argument that our affective constitution is internal to (a conceptual part of) processes of 
rational thought per se. Like Williams, Gaita starts by noticing that there is a way of 
thinking about meaning that is conceptually dependent on the fact that people are 
sometimes moved by what they encounter. He also claims that we do not speak 
univocally of reason: we need not accept that reason is confined to the merely rational; 
nor need we argue that what we think of as strictly rational is much closer to other forms 
of cognitive activity than it seems. Instead, Gaita claims that there are different forms of 
the cognitive which change with the subject matter. 
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33 Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, pp.186-187. 
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 26
 
Rationality - obedience to logic, conceptual clarity, consistency, and attention to the facts 
- is on Gaita’s view not only essential to good thinking in the narrower sense, but 
indispensable to good thinking within the realm of meaning. Perhaps thinking of any sort 
could hardly be good thinking without them; or would not be thinking. For example, 
conceptions of meaning or morality may have as part of their conceptual structure certain 
kinds of generality which demand that consistency be observed and that similar cases be 
judged similarly. (That is true even when, say, prescriptivism is rejected.) But although 
rationality is a necessary condition of this alternative type of understanding, it is not a 
sufficient condition. This does not mean that we have here a form of irrationalism: ethical 
understanding is not a matter of mere faith, intuition, or romantic insight. Nor does it 
demand a new philosophical theory about the nature of being moved – say, a theory about 
the emotions and their hidden cognitive dimensions.      
 
The realm of meaning does, however, require a certain range of responsiveness and forms 
of engagement. It would be possible for someone to hold, with Wittgenstein, that having 
possession of a range of concepts – perhaps particular concepts beyond the purely 
scientific - is conceptually possible only for creatures that respond and behave in various 
ways like human beings. But such a person might also hold that genuine understanding 
stops where the ways in which we are moved, as individuals with particular characters, 
enter into our concepts. Williams observes that while Wittgenstein largely pursued 
“philosophy which aspired to the utmost generality”35, there is a different sort of 
philosophical enquiry that is more “perspectival” and engages with a “richer and more 
imaginative range of resources”36. 
 
A further clarification may be made. There are some philosophers who suggest that the 
understanding that comes through being moved by the way an idea is presented, by its 
tone or style, is something that relates purely or specially to art such as literature. For 
example, Jennifer Flynn is tempted to the “claim that some philosophically relevant ideas 
                                                 
35 Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, p.210. 
36 Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, p.211. 
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can be articulated only in literary form”37. Literature, she argues, allows us to emotionally 
engage with the characters in stories and so come to have an understanding of “life-
morality”38 - a kind of morality that goes beyond rules of conduct. But Gaita does not 
want to confine the distinctive means of grasping ethical notions or meaning that can 
occur when we are moved to any particular way in which ideas can come. What moves 
us and brings understanding can include arts other than fiction. But it can also include: 
science, individuals (adults or even children), actions, speeches, law, and conversation. It 
is the way we learn from such experiences and encounters that most distinguishes the 
realm of meaning.  And Gaita is not suggesting that what most radically distinguishes the 
cognitive dimensions of this other form of reason from traditional philosophical argument 
is that the former is tailor-made for examining “life-morality” and “the involuntary” 
while the latter is naturally more at home with “conduct-morality”39 (though that may 
also be true). 
 
So Gaita holds that such cognitive activity in the realm of meaning proceeds very 
differently from rational activity as commonly construed. In particular, he calls attention 
to the fact that we make cognitive claims when we are moved or affected by the manner 
in which certain ideas are presented. He points out that the traditional conception of 
reason implies we may extract such ideas from particular forms of language and drop 
them into a minimally emotive and tone-free zone containing inexpressive forms. This is 
a place where we may no be longer moved, affected, or touched. But Gaita claims that 
these conditions are not compatible with this other mode of understanding which is also 
familiar to us. I now need to spell out why Gaita thinks, against the assumption of most 
philosophers, that this form of responsiveness to ideas can do cognitive work capable of 
“disclosing reality”40.  
 
We often think about, and argue over, which descriptive ethical concepts, including the 
ones Williams calls the “thick” concepts, to apply in different situations. Further, we 
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assess ethical ideas and their bearers by means of critical concepts. Sometimes we are 
moved to say that someone or some view is horrible, unjust, disgusting, vile, and 
cowardly; or that it is just, compassionate, loving, beautiful, and so on. These are familiar 
parts of ethical reflection. Gaita, however, draws our attention to another range of critical 
concepts embedded in our language that is not so explicitly moral in tone, and yet which 
apparently identify what he calls forms of the false. Use of these concepts of criticism or 
appraisal seems to give rise to learning something or to seeing “sense where we had not 
before”41. In this range of critical terms we might find: sentimentality, a weakness for 
pathos, shallowness, banality, cliché, superficiality, and showing a tin ear for irony. That 
such talk is present in, or there is the background of, ordinary talk about value should not 
be particularly divisive. It is the suggestion that these are genuine critical concepts that is 
controversial.  
 
Bernard Williams makes a similar observation about ethical practice when he 
distinguishes what is “unintelligible” from what is “phony, mechanical, unengaged, or 
kitsch”42. The way a view is couched may appear to be rigorous, well argued, and 
rational. But, he says, someone’s view may at the same time strike us as “stupid”43 or 
perhaps childish. These writers have in mind ways of talking and criticizing, recognizable 
to us all as well as being a part of a discernable alternative philosophical tradition, which 
“a grown-up, concerned, intelligent person” might say or be interested in44. We certainly 
have a notion that some people are typically sentimental and that others are “worth 
listening to”45. But we tend to forget, downplay, or overlook the fact that these less 
explicitly moral terms are inseparable from ordinary ethical appraisals. People constantly 
respond in terms of what is cheap, shallow, profound, deep, fine, etc. But they also step 
back from their initial thoughts to see whether their first use of these concepts is itself 
(for example) sentimental.     
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Although there clearly is a common practice and tradition of the heart’s understanding – 
or of head and heart “inseparably combined”46 - most philosophers do not take seriously 
this range of critical concepts. These concepts are “more extensive than those to which 
factual thought is answerable”47  but they are (conceptually) internal to an apparently 
genuine area of cognitive thought. An important part of Gaita’s elucidation of the realm 
of meaning is his explanation of the failure of philosophers to take this critical vocabulary 
more seriously.  
 
On Gaita’s view, philosophers commonly make a key assumption about the relation to 
reason of this neglected set of critical concepts. Finding something sentimental (and so 
on) implies, as we said, being moved by the way something presents to us. There is a 
temptation to limit and misconstrue what this can mean. Here is a passage that makes 
clear two possible views of the relation between the critical concepts and reason, or the 
effort to see things as they are. Gaita distinguishes between 
 
sentimentality when it is a cause of our failure to see things as they are and 
when it is a form of that failure. When it is a cause it functions as 
tiredness, drunkenness, haste, and fear do when they distort thought and 
understanding. When it is a form of a failing in thought and understanding, 
then it is a failing in the way that a factual mistake or an invalid inference 
is a failing.48 
 
Gaita acknowledges that what we call sentimentality, like virtually any form of feeling or 
passion, can sometimes function as a cause of cognitive failure. He would not argue at 
this level with Tom Regan’s concern that strong emotion can throw ethical reflection off 
course. Instead, he can emphasize it. Emotional distortion may indeed be associated with 
the widespread prejudice against animals, as well as with indulgent arguments made in 
their defense. Importantly, Gaita would not deny that affective responses can interfere 
                                                 
46 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.85. 
47 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.84. 
48 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.103. 
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with types of understanding that occur beyond the narrowly rational. In both rational 
thought and beyond it, reason may demand a cool head. 
 
When the domain is the narrowly rational, the cognitive error is not specified in terms of 
the emotional or physical states which causally distort it, because those kinds of faults are 
merely contingently related to what is false. That is clearly the case for states like 
tiredness and drunkenness. No one thinks that intoxication is itself a rational error. Some 
drugs may even, if not reliably, enhance understanding and rational creativity.  
 
Similarly, a person might be thought to have a sentimental attitude towards animals. This 
may merely mean, in an older usage perhaps, that they have tender and warm feelings in 
respect of them. A passion for animals may, no doubt, sometimes contingently facilitate 
understanding, as when it leads to painstaking ethological observation and imaginative 
science. But a term like sentimentality is these days often used critically - where the soft 
feelings are thought to play a role in poor rational thinking (ethical or otherwise). 
Although a love for animals may not on its own be derided as sentimental, it is natural to 
say, when the rational reflection is muddled by affection for animals, that sentimentality 
is the cause of the error. Here the error is regarded as a sentimental one precisely and 
only because it was caused by an emotional tendency: warm feelings towards animals.  
 
Gaita’s argument is that this cannot always be said of accusations of sentimentality. 
Someone who simply could not see why we might sometimes call sentimentality an 
essential form of cognitive error, rather than merely pointing to a cause of error, would 
not have grasped the range of its natural critical use or meaning. Gaita wants to 
distinguish these cases where sentimentality is a cause of cognitive failure from cases 
where the apparent sentimentality, banality, or cliché is conceptually integral to the 
cognitive content. 
 
Mawkishness and self-indulgence accompany many discussions about animals. We can 
transpose one of Gaita’s animal illustrations onto a favorite example of those who are 
highly skeptical about animal capabilities. Philosopher, animal trainer, and poet Vicki 
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Hearne re-tells the story of Clever Hans because of what it reveals, in her opinion, about 
cynical attitudes towards animals and their lives. Here is a version of the story.  
 
Convinced after working closely and intimately with Hans that this horse, and horses in 
general, are more intelligent than commonly thought, Herr von Osten taught Hans to tap 
out answers to questions with his hoof. Of course, careful observers were able to establish 
that the horse was not counting or comprehending questions but was rather picking up 
very subtle bodily changes in the unwitting human questioner. Hearne writes that this 
“led to von Osten being denounced as a fraud, and he seems to have died an unhappy 
man, not so much on his own account as on that of the horse in whom he so deeply 
believed” 49. 
 
Suppose (in this adapted example) that von Osten continued to believe that Hans 
genuinely could understand human language even after being soundly discredited. One 
reason that might be given for this, other than his social humiliation, is that he was 
sentimental about his animals and that this was the cause of his gullibility. Hearne’s 
interest in this story is that it shows something similar about those who deploy with “an 
unhealthy air of triumph”50 the Clever Hans fallacy against animal advocates like Peter 
Singer. She implies that it is sometimes their cynicism towards, or contempt for, animals 
which interferes with an ability to respond imaginatively to the expressiveness of animals 
and to those actual modes of life which are more interesting than the original, fraudulent 
claims about a human-cum-equine mathematical ability. Clever Hans, Hearne is arguing, 
has a life marked by an intersubjective understanding and awareness that can be missed, 
as well as exaggerated, under the influence of certain attitudes towards animals.  
 
As we will see in later chapters, the thrust of one part (and only one part) of Hearne’s 
position is that a properly factual understanding of animal behavior and capacities is not a 
matter of inference or evidence, but of imaginative observation of, and interaction with, 
animals. But even though such understanding goes beyond the logical, metaphysical, or 
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scientific sense of knowing what it true, it can still be regarded as understanding of what 
is neutrally (ethically non-evaluative) or ordinarily factual. And that sort of understanding 
is what is causally influenced, for better but maybe mostly for worse, by the affective 
dimension of a sentimental mood or disposition.                
 
In the example so far, the forms of cognitive error involve mistakes or falsehoods that can 
be “specified without reference to…sentimentality”51, in a similar way to errors that can 
be specified without reference to pride, arrogance, tiredness, and so on. The second main 
sense of sentimentality (and so on) is, on Gaita’s view, crucially different. Following an 
example52 of Gaita’s, we can suppose that Herr von Osten treated the death of Hans as 
warranting some of the practices that apply to the human deceased – traditions such as 
erecting a tombstone, lighting candles on the anniversary, wearing the clothing of the 
bereaved, holding a funeral in a church, and so on. Let us imagine von Osten had 
relinquished at last his absurd beliefs in Hans’s intellectual powers. But many will still 
feel compelled to say that von Osten’s understanding of the horse and of the rituals 
warranted by animal death was ruined by his sentimentality. That perception need not be 
in any way dependent on believing that von Osten had mistaken his horse for a person or 
for a metaphysical being with an immortal soul. Gaita writes: “Sentimentality is, in the 
second case, a form of the false, a way that belief can be false, rather than the cause of 
it”.53 Furthermore: “When sentimentality is a form of the false rather than a cause of error 
whose nature can be specified without reference to sentimentality (as factual or logical 
error can be), it need not be the cause of false beliefs, nor be grounded in them”.54 
 
That does not mean that sentimentality as a form (not merely cause) of the false may not 
be informed by rational or factual error, in the sense of the latter becoming a conceptual 
part of the attribution of sentimentality in any one instance. Imagine that von Osten 
looked favorably upon extending the above human rituals of death to Hans in part 
because he retained his false, or rather absurd, belief that the horse had a remarkable 
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intellect, just like a Houyhnhnm from Gulliver’s Travels. If that was a component of his 
sentimentality, then the irrational belief is an essential part of his cognitive failure, not 
only because it is delusional in itself, but because it informs the nature of von Osten’s 
sentimentality, and so gives rise to this second and distinct failure to see things as they 
are. We may sometimes feel that a person who exhibits great warmth towards animals, 
and who makes absurd statements about their superhuman mental powers, is sentimental 
in both the senses described. 
 
People who have a factually or conceptually mistaken view of animal life might not be 
able to understand animals in the realm where the critical concepts like sentimentality or 
banality are forms of cognitive failure, because any judgments about meaning they are 
capable of finding there may be undermined by their misconceptions.  Having possession 
of certain facts and basic conceptual understandings may then be internal to the correct 
deployment of the critical concepts for understanding meaning. Hearne might feel that 
certain people who lack a proper conceptual grasp of the behavior of animals are not able 
to appreciate the reality of animal life, because their perceptions, and not just in the 
extreme cases of Cartesians and modern behaviorists, are not just conceptually mistaken 
but also coarse.  
 
It would be a misreading of the present position to try to retain the identified critical 
categories and to seek a rational grounding for them. Someone, for example, might say 
that the sentimentality of von Osten’s grieving rituals can be demonstrated “objectively”, 
outside those critical concepts themselves. But if that were so, then sentimentality, while 
it might still be thought in some sense objectionable, would not be a form of the false. 
Therefore, it would not be the essential form the cognitive failure takes, but would rather 
be a consequence of a more elementary cognitive mistake which turns on a different set 
of critical concepts. 
 
Others, even some of those attracted to an understanding of heart, might take a less 
sympathetic view of the distinctive set of critical concepts, which, as we have noted, are 
not explicitly “moral”. Our task, they may say, is indeed to distinguish appearance from 
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reality by endeavoring to make sense of the meaning of things. But the way to do that 
(they continue) is to decide upon the correct use of the explicitly ethical and moral 
vocabulary. There is debate, for example, over the extension or precise application of the 
concept of dishonor to animals. Someone who fails to apply it in the right way when they 
are moved to do so will not have really understood the meaning of dishonor or 
degradation. They may, for example, apply the concept too narrowly or too widely to 
animals.  
 
Downplaying the role of the critical terms in ethical understanding, however, fails to 
notice how those concepts govern the application of the more explicitly ethical and moral 
vocabulary, and indeed fails to notice how concepts like sentimentality partly constitute 
our belief that something is cruel, unjust, loving, compassionate, and so on. There are 
many forms and expressions of, for example, compassion towards animals. Some of these 
may be true forms and some may be phony. But the way in which we are moved – the 
form of what we respond to in being moved – is critical in determining the correct 
application of the relevant concepts.  
 
When thought occurs in the realm of meaning, form becomes indispensable to our 
judgments. Hardly anyone, Gaita observes, would fail to “care whether her grief at the 
death of a loved one – a parent, a child, a lover – was genuine rather than self-
indulgent”55. And that means they must be willing to describe or express their grief in 
ways that run a risk of being self-indulgent. What “shows that something is sentimental” 
is in the end, Gaita thinks, “only something that is not”56. “Sentimentality needs to be 
shown up by example”57 he says. He writes: 
 
What it is to overcome sentimentality will therefore be different according 
to whether it occurs in the realm of meaning on the one hand, or in the 
realm of the factual, the logical, or the discursively metaphysical, on the 
other. The realm of meaning in which form cannot be separated from 
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content is essentially, rather than accidentally, vulnerable to 
sentimentality. We can dream of overcoming sentimentality, pathos, and 
banality, but we cannot dream of – because it makes no sense to try to 
conceive of – a realm of meaning in which we are not vulnerable to these 
failings.58  
 
Because this variety of critical error is essentially connected with the detailed way 
concepts related to meaning are presented in literature, art, philosophy, in someone’s life 
or words, and in our own personal beliefs, the content of those concepts, and the form in 
which they are expressed, are inextricably combined. It makes no sense, on this account, 
for a poet or novelist wanting to create works of significance to wish to be coldly 
unresponsive, emotionally unengaged, and tone-deaf. It makes no sense for them to be 
“free of the disturbances of practical and affective human living”59. Nor would it make 
sense for them to hanker after an “especially constructed ideal language”60 or a dead or 
dying language, or to resort (unless perhaps ironically) to formal scientific journal 
writing, to bureaucratic talk, or to the language used in the minutes of a boardroom 
meeting.  
 
By contrast, the work of a mathematician or a scientist may shine in “an idiom in which 
style can be divorced from content”61 and in which propositions are not “intrinsically 
vulnerable to cliché or sentimentality”62 (which is not to say that all science writing is 
lacking in this sort of style or can do without it). Because our “critical concepts play little 
part in most of the natural sciences”, they tend to have the very different function of 
representing “external obstacles to thought” rather like those of “hastiness, the desire to 
protect a pet theory, tiredness or drunkenness”, as opposed to “ailments to which thought 
is intrinsically vulnerable”63.  
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About artists such as poets, Gaita says: 
 
Even more fiercely than scientists, they may long to be free of 
sentimentality and similar vices, but for a poet to long to be free of her 
vulnerability to them is for her to long to be free of the only idiom in 
which she can write poetry. The life that poetry sustains in language is life 
that is always threatened by our disposition to sentimentality, to cliché, to 
pathos, and so on.64 
 
The cost of avoiding the very possibility of banal material, going instead for material that 
is unengaging or mechanical, is relinquishing altogether the opportunity of expressing 
forms of meaning that can be taken seriously. And it applies as much to anyone trying to 
appreciate or express meaning as it does to artists who wish to embody it in their art. 
When sentimentality is a form of cognitive failure, Gaita observes, we cannot intelligibly 
say, “‘I know it’s sentimental, but that doesn’t matter, I just want to know whether it’s 
true or false’”65.  
 
Again, it might be thought that it is true that we learn when we are moved by finding 
some things compassionate or loving, but that the special critical concepts like 
sentimentality play only a peripheral role in many of our most important ethical 
responses. A Humean or virtue ethicist, for example, might ask: if we have the idea, say, 
that torturing children is wrong, does it help to know that it can be given “deep” and 
unsentimental formulations? Don’t we already have an adequate sense of its horror and 
its injustice? This thought may even go with the concession that we can turn to such 
critical concepts to make sense of some less obvious or private ethical matters.  
 
Two points can be made in reply to this thought. One is that there are forms which 
describe even clearly horrific (or clearly wonderful) things in sentimental ways, and 
forms which describe them in justly powerful ways. In all such cases, they possess 
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content inseparable from their forms (Gaita says that Eichmann was guilty not just of evil 
but of “grotesque sentimentality”66). Because they are not merely rhetorical expressions 
or embellishments but rather possess intrinsic content, they may enrich, when they are 
powerful, our understanding even of notions we would never dream of denying. The 
other point is that understanding in the realm of meaning can depend upon many details, 
and upon the precise meaning of even plainly horrible or good subject matter. As will be 
seen, there is much of an ethical but not strictly moral sort that fills in the background of 
our thinking. Our understanding of what it is to be a “human being” may significantly 
inform our understanding of what it means to torture them. That understanding may, for 
example, depend upon love that has the right shape, which in turn depends upon “certain 
ways and tones of speaking of what we love”67. An understanding even of plainly wicked 
or perfectly good things turns, at a deep level, on concepts such as sentimentality.  
 
In this chapter I have outlined some of Gaita’s reasons for believing that thinking about 
meaning of the sort that depends upon how we are moved, is a genuine kind of cognitive 
activity capable of disclosing reality and distinguishing appearance from reality. 
Reasoning, arguing, and reflecting in this manner demands attention to a familiar but 
richer and more extensive critical vocabulary than we use when we are evaluating the 
logic or truth of an argument.  
                                                 
66 Good and Evil, p.306. 
67 A Common Humanity, p.26. 
 38
 
Chapter 2 : Realm of Meaning Part 2.  
 
Being properly moved, Gaita argues, “depends on the nature of what we attend to and on 
the quality of our attention”1. The critical concepts and responses that make up our 
understanding when we are fittingly moved depend upon two things. One is that we are 
creatures of flesh and blood who are capable of “affective human living”2 and of 
acquiring certain characters and life experience. The other is that we live in cultures 
which have natural languages and histories. It is important to our understanding that parts 
of these languages and histories – such as our art - can either be nourishing and appear 
“alive to us”3 or can become tired and “go dead on us”4.  
 
The kind of understanding that is responsive to life relies upon “content which often 
cannot be separated from its form and whose form cannot be separated from the 
contingencies that have nourished particular cultures, particular forms of living and 
particular natural languages”5. Both our individual responses and the language available 
to us are “vulnerable to our laziness, our sentimentality, our banality and our weariness of 
spirit” and so are always at risk of “becoming weak and sometimes dying”6.  
 
The sense we make of ourselves and the world is in crucial part 
determined by the art and culture of peoples – by art and culture which is 
steeped in, even when it is not expressed in, a natural language, rich in 
historical resonance, shaped by and shaping the life of a people.7    
 
In this chapter, I will go further into the nature of understanding in Gaita’s “realm of 
meaning”.            
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Philosophers are familiar with the kind of impersonal ethical thinking modeled on an 
Archimedean point, a view from nowhere, or an impartial observer. These metaphors 
imply an idealized thinker “stripped of any particular form of living”8. Such models of 
reflection purport to reveal reality, or the truth, or what is reasonable and justifiable, or 
the world as it is. But, Gaita thinks, “world” is a “word with many meanings”9; as are 
words like reality, truth, reason, and objectivity. Put simply, there are different legitimate 
ways of understanding and seeing things as they are. In the ethical realm, thought is 
“answerable to critical categories which are conditioned by the contingencies of 
particular ways of living and being”10. And this means, he says, that our thinking must be 
“inescapably in media res, in the thick of things”11. Our thinking in this way is not just 
causally or contingently aided or distorted by our personal experiences of being moved. 
But this does not mean that grasping meaning is simply to “feel rightly about the facts”12. 
Nor is reflecting on meaning   
 
a neutral exercise in linguistic or conceptual analysis. It is a reflection on 
how we live our life with this part of language, by which I mean it depends 
on how the language we use to speak about this might become alive to us, 
in its creative use, in story or poetry, in theatre or film. Here we often 
learn, or see sense where we had not before, when we are moved.13                                 
 
Some contemporary philosophers agree that ordinary ethical thought and understanding - 
and certainly ethical thought and understanding when it is at its cognitive best and 
deepest - has an essential personal character. For example, Bernard Williams believes 
ethical ideas “should sound right” and “should speak in a real voice”14. The truthful 
presentation of these ideas demands attention to the style of one’s own words. Williams 
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is critical of a great deal of philosophy for being “one-eared” about the way philosophical 
writing and its ideas are expressed: 
 
We encourage, rightly, a concern with whether it is true (and accurate, and 
so on), but less with whether it rings true. A good question, at least to start 
from, is whether what one has written is something that a grown-up, 
concerned, intelligent person might say to another about these subjects.15             
 
Cora Diamond also thinks good ethical thought, and hence good moral philosophy, is tied 
to language that is truly expressive and resonant. Such language is not to be treated as 
merely “emotive” simply because it requires a developed human sensibility and 
responsiveness to life, as we find, for example, in reading literature well: 
 
‘Mistrust of language’ is a reluctance to see all that is involved in using it 
well, responding well to it, meeting it well, reluctance to see what kind of 
failure it is to use it badly. How do our words, thoughts, descriptions, 
philosophical styles let us down or let others down? How do they, used at 
full stretch – and in what spirit or spirits – illuminate?16  
 
According to these philosophers, the rejection of language used “at full stretch”, and of 
those (linguistic or perhaps non-linguistic) forms which have any chance of “ringing 
true”, necessarily undermines ethical understanding.  
 
Some will say that judgments are not objective if they are substantially based in the 
human point of view rather than aiming for the point of view of the universe. The 
objection is often made by those decrying the arrogant placing of human concerns and 
responses at the centre of judgments about value. In this vicinity there is sometimes, as 
Bernard Williams identifies, the philosophical mistake of thinking that the idea of the 
point of view of the universe is intelligible:       
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If there is no such thing as the cosmic point of view, if the idea of the 
absolute importance of things in the scheme of things is an illusion, a relic 
of a world not yet thoroughly disenchanted, then there is no other point of 
view except ours in which our activities can have or lack significance.17  
 
Others, however, look to the occupation of the point of view of the universe as simply a 
model for good thinking rather than (unintelligibly) as a coherent if contingently out of 
reach metaphysical possibility. In each of these cases there is a suspicion of some aspect 
of the human standpoint.  But the problem here is to determine whether that standpoint is 
not, after all, essential to the attempt to make sense of things. Gaita, for example, thinks 
that when we are encouraged to detach from aspects of our human engagement and to 
take seriously the 
 
standpoint of the universe, from where we seem like ‘specks of dust’, it is 
impossible to hear voices that are locally inflected as any voice must be if 
it is to reveal to our compassion the meaning of what we do and suffer. 
The conclusion should not be that therefore nothing matters objectively. It 
should be that the concept of something mattering, of something having 
meaning, can have no application from the point of view of the universe. 
From there, neither the assertion nor the denial that anything matters 
makes sense.18     
 
For Williams, human values “are not just values that we have, but values that express our 
humanity, and to study them is to study what we value inasmuch as we are what we are, 
that is to say, human beings”19.  
 
The philosophers we have been talking about are committed to a kind of 
anthropocentrism in ethical thinking, in the sense that such thinking needs to occur in 
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media res, with the richer resources of full human engagement at its disposal. Hence 
there is no point in mitigating our best efforts at thinking well “with an empty ‘from our, 
human, point of view’”20, for there is no other position from which we can think well 
about this subject matter. It must, then, be stressed that this kind of anthropocentrism is 
not a gross failure of objectivity or of clear-headed reflection. On the contrary, the view 
these philosophers have is that it is the only way to honor our own and philosophy’s 
interest in perceiving truly. Furthermore, this position does not a priori commit anyone to 
holding particular values which might be thought to express human arrogance. 
 
Yet although it is true that the humanly-engaged model of good thinking does not have 
strictly logical consequences for the values “we” have, Williams observes that it is 
“unsurprising that this ‘we’ often shows up within the content of our values”21. His 
general position is reflected in Gaita’s question, “Are we therefore at the centre of the 
universe?”, and his given answer that while there is “no flat answer to that”, we human 
beings are yet “precious as nothing else we know in nature”22.  
 
Moreover, and just as controversially, the contention that we need a fully human model 
of good thinking in the realm of meaning is naturally allied to values which are in a 
peculiar manner also anthropomorphic. That suggestion will also cause alarm in those 
who reject what Williams calls “the human prejudice”. The special sense in which our 
language, used at full stretch and licensed to ring true, has an anthropomorphic element – 
even sometimes when extended to animal life – will be explored in later chapters.  
 
Should we say that thinking with the extended vocabulary of critical concepts is an 
essentially personal or essentially impersonal form of thought? Gaita recommends we 
“resist saying flatly that thought about value is personal or impersonal”23. It has elements 
of both, and they are not always separate but internally related. Together they show how 
                                                 
20 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.206. 
21 Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, p.138. 
22 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.206 
23 A Common Humanity, p.258. 
 43
this kind of thought, and the way it is “rightly related to what makes it true”24, differs 
from thought that is characterized by its impersonal distance from what affects us as the 
creatures we are.  
 
We have already distinguished between the distinctive ways we can be (rightly or 
wrongly) moved and states or emotions which can hinder thought and reflection. In the 
latter category are such states as drunkenness and tiredness. But even more importantly, 
on Gaita’s account, good thinking is disciplined and impersonal precisely because it is 
inseparable from the proper use of the critical concepts that go into the various ways 
human beings can be engaged and moved. He insists that the critical concepts can be 
further deployed when we step back to examine whether we were rightly moved in 
judging something to be sentimental or banal. Disciplined reflection requires an ability to 
step back and reappraise what moves us by the lights of the critical concepts.     
  
Strangely enough, the manner in which this form of thought is impersonal is thus 
thoroughly informed by its equally personal nature. That is why Gaita says we “learn 
from what moves us because its epistemic authority is inseparable from the fact it moves 
us”25. In an early paper called “Moral Experts”, Peter Singer claims there is such a thing 
as expertise in moral reflection, and that philosophers are “in general, better suited to 
arrive at the right, or soundly based, moral conclusions than non-philosophers”26. Moral 
expertise in these terms entails a kind of impersonality regarded by Gaita as eminently 
suitable for certain investigations but not for moral reflection. In the domain of moral 
reflection, Gaita says, there can be “no experts in it, no whizz kids and no Nobel 
Laureates”27 - even though the discursive methods of philosophy as a discipline contain 
elements of the more impersonal forms of understanding which may sometimes be 
classified as “expertise”. According to Singer’s claim, moral understanding could in 
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principle reduce to a “depository of propositions in our heads which God could have put 
there ‘in a flash’”28. Gaita notes how odd it is to believe we can 
 
delegate thought about it to an expert, asking her to deliver a conclusion, 
or even the main options, no later than Monday morning. We can no more 
do this than we can delegate thought about our moral dilemmas to an 
expert ethicist, with the same request, that she have a range of options, no 
later than first thing Monday morning. These scenarios are a parody of 
what it is to think seriously about such matters.29   
 
Singer might reply that one cannot understand a mathematical problem without knowing 
the steps in the solution, and that ethical problems are practical problems which at the end 
of the day require a personal decision – but that, nevertheless, a range of options can be 
provided in principle by Monday morning, enclosed with a step by step account of ethical 
arguments, which may then be assessed by the decision maker and rejected or accepted 
on rational grounds. But this reply is still inadequate because it ignores the element of 
ethical thought that is characterized by our capacity to be critically moved and to reflect 
on the way we are moved. In this way, it is divorced from our thinking as individual 
thinkers who bring to bear on our reflection our experiences, histories, cultural learning, 
and affective powers. That is why we sometimes feel that ethical thought is “essentially 
personal”30 and requires, not delegation to experts, but a unique form of responsibility. 
 
Because of the interdependent impersonal and personal nature of thought about meaning, 
Gaita prefers to call the development in the individual of such understanding lucidity. 
Lucidity requires that we let an encounter or experience speak to us. It is related to the 
concepts of wisdom, depth in understanding, and “disciplined sobriety”31. This 
terminology, he believes, more naturally characterizes the sort of understanding at issue, 
and distinguishes it from “knowledge of the kind that can make one knowledgeable and 
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possibly an expert”32. It does not distance itself from the need for individual response, but 
at the same time it brings with it “metaphors of submission and obedience which have 
been so fundamental to our characterization of a concern for truth”33 . It implies 
answerability to the critical concepts in a region where style cannot be divorced from 
content34 and where there is an effort to see things as they are.   
 
Lucidity and sobriety, Gaita continues, imply being able to respond to a call to 
seriousness35, and that implies being able to stand personally behind our words and so 
seriously to mean them36. Gaita explains this thought by imagining someone addressing 
us “in a genuine human interchange”37 and with words and in a spirit like the following: 
“‘Come now, are you serious? Stop thinking in clichés. Speak for yourself. Can I take 
you seriously? Think about what you are saying!’ and so on”38. This is not simply an 
address to a person as a rational agent39, or an address that philosophers like Singer 
would (officially) recognize as an essential part of serious ethical thinking and 
understanding. Instead, it involves the demand that in a certain sense we can be “present 
in our speech”40 and be possessed of a “vital responsiveness”41 in reflecting upon and 
discussing meaning. 
 
A further way of elucidating this type of understanding is Gaita’s distinction between 
truth and truthfulness. Lucid thought involves the avoidance of falsehood and (in a 
certain sense defined by its critical character) the pursuit of truth; but not all forms of 
truth are constituted by truthfulness. Only the latter concept – truth as it is constituted by 
truthfulness - is tied to the disciplined and vital responsiveness we have been examining. 
Gaita writes: 
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Truth and truthfulness are inseparable in the conceptual structure of 
sentimentality, as they are in the structure of most of the critical concepts 
with which we assess our thought about the states of the inner life. This 
shows itself in the way authenticity and integrity are often invoked as 
concepts which partly characterize the forms of thinking well rather than 
the names of virtues which help us to think well. Clearly this is not so for 
all forms of thinking. It seems not to be in physics. Truthfulness is 
important there, of course, but as a means of securing and protecting truth. 
It is not intrinsic to the conception of truth that is sought and protected.42 
 
Lucidity and truthfulness are inseparable from the form or spirit of someone’s speech and 
actions. That is because they are inseparable from a person’s intimacy with the critical 
concepts. In Eichmann, Gaita argues, such thought was spectacularly absent. Eichmann 
was so enamored of “winged words” that he was “incapable of a lucid response to the 
meaning of his death”43. The problem with his thought is not that he was inattentive to 
the facts44. The problem was he was “not sufficiently present to be able seriously to say 
anything”45, because he had no sense of the “metaphors of obedience, attunement, and 
correspondence to reality, which are so fundamental to any conception of serious 
inquiry”46.  
 
But was not Eichmann passionate about the way noble words and ideas about meaning 
moved him? And, furthermore, doesn’t that show the dangers of not subjecting our 
responses to external rational critique? But the problem in Eichmann’s case, Gaita is 
saying, is that he “was not interested in saying anything true”47. He lacked the history, 
character, and discipline that would enable him to care about the worth of his words and 
to subject them to the only kind of impersonal scrutiny suitable for questions of this kind. 
So while Eichmann was in a sense humanly engaged, and was indeed moved in wonder 
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by his sense of the “depth” of the Nazi project, his pervasive “thoughtlessness”48 meant 
he was simply unable to reflect critically in the realm of meaning. The process of critical 
reflection necessarily involves, Gaita thinks, a kind of “un-selfing”, and overcoming of 
those “egocentric fantasies”49 which result from undisciplined submission to secondhand 
opinion and cliché50. Other committed Nazis may not have possessed Eichmann’s 
profound thoughtlessness and lack of integrity. Their failure of lucidity is therefore both 
similar and different. For despite their personal integration and passion for sobriety, they 
could hardly achieve lucidity when they mistook the banality and hollowness of their 
horrific project for something deep and fine. Like Eichmann, they suffered from views 
which were false because “grotesquely sentimental”51.  
 
Some may want to confine the notion of the inseparability of form and content to art, 
especially to literature. Gaita does not want to make any such restrictions upon the way 
ideas in the realm of meaning may present to us. Indeed, it is a fundamental part of his 
work that we do not think alone, even as solitary thinkers immersed in literature. Instead 
we “often learn by being moved by what others say and do”52. The example of others 
does not present us merely with arguments and energy but with a “spirit” in action53 and a 
presence, demeanor, or even style of living, all of which that are not “separable from 
what they say”54. In the following passage Gaita explains why and how he thinks the 
example of other human beings is so important to the achievement of a lucid ethical 
understanding: 
 
Something speaks to us insofar as we hear in it the disciplined 
individuality of its speaker. But, of course, in rising to that, in responding 
to what moves me, I must acknowledge and submit to the same 
individualizing disciplines which made the other authoritatively present in 
her words or deeds and which gave her a distinctive voice…To put the 
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point in the idiom of Martin Buber, the philosopher who was one of the 
first to see this and who has been much misunderstood: in responding to 
what moves me, I must make myself I to someone’s Thou.55     
 
So we learn in a public and dialogical situation from who others are, what they say, and 
how they say it, because we can respond to them in the same critical and personal 
manner. But even when we are simply reflecting upon what we have read or encountered 
as individuals, our thought may be shaped by our tradition and “by those we respect and 
admire”56. The fact that we learn from individuals whose views we judge, from our own 
critical perspective, to carry weight and authority is a further and vital dimension of the 
way our thinking must be humanly involved. There is, in Gaita’s opinion, a necessary 
“connection between the reality of the moral and its being made manifest in authoritative 
speech and disclosure”57. If it were the case that we did not learn from real and living 
human examples, then our reflection upon value would lack the form and the seriousness 
it has. Even in limpid, solitary, hermetic reflection, then, we do not think entirely alone. 
 
We do not only learn when we are moved by passive observation of the lives and words 
of other human beings. On the contrary, Gaita believes, we also learn from the sort of 
serious and authentic conversation touched on above, in which the conversational 
partners make themselves present to one another as “I to the other’s Thou”. Such 
conversation requires treating the other person not just as a rational agent or as a source 
of knowledge, but as someone capable of committed mutual exploration of what might 
ring true. This sort of conversation has a particular character and is registered in our 
responses to it, and in our “deep need of lucidity”58: 
 
Who would not be glad to be complimented as someone others could 
really talk to, not in the sense of being a sought-after confidant, but in the 
sense we express when we exclaim, ‘At last! Someone to talk to!’… 
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 The joy of ‘finding someone to talk to’ is the joy of conversation in which 
its participants speak as individuals from their own experiences, having, as 
Kierkegaard put it, ‘lived their own lives and nobody else’s’. Each has 
something to say in a sense that implies that each has found the voice in 
which to say it. The pleasure of such conversation is not the pleasure we 
often find in novelty or in hearing something we had never heard before. It 
is especially wrong to think of scintillating personalities, bent on 
distinguishing themselves. One gets more of the hang of it if one thinks of 
the times when someone says that, though she had heard the words many 
times before, it was only when so-and-so spoke to her that she sat up and 
listened and for the first time understood what was meant. Such 
experiences can be transforming, but the concepts we need to explain why 
are quite different from those that articulate the pleasure of hearing new 
theories, or the charm and power of charismatic personalities.59       
 
The indispensable conversational aspect of our critical thinking about meaning has led 
Gaita to suggest a “dialogical metaphor” in place of Iris Murdoch’s metaphor of vision in 
moral philosophy. He says that rather than “saying that we see a (moral) situation I would 
prefer to say that we let it speak to us and are claimed in response”60. Whereas we know 
we have achieved understanding and can often stop seeking it when we have seen 
something or have a sound rational argument for it – usually in “meaning-free zones”61 - 
ethical understanding seems to require on-going thought and active engagement: 
 
F.R. Leavis said that the form of a critical judgment of a poem of novel is 
‘It is so, isn’t it?’ and the form of response to it is ‘Yes, but…’ It’s a fine 
way of characterizing the essentially conversational nature of judgments in 
the realm of meaning, their objectivity as well as their necessary 
incompleteness. Always, it is assumed, the text would be before the 
conversationalists, and the never-ending ‘Yes, but…’ requires that one 
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remain open to it, in a responsiveness that is both vital and disciplined by 
the critical concepts constitutive of thought in the realm of meaning. That 
is why Leavis was right to resist philosophers who said it should be 
possible, a priori, to list the criteria that distinguish good from bad critical 
responses. It is no different in life. We cannot tell in advance what is 
possible in the realms of meaning, because we cannot say what vital 
responsiveness, disciplined by and disciplining a language ‘used at full 
stretch’, will reveal to us.62    
  
Our ethical understanding might be seen as “necessarily provisional”63 because it always 
remains subject to critical reflection molded by our being in the “midst of life”64. Our 
growing experience, our character, our conversational partners, and so on, may affect our 
sense of what is sentimental and what is not. Furthermore, our understanding can wax 
and wane65 in a way that is quite distinctive, because of its dependency on our responsive 
engagement at a personal level, and also its dependency on the level of our access to rich 
forms of meaning in cultures which inform, nourish, and stimulate thought.  
 
Our culture – its people, its natural languages, its art, its practices, its norms, its 
institutions, and so on – can present and embody ideas about meaning in many ways. 
These manifold cultural forms can be resounding or lifeless. Gaita thinks that without 
access to these vibrant and serious forms, along with a language to make them come 
alive, we will lack the resources that are needed to develop a rich inner life. This inner 
life 
 
as we mean it when we say that some people have rich and others 
impoverished inner lives – is not a discovery which a sophisticated culture 
has made possible for us. Its very existence is a cultural achievement. It is 
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constituted by our culturally mediated, reflective responses to the defining 
facts of the human condition.66  
 
Gaita is here distinguishing between the way, say, a scientifically sophisticated culture 
gives us access to new discoveries and the way culture can embody ideas about meaning. 
In the case of scientific discoveries, the particular detailed form of the culture is 
immaterial to the nature of the new information it generates. The production of new 
knowledge of this kind could happen, in principle, in a decaying culture concerned 
mainly with power or technology or in a lively culture interested in scientific truth for its 
own sake. But as we have seen, discoveries or ideas in the realm of meaning depend 
crucially upon the way they are presented. For Gaita, our “thoughts must remain in a 
conceptual space which is conditioned by a natural language, rich in phrases and 
descriptions which come to us from, and which resonate against, that in our history – 
most notably our art – whose content cannot be separated from its style”67.  
 
If a culture was to lose interest in the meaning of the human condition, and in doing so 
lost a language - or “living speech”68 - which could express that meaning, then even if an 
individual in that culture were to stumble across the literary classics (for example), it 
would be difficult or impossible for her to read into them the seriousness they can 
possess. For she would lack a language and a form of life in which that possible meaning 
can be discussed and can movingly resonate. Gaita’s view does not imply that there 
cannot be radical ethical (and artistic) thinkers – thinking about human life, and animals 
and nature too - in a culture which does not understand their views and might even mock 
them. Nor does it mean that individuals may not rediscover the vitality of culturally lost 
or fading meanings in older forms (like works of literature, past practices and 
communities, etc.).       
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Individuals are “dialogically rooted in a particular culture”69. Their culture may gift70 to 
them the living language with its “rich associations”71, and compelling examples, needed 
to make sense of life. But remaining lucid in our thought requires a special sort of 
responsibility and trust that is ours alone to meet. In a sense, the deepest values cannot be 
taught (as can mathematics), only shown – but they can be shown “only to those who 
have eyes to see”72. Although understanding is something we find in a culture and in 
common with others, taking responsibility depends on a degree of trust in our own 
responses, on a personal engagement, and on “the quality of our attention”73:  
 
Rising to the requirement to be lucid about one’s inner life is an effort to 
be objective whose success depends upon the realization of a distinctive 
individuality. It is the kind of individuality we refer to when we say that 
each human being is a unique perspective on the world. Though it might 
seem paradoxical at first, all efforts to see our inner lives ‘as they are’, 
rather than as we would wish them to be, or as they appear from a limited 
or distorted perspective, require thought to be disciplined by critical 
concepts that individualize the thinker. That lies behind our meaning when 
we say that someone has ‘something to say’ (and we don’t mean that they 
have a new theory to propound or new facts to report), that they have 
‘found their voice’, that they speak from an authority that is inseparable 
from the fact that they have lived their own life and no one else’s.74      
 
Clearly, as Aristotle thought, this sort of understanding, or wisdom, is an ongoing task 
and requires life experience. It is achieved only in the mature or adult stage of a life and it 
requires the gradual development of an “inner life” which is “morally conditioned”75 and 
more broadly characterized by reflection upon, as Gaita puts it, the real and the 
                                                 
69 Good and Evil, p.266. 
70 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.190. 
71 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.190. 
72 A Common Humanity, p.231. 
73 Good and Evil, p.269. 
74 A Common Humanity, p.257. 
75 A Common Humanity, p.53. 
 53
counterfeit. He has called this process a “historically achieved individuality”76 and an 
“individually achieved lucidity”77. Such critical reflection transforms our understanding 
of the inner life of humans – including “certain virtues or affective responses – love, 
courage, grief, kindness, and so on” 78 - by showing how they are informed by the critical 
categories. This is so even in the so-called virtuous peasant. This peasant’s 
“thoughtfulness, wisdom and lucidity”, though not reflective or articulate, is still (as it 
was not in the case of Eichmann) answerable to the range of “critical concepts [which] 
demand the kind of individuality that a peasant in an unreflective, stable culture achieves 
in her lucidity”79. 
 
Indeed, Gaita thinks that such understanding appears to be capable of deepening without 
limit80. But in what way, we might ask, is lucidity capable of “ever deepening 
responses”81 to meaning? One such way is that, as Gaita says, we may become 
convinced, by the different forms in which they arrive, that ideas or concepts which once 
meant little or nothing to us have power and reality. Or we may be presented with 
meaning-concepts which are new to us and even quite new in our culture.  
 
Another way in which our understanding may deepen without limit is somewhat 
differently related to the inseparable connection between form and content. Take, for 
example, the suggestion that every human being without exception is “unique and 
irreplaceable”. Gaita writes that he became convinced of the equal humanity of severely 
retarded psychiatric patients by witnessing the uncondescending and pure love of a nun in 
a psychiatric hospital toward them. The encounter caused Gaita to embrace a conception 
of human life which he had hitherto believed more in his head than in his heart. This is 
one kind of deepening of the understanding. By coming to see human beings as 
unconditionally precious, Gaita possessed an utterly transformed understanding of human 
life. But as we have seen, there are potentially unlimited ways of embodying, say, the 
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notion that human beings are unique and irreplaceable in literature, film, conversation, in 
the example of others, and so on. And although responding with assent to fine forms of 
this idea in the realm of meaning need not introduce to us a completely new concept, we 
still have in these various fine presentations a content which cannot be separated from the 
precise detail of the form in which it is expressed. This seems to be a way in which 
imaginative forms that are new to us – such as reading James Joyce’s Ulysses for the first 
time - can enrich and deepen our understanding, seemingly without limit, but (in a sense) 
without quite transforming our view that, in this case, human beings are unique and 
irreplaceable. That is not in the same way possible with the presentation in varied forms 
of ideas that exist in meaning-free zones. Once we have a full understanding of the 
physics of Einstein’s famous equation, our understanding of E=mc2 is not advanced by 
engaging teachers and powerful texts. Our appreciation of the mystery and wonder of the 
universe as revealed by Einstein’s laws is a different matter. 
 
In one sense, it does not seem to matter if, say, my belief in the uniqueness and 
irreplaceability of the severely retarded is informed by different (nonsentimental) 
examples of this conception compared to someone else’s. It does not appear to be the 
case that the meaning of such conceptions, though dependent on culture, can only be 
grasped through their presence in an exclusive set of forms or styles. If that were true, we 
could not be said to share an understanding about human life - the forms from which we 
learn are too many and various and do not always overlap. The point is that 
understanding is necessarily connected to the possibility of unsentimental forms. And 
even when we are moved directly in the face of a real life event, it matters to our 
reflection that we are not being sentimental or callow, and so it must be possible for that 
to be made clear to us in some authoritative form or other. The choices we make in 
selecting examples or words to explain our sense of things will determine whether or not 
that sense is sentimental. If our claim that “all human beings are unique and 
irreplaceable” is ultimately sentimental, then the content of that claim will not contain a 
genuine sense of human preciousness.   
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It also seems plausible to say that one person who shares with another a sense of the 
meaning of something may yet have a comparatively richer and even deeper 
understanding of it, in virtue of having been moved in critical response by a greater range 
and depth of examples - in art, in conversation, and so on. On the other hand, a shared 
understanding could not be realized if two people disagreed on all or most of the 
examples which they claimed gave depth to their sense of value. If they did disagree in 
that way, then, because of the inseparability of form and content, they would each 
necessarily believe something different. 
  
Before we finish this chapter, it is important to note that, just as the “realm of meaning” 
is not isolated from other forms of thinking such as logic and empirical understanding, 
neither is it a new technical concept or philosophical theory about the nature of thinking 
in ethics. Instead, what Gaita calls the “realm of meaning” is a result of following 
Wittgenstein’s advice and looking at the relevant phenomenon (in this case ethical 
thought) to see what is there, rather than imposing preconceptions upon it or distorting it 
through theorizing. (Of course, this methodology does not guarantee that the outcome 
will be right.) Gaita’s position does not, for example, attempt to introduce theories or 
controversial premises about the nature of concepts like emotion, form, and tone.  
 
It might be helpful in this context to contrast, briefly, Gaita’s approach with that of 
Martha Nussbaum who, like Gaita, is trying to find the right relation between thought and 
feeling in serious ethical thought. In Upheavals of Thought: the Intelligence of the 
Emotions, Nussbaum claims that, notwithstanding their “kinetic and affective aspect”82, 
emotions are essentially propositions or cognitions about what has genuine importance or 
salience. In experiencing love, grief, compassion, joy, wonder, and so on, we can value 
“things aright”83 and in a way that is “bound by the world”84. Emotions, she believes, do 
not in essence have constituent non-cognitive elements. For example, she thinks that the 
emotion of grief is in fact not partly constituted, even in a family-resemblance manner, by 
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certain expressive features and bodily inflections (like weeping). That is because, she 
says, it is only inconstantly correlated with them. Rather, grief (etc.) is a peculiar kind of 
intelligent perception, with essentially propositional content, which is aimed at 
distinguishing appearance from reality.  
 
One drawback of Nussbaum’s theory about the intelligence of the emotions lies in its 
controversial, and quite possible mistaken, view of conceptual understanding of 
“subjective” states. (The topic of conceptual understanding regarding expressive behavior 
will be addressed in chapter 6.) Apart from that, a theory like hers is not necessary for 
describing the way feeling and emotion conceptually condition the cognitive dimension 
of the realm of meaning. For while the application of the critical concepts depends upon 
the possibility of our being moved, it does not depend upon a theory about the essential 
“propositional” content of emotions per se. 
 
Nussbaum also addresses the issue of the inseparability of form and content in forms 
which are expressive. She is certain that Mahler’s belief was right that in music, “content 
and form are indissolubly blended”85; and she agrees with Helen Vendler that “nothing 
counts as literary criticism if the criticism would be just as true of paraphrase”86. The 
cognitive content is lost or distorted when the form, say a musical form, is translated 
from a non-linguistic to a linguistic presentation. Thus, the emotion of devastating grief 
at the loss of a child present in Mahler’s Kindertotenlieder (music set to words of 
Ruckert) has a cognitive content (the preciousness of children perhaps) that would be 
altered or lost if all we had of that work were the Ruckert poems on child mortality, or 
worse, a mere outline or summary of what they are about. The reason content cannot be 
extracted from form in this way, she argues, is that in artistic forms and elsewhere, 
emotions (with their true or false cognitive content) are embedded in the “symbolic 
structure”87 of the medium. 
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Gaita would of course agree that the form and content in the Mahler songs are 
inseparably combined. He thinks that works such as this have a truthful (or false) tone 
and resonance partly in virtue of their form. But Gaita’s observation is that what most 
importantly makes the cognitive content inseparable from the form in a work like 
Mahler’s Kindertotenlieder is that we can be moved to regard it as profound rather than 
sentimental. The cognitive content may be partly determined by the fact that the emotion-
content is embedded in a symbolic structure or musical medium. But more significantly, 
the cognitive content is determined by the critical concepts which are responses to the 
form of a work. These are critical responses that determine the nature of the work’s tone.    
 
The notion of “tone” is not the result of theory or postulation. Rather, the concept of the 
resonance or the tone which can belong to a form is mutually determined by the 
possibility of our responding to it as sentimental, banal, hollow, or phony, and by the 
kinds of forms which we typically respond to in these various ways. As we have seen, 
these forms include art and the moving behavior of other people. And it is these critical 
responses that tell us whether the tone of such things speaks to us rightly or whether it 
presents only a false semblance of reality, say, because it is mawkish. 
 
That is the essential reason why, for example, the Mahler work cannot be re-packaged or 
stripped back without losing or altering its content and its truthfulness. Thus, we might 
well think that Mahler’s song cycle deepens our understanding of the preciousness of 
children, and connected with that, the irreplaceability of human beings. And we might 
feel that the Ruckert poems, which give the music its setting and context, are, compared 
to the music, somewhat sentimental (or the reverse). Yet these various forms have the 
kind of cognitive content that they do only because we can assess them, not in a tone-free 
zone, but in a zone that exists only in virtue of a rich language, artistic tradition, and 
culture, a zone that invites the kind of responsiveness that is disciplined by critical 
concepts like sentimentality.           
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Chapter 3 Ethical Theory and Human Nature   
 
The lucidity which depends on an ever-deepening and critical responsiveness to what is 
important characterizes a particular kind of ethical understanding. Obviously there are 
other kinds of lucid thinking, the nature of which varies with the subject matter. But lucid 
thinking in this particular sense is associated with a certain relation between the human 
condition, language, and culture. 
 
Clearly, the character of the connection between human nature and ethical understanding 
is disputed. In this chapter I shall look at what some other prominent contemporary 
thinkers on animals and humans make of this connection, and at how they part company 
with Gaita’s idea of a realm of meaning.  
 
Tom Regan’s major work on animals, The Case for Animal Rights, argues that all 
humans, and all nonhuman mammals, have equal “inherent value” and are equally rights-
holders. Regan arrives at this position by employing a particular understanding of the 
nature of ethical argument. He thinks good ethical thinking requires the development of 
theories and principles which make use of our ordinary “intuitions”. By “intuitions”, 
Regan does not mean either gut reactions (pre-reflective intuitions) or a special cognitive 
faculty. He simply means our “reflective” or “considered beliefs”1. The principles or 
theories we construct must be consistent with a broad range of reflective beliefs. But 
equally, Regan says, our reflective judgments are subject to alteration by the moral 
principles or theories we construct with the help of the criteria of an ideal moral 
judgment. A single reflective response or belief, no matter how strong, may not be 
enough to upset a well grounded theory or principle of action.  
 
Regan advances a form of “reflective equilibrium”2, or coherentism, for developing or 
critiquing ethical judgments. According to Regan, theories are to be assessed by how well 
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they “systematize our considered beliefs”3. Indeed, the model Regan looks to is the 
scientific method4 - except that in ethics, the data are our considered intuitions and 
beliefs. In the spirit of scientific theorizing, Regan says that we cannot always be certain 
that the principles we construct are true or valid5, not (apparently) because the 
methodology is suspect, but because we can make mistakes in the application of a 
principle  and with the data we feed it. In another nod towards science, Regan’s method 
sometimes generates “postulates” – the “postulate” of “inherent value” is one; and the 
“subject-of-a-life”6 criterion of the equal inherent value of humans and (many) animals 
seems to be another.   
 
It appears to be part of Regan’s position that our considered intuitions or beliefs, 
indispensable to ethical theorizing, are acquired through life experience. These beliefs 
must be made subject to the following criteria for an ideal moral judgment: conceptual 
clarity, relevant information, rationality (essentially the “need to observe the rules of 
logic”7), impartiality (treating like as like), coolness, and validity. He also reveals the 
criteria for evaluating moral principles, namely: consistency, adequacy of scope, 
precision, simplicity, and conformity with our intuitions.  
 
While Regan believes that our experience generates the intuitions or judgments without 
which thinking well in ethics would be impossible, he is deeply wary of emotions, 
feeling, and sentiment. Our reflective beliefs and judgments, he cautions, must not be 
swayed and distorted by emotion. Since 
 
all who work on behalf of the interests of animals are more than a little 
familiar with the tired charges of being “irrational”, “sentimental”, 
“emotional” or worse, we can give the lie to these accusations only by 
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making a concerted effort not to indulge our emotions or parade our 
sentiments. And that requires a sustained commitment to rational inquiry.8 
 
Because Regan dissociates his “reflective and well considered beliefs” from a 
vulnerability to sentimentality and so forth, his preferred method of understanding clearly 
lies outside the realm of meaning. Still, at some level Regan’s warning should be 
acknowledged by the proponent of that style of thought. Science, for example, has often 
rightly made much of the need to control ego and feeling, including fearful conservatism 
on the one hand and excessive zeal on the other. In the past, the counterintuitive insights 
of Copernicus, Galileo, and Darwin tested severely the dispassionate contemplation of 
scientists and laity alike. Today, cogent climate science imposes similar disinterested 
requirements on those who develop and receive it in a politically charged environment. 
The challenge of controlling distorting emotion, it can be admitted, is no less grave when 
the subject is ethics and value. Indeed, the challenge for unprejudiced reflection about 
value and meaning is often greater than it is for science, which explains why Regan and 
others are at pains to issue their salutary cautions.       
 
“Rational” activity (like science) is liable to be distorted (or facilitated) by our affective 
make-up. But thinking in the realm of meaning is partly constituted by “rational” 
elements, and these elements are subject to disablement here as they are in other 
cognitive domains. That distinctive kind of cognitive activity is therefore also subject to 
deformation by irrationality and inattention to ordinary facts. Thinking critically about 
meaning can be distorted (or facilitated) by affective responses, even as such thinking is 
itself dependent on the critical responses. Herr von Osten will serve once again as an 
example.  
 
On this occasion the now infamous von Osten, stung by public mockery of his disproved 
claims about Clever Hans’s mental powers, defiantly embraces increasingly sentimental 
ideas about how the dead horse should be honored. The defect in his thought is the 
sentimentality itself, but it has a cause. Van Osten’s view could go either way. Perhaps, 
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instead, his humiliation will compel him to abandon his mawkishness rather than leading 
him to embrace it. Thinking about meaning, then, is susceptible to emotion in a way 
comparable to other kinds of critical reflection. The realm of meaning is vulnerable to 
emotion and to ego in both a constitutive sense – insofar as it depends on ways of being 
moved - and the contingent one we have been discussing.      
 
Regan’s “coherentist” methodology has been heavily criticized. Peter Singer has an 
approach that Jamieson might regard as nearer to “foundationalism”. A critic of Rawls’ 
“reflective equilibrium”, Singer writes: 
 
Some philosophers think that the aim of moral theory is to systematize our 
common moral intuitions. As scientific theories must match the observed 
data, they say, so must ethical theories match the data of our settled moral 
convictions. I have elsewhere argued against the inbuilt conservatism of 
this approach to ethics, an approach which is liable to take the relics of our 
cultural history as the touchstone of morality… 
Our moral convictions are not reliable data for testing ethical theories. We 
should work from sound theories to practical judgments, not from our 
judgments to our theories.9 
  
From Singer’s standpoint, Regan allows prejudices a central place in his theory. Regan’s 
rejoinder is that it is part of the meaning of “prejudice” that critical reflection is wanting; 
but that is exactly not the case for a considered belief10. When we have reflected critically 
under the guidance of the criteria of good moral thinking, Regan contends, “we have 
done all we can reasonably be required to do to be in a position to justify our belief”11.  
 
Regan operates with some general criteria which apply to different types of good 
thinking. Singer would say the results of their application are likely to be convictions 
with a conservative bias. The results of a “reflective equilibrium” method like that of 
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Rawls, he says, cannot challenge the “prevailing broad consensus of moral opinion in a 
community”12. Where, he might ask, are the rational criteria for distinguishing one coolly 
made, factually accurate and logically consistent conviction from another which opposes 
it? He would therefore call into question whether, in forming our settled convictions, 
these general criteria are of any assistance.  
 
In Singer’s assessment, our practical judgments themselves need grounding in reason to 
be called rational. Singer has consistently denied that even apparently awful or absurd 
implications of a sound theory carry much weight at the deepest level of critical reflection 
(the “intuitive level” of everyday living), even though our intuitions may “represent the 
accumulated experience of human beings about what to do13. For Singer “an appeal to 
intuitions is always an ad hominum argument”14, and does no basic critical work. 
Consequently, his strong belief in reason and its ability to defeat reductio ad absurdum 
arguments designed to reveal the counterintuitive implications of his utilitarian position 
has remained quite steadfast.    
 
I have outlined how Singer conceives the nature of ethical argument. However, it would 
be a mistake to conclude that Singer believes “cultural and biological factors”15  have no 
impact on the nature of ethics. He says he is “not a naturalist”16 about ethics. As a kind of 
prescriptivist, he has non-naturalistic meta-ethical views about moral judgments, facts 
and objectivity. Although he recognizes that “the fundamental nature of ethics” remains 
disputed after millennia17, Singer does think that our “empirical selves”18 have affected 
morality. Ethics is the “product of evolution among long-lived social animals with the 
capacity to reason”19, and evolution has given rise to “evolved patterns of conduct”20 in 
human societies and cultures. In this regard, Singer endorses Mary Midgley’s words that 
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we are “not just rather like animals; we are animals”21. To see the connections Singer 
makes between our empirical, primate selves and ethics, I shall go a little further into his 
elucidation. 
 
Singer starts by reminding us that we share with other social animals not only a solid core 
of self-interested motivation but also altruistic motivations generated from ties of kinship 
and reciprocity. Like those animals, we are “motivated by the desire to benefit others”22. 
These desires are strongest by far with regards to those individuals who are close to us 
and they diminish with distance. Still, in some social animals they can involve other-
motivated actions which can carry great risk and come at some personal cost. In this 
respect and in others - such as in the ability to “reason”23 at some basic level - the 
difference between humans and animals is “one of degree and not kind”24.  
 
Nonetheless, there is one key difference in degree if not in kind. It is that we can reflect 
and “choose on the basis of our reflections”25. We can also discuss, challenge, and defend 
our ethical judgments. Singer claims that the “readiness with which we can bring 
particular events under a general rule may be the most important difference between 
human and animal ethics”26. The reason or rationality which results from our capacity for 
reflection and discussion has an autonomy of its own and is like an escalator that takes us 
to new and unexpected ideas.27 That is true of ethics, Singer believes, as it is of 
mathematics. The “inherent logic of ethical thinking”28 can take us to places that cannot 
be predicted purely on the basis of our social and sympathetic instincts.      
 
What is this escalator-like logic built into ethical language and practice? Singer claims 
that ethical language by its very nature “requires us to go beyond ‘I’ and ‘You’ to the 
universal law, the universalizable judgment, the standpoint of the impartial spectator or 
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ideal observer, or whatever we choose to call it”29. Furthermore, he claims that ethical 
language implies “universalizing self-interested decision making”30 and that this leads us 
in the first instance to a “utilitarian position”31. Singer’s view of the rationality of ethics 
can be further brought out by turning from his claims about ethical language to his 
description of the nature of ethical argument and practice.    
 
The “rational basis” of ethics, Singer argues, flows from the fact that in going beyond self 
interest and in arguing on ethical grounds, “I must address myself to a larger audience”32. 
That is simply a corollary of the fact that ethical practice necessarily involves argument, 
questioning, and justification. Singer writes: 
 
In making ethical decisions I am trying to make decisions that can be 
defended to others. This requires me to take a perspective from which my 
own interests count no more, simply because they are my own, than the 
similar interests of others. Any preference for my own interests must be 
justified in terms of some broader impartial principle.33  
 
The reflective and rational beings (including those reasoning beings who are not my kin) 
to whom, as the nature of ethics dictates, my arguments must finally be addressed will 
not accept arguments put forward in terms of universal egoism, sectional interests, 
intuited moral truths “out there” in the universe. All these are mere preferences to be duly 
and impartially weighed along with all the others. “On the collective level”, Singer 
writes, “once we have begun to justify our conduct publicly, reason leads us to develop 
and expand our moral concerns, drawing us on toward an objective point of view”34. 
From the objective point of view of the impartial spectator, Singer tells us, we arrive at 
the principle of the equal consideration of interests. This is ethical reasoning at its 
strongest, he believes, for once 
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there are beings with desires, there are values that are not only the 
subjective values of each individual being. The possibility of being led, by 
reasoning, to the point of view of the universe provides as much 
‘objectivity’ as there can be. When my ability to reason shows me that the 
suffering of another being is very similar to my own suffering and (in the 
appropriate case) matters just as much to that other being as my own 
suffering matters to me, then my reason is showing me something 
undeniably true.35   
 
We know what reason provides and demands according to Singer. Even those who are 
not ethically inclined – Martians and amoralists – can supposedly see its inherent logic. 
Should we follow it? At this point in Singer’s picture of moral practice, the profile of our 
empirical selves - our cultural forms and especially our biologically given nature – is 
raised. There are four main zones of intersection between our reason and our human 
nature. 
 
First, ethics is “part of the natural human condition”36 and is “inescapable”37. Very few 
people are, as it happens, genuine amoralists, even though the positions of the amoralist, 
psychopath, egoist, and hedonist can be perfectly rational ones. Second, he says that the 
“‘feeling of need for logical consistency within the hierarchy of moral evaluations’ may 
be a feeling, but it is a feeling that derives from our capacity to reason”38. A feeling of 
cognitive dissonance may, in ethics as well as elsewhere, induce us to travel on the 
escalator of reason. Singer believes that only impartial reason can reliably take us beyond 
the circumscribed range of “non-rational instincts”39, such as our sympathy for 
individuals who are not too distant from us. On a personal level, this “cognitive feeling” 
seems not to be a mere source of dissonance for Singer, but a partial explanation of his 
steadfast commitment to his ethical stance. That aspect of his commitment is most clearly 
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put when he says: “To my embarrassment, I find myself not far from what I have long 
thought to be one of Kant’s most baffling ideas: that pure reason, in the form of the moral 
law, gives rise to a necessary feeling of respect or reverence”40. 
 
Third, Singer’s “two-level” utilitarianism is sensitive to the “existing tendencies in 
human nature”41  since it recognizes that ethics cannot be so “abstract and divorced from 
human nature as to be…‘an ideal state for disembodied spirits’ but totally inapplicable to 
real human beings”42. For example, children require the partial love of their parents, a 
love which in any case is almost certainly and demonstrably a fixed part of human nature. 
Ethics for Singer is a human creation which exists in human cultures. It therefore cannot 
in practice hope to realize completely what it rationally demands: “an impersonal concern 
for all”43. There are powerful nonrational and irrational parts of our lives as well as 
rational ones. Only an “ethic for saints” could entirely neglect “our feelings for others as 
individuals”44:   
 
Even Mother Teresa, whose work for the destitute of Calcutta seems to 
exemplify so universal a love for all, has described her love for others as 
love for each of a succession of individuals, rather than ‘love of mankind 
merely as such’.45 
 
In a sense then, the requirements of the escalator of reason are, like Kant’s pure will, a 
kind of (practically unattainable) absolute value in Singer’s (non-absolutist) ethic. 
Impartial or impersonal concern, not for this or that individual but for all individuals as a 
group - or more precisely, for the interests of the individuals of the group - is the standard 
against which all our acts can be measured. But it would be a misreading of human nature 
to think we can measure up to this standard, and an intellectual and ethical mistake to try 
to become the impartial spectator. As Bernard Williams said (in an attack on Singer’s 
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impartial spectator): occupying that position would be an “unendurable nightmare”46 and 
may well, when its would-be occupant proves hopelessly inadequate in the role, issue in 
“self-hatred”47. But we should rather, Singer recommends, use the wider perspective of 
pure impersonality as an ideal to keep our love and concern for specific individuals in 
check48.  
 
Fourth, Singer believes that normal and “reflective people, at some time or other, want 
their life to have some kind of meaning”49. This, too, is part of human nature. 
Psychopaths, with their atypical “emotional poverty”50, probably cannot find meaning 
because they “have no long-term commitments or life plans”51. And animals, we might 
add on behalf of Singer, cannot find meaning in life because they are unable to see their 
past and future lives as a whole. Nonhuman animals, even those who are “Lockean 
persons” capable of seeing themselves as the same creature existing over time, cannot 
take an attitude to their lives and cannot shape them. Furthermore, egoistic human 
pursuits are unlikely to bring lasting “joy and fulfillment”52:  
 
If we are to find meaning in our lives by working for a cause, that cause 
must be…a ‘transcendent cause’, that is, a cause that extends beyond the 
boundaries of self…The more we reflect on our commitment to a football 
club, a corporation, or any sectional interest, the less we are likely to see in 
it. In contrast, no amount of ethical reflection will show a commitment to 
an ethical life to be trivial or pointless.53   
 
Singer is arguing here that a life lived “to some larger purpose”54 can involve “taking up 
the ethical point of view as a settled policy, a way of living”55. Although the motive for 
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taking up the ethical point of view is ultimately based on self-interest, he argues that it is 
conceptually compatible with an ethical life because it involves a whole of life 
commitment to the enactment of (rationally derived) impartial considerations. Singer 
admits that the superior potential of the ethical life to yield meaning is somewhat 
speculative. Furthermore, he acknowledges that it is not a failure of reason to refuse to 
take up the ethical point of view. Amoralists are “neither irrational nor in error”56. Yet at 
the same time it may be rational to adopt it - or more typically to be fortified in one’s 
commitment to ethical living - in order to find meaning. Most people, as he says, almost 
inescapably desire some sort of ethical life. So grounding ethics in meaning is a “fall-
back rationale” or a “rationale of last resort”57. 
 
Roger Crisp suggests that Singer’s invocation of meaning commits him to a “move 
towards objectivity”58 and in particular to what is objectively worthwhile. He thinks there 
may be a tension here with Singer’s view that judgments and values connected with 
meaning are no more than preferences or “intuitions” that cannot be discussed or 
defended in the light of reason. But Singer is quick to remind Crisp of his understanding 
of the nature of reason, and, in disabusing him, to conclude that “there is no prospect of 
my taking up Crisp’s suggestion that I develop an account of welfare in terms of 
meaningfulness rather than preference satisfaction”59. On Singer’s account, finding 
meaning is a “factual matter”60, not a matter of thinking well or badly. The only way it 
can be a failure of rational thought is when a miscalculation is made about what is likely 
to be personally fulfilling and satisfying when a longer view of one’s life is taken. So 
when Singer views the 1934 film of the “shining eyes of the rank-and-file Nazi faithful”, 
he is sure that many of them could have said, “truthfully, that their membership of the 
Nazi party had given meaning and fulfillment to their lives”61. In one sense, it is hard to 
disagree with him. But Singer also thinks that if the Nazi faithful, certain of the rightness 
and justice of their beliefs, fail to see things objectively it is because they fail to think 
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rationally to the point of view of the impartial spectator. It is not because they fail to see 
things as they are in virtue of being, say, “grotesquely sentimental” – except as that is 
taken to be merely the accidental cause of their cognitive error.    
 
It is worth emphasizing Singer’s belief that claims made in what Gaita calls the realm of 
meaning are mere subjective preferences – which take their place alongside other merely 
personal values in the utilitarian calculus - as opposed to bona fide attempts at thinking 
well. We must, he thinks, find a way past “deep moral subjectivism”, since if “ethical 
judgments were nothing but the outflow of our emotional control centers, it would be as 
inappropriate to criticize ethical judgments as it is to criticize gastronomic preferences” 
such as whether tea goes best with milk or lemon62. What Singer should say, if he is to be 
precise, is not that “subjective” ethical disagreement is inappropriate as it is with 
preferences about tea, but that ethical criticism and discussion would be no more a 
genuine cognitive activity than is everyday gastronomic disagreement or etiquette.63 
Specifically, it would not be rational, and would therefore not command the sort of 
reverence and regard he and others have for the exercise of reason. Talking about 
Socrates, Singer says that “as rational beings we are drawn to respect someone utterly 
committed to rational inquiry and a rational life”64. He writes that our ethical beliefs and 
rules are  
 
not moral absolutes or unchallengeable intuitions. Some of them are no 
more than relics from our evolutionary and cultural history and can be 
discarded without cost.65 
 
One of these relics is the Western principle which is “unique in the sharpness with which 
it separates the wrongness of taking the life of any human being, no matter how severely 
defective, from the wrongness of taking the life of any non-human animal, no matter how 
                                                 
62 The Expanding Circle, p.85. 
63 Practical Ethics, p.325. 
64 The Expanding Circle, p.97. 
65 The Expanding Circle, p.167. 
 70
intelligent”66. These sorts of ethical claims – which as we will see are often claims made 
in the realm of meaning - have an air of mystery; whereas Singer thinks his utilitarianism, 
based as it is on a particular view of humans as “social, reasoning beings”67, “takes a 
more concrete and less mysterious approach to ethics than its rivals”68.  Talk of the 
“intrinsic dignity of the human individual” or of their “distinctive” or “intrinsic worth”, 
and talk of humans as “ends in themselves”, is “waffle”69. 
 
The final chapter of The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology speaks of “our new 
understanding of the nature of human ethics”70. How does Singer’s placing of human 
nature and reason compare to understanding in the realm of meaning? One reason for 
Singer’s contention that he has found a “uniquely rational basis for ethical decision-
making”71, and that we are “compelled by reason”72 to adopt something like his 
utilitarianism, is his assumption that claims which rely crucially upon other aspects of 
human nature and culture are merely subjective values or preferences. He does not 
distinguish, however, between Regan’s very general criteria (the non-theoretical criteria) 
of good ethical thinking and Gaita’s more detailed set of critical concepts.  
 
Singer’s lack of attention to these concepts leads him to a different understanding of the 
way in which human nature, experience, and culture enter into the substance of critical 
ethical reflection. If we assume only the presence of something like Regan’s criteria of 
(pre-theoretical) critical thought, then Singer, it would appear, creates trouble for any 
view which speaks of our disciplined and critical responses. For it is indeed hard to see 
how Regan’s criteria – or any similarly meager set of conditions - could locate anything 
more than what might dismissively be called “feeling right” or “right feeling”. But if we 
now notice a more extensive set of critical concepts, there emerges a view of human 
thought in media res which goes beyond “right feeling” and which seems to capture the 
cognitive nature of ethical activity. Such activity is cognitive in that it involves thinking 
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well and badly in a sense which is substantial because it is a disciplined attempt to “see 
things as they are”. This possibility may become clearer in later chapters where examples 
are discussed. But for now, it can be noted that although Singer himself appeals to a 
concept of reflecting upon life’s meaning or at least meaning in life, he assumes that this 
activity must terminate in mere subjective preferences existing beyond any serious 
criteria of thinking. His assumption renders our life with concepts of meaning 
noncognitive.      
 
Ethical activity, as Singer says, is bound up with the emergence in human “primates” of 
discussion and questioning. He writes: “Once beings can think and talk, once they can 
challenge each other, and ask, ‘Why did you do that?’ their growls and licks are evolving 
into ethical judgments”73. They can subsequently proceed to the “rational basis” of 
justifying their ethical statements to other rational beings which, like us, have their own 
interests. Singer gives us one view of what it is to justify oneself to another reflective 
ethical being, but it is not the only view. If Gaita (and Martin Buber) are right, ethical 
activity is not so much an activity between “I and You” or “I and Them (the class of 
rational beings)” as it is between “I and Thou”. When we ask someone, “Why did you do 
that?” and they seriously respond, or when someone challenges us with, “Don’t you see 
what you are doing?” or, “What do you think it means to think or do that?”, there need be 
no question of a rational justification or settlement (unless of course one intends to widen 
the meaning of “rational” beyond its readily recognized meaning). Rather, these appeals 
and questions are made within a different arena of thought inseparable from the 
deployment of the critical concepts. These points allow a reconsideration of the claim that 
ethics by its very nature demands the adoption of the “standpoint of the impartial 
spectator”74. And that reconsideration may be made, for reasons previously noted, 
without thinking that ethical judgments concerning meaning cannot in their personal 
character also be impersonal and in some sense impartial.     
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Suppose that Gaita’s realm of meaning accurately characterizes ethical thought or at least 
the kind of ethical thought which we all recognize and which is fundamental to our lives 
and our sense of morality’s seriousness. It then becomes possible to look at some of the 
claims that Singer makes in a different way. For example, his claim that an ethical life 
can be ultimately founded on the pursuit of self-interest can now be viewed from the 
realm of meaning as a shallow one. There are also implications for the view that there can 
be moral experts. For on Gaita’s account of ethical understanding, it is a kind of 
conceptual truth that understanding cannot be achieved “in a flash”, as if God or a 
supercomputer could in principle implant it in an individual person.  
 
The sense of “experience” which Gaita relies upon in making these points is different 
from the sense of experience which facilitates the accumulation of data for ethical 
theorizing (Regan) or the receipt of information for the crafting of moral rules at the 
intuitive level of a two-level ethical theory (Singer). In neither Regan’s nor Singer’s case 
does “experience” imply the kind of experience which is conceptually essential to the 
development of a historically achieved individuality. In fact, the conceptions both these 
philosophers have of the place of lived experience in ethical reflection exclude the 
possibility of lucidity as Gaita understands it.  
 
The above two ideas – the proper link between human nature or wellbeing and value, and 
the fact that ethical understanding must grow slowly in individuals and depends non-
contingently on being in the midst of life – are central ideas in the theory of virtue ethics. 
Roger Crisp contends that Singer’s attempt to back up his stringent ethic with the 
‘transcendent’ but self-interested motive of achieving a fulfilling human life is not 
promising. As Singer puts Crisp’s objection, it is much more difficult to use enlightened 
self-interest to “justify an extremely demanding ethic such as act utilitarianism than to 
justify ‘the more modest virtue ethics of ancient times’”75. Singer’s reply to the objection 
is a straightforward admission that what Crisp says “is true, and ultimately I have no fully 
adequate answer to it” 76. Virtue ethics, taken as a theory about ethical value, thinks it can 
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make the right connection (whatever that turns out to be) between human nature, well 
being, and ethical understanding of human and animal life.  
 
Rosalind Hursthouse regards a person with moral understanding or wisdom as one with 
the right character traits, spirit in action, feelings, reasons, and history of behavior. Hers 
is a sophisticated virtue ethics approach to the constitutive role played by thought and 
feeling in the understanding of human and animal life. Hursthouse believes that the 
concepts of virtue and of a virtuous person, which are not exclusive concepts in virtue 
theory but are still its “focal” ethical concepts77, shed light on the nature of ethical 
understanding. Arguing against theories with codifiable principles and theories that go in 
for the “fantasy” of a rule-governed decision procedure, she claims that the true nature of 
moral situations can be discerned only by exercising “the faculties of ‘moral sensitivity, 
perception [and] imagination’ – moral wisdom or phronesis, in short”78. The general 
complaint Hursthouse has against theories which leave out this dimension of human life 
is that their reductive approach “misrepresents the texture of our moral experience”79  and 
overlooks “what we find the world to be like”80: 
 
We do not think of moral or practical wisdom – of knowledge of what one 
should do – as easily come by, as something that an adolescent is likely to 
have, even if the adolescent is a genius at mathematics or science or the 
stock market and has been to lectures on normative ethics.81    
 
At the same time, Hursthouse argues that although it is true that we rightly talk of 
emotions shared in humans and nonhumans,  
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no emotion in us is just the same as it is in other animals. For, in virtue of 
our reason, we, unlike the other animals, draw the distinction between 
what appears to be so, and what is really so in language.82  
 
Thus she thinks that all adult human reasons and emotions are transformed by language 
and reflection. She says: “How very unlike the other animals human beings are when 
they endure agony, and risk their lives, for justice and truth, or are terrified at the 
prospect of university examinations; when they are ready to die for glory, but tremble at 
the prospect of humiliation”83.  In teaching children we transform “mere passion or 
desire” into “rational wanting or desire” and “acting from reason”84. Hursthouse claims 
that some of our impulses and reactions “are partially constituted by judgments at least 
some of which are evaluative”85  and that emotions can display a “cognitive”86 element 
by containing judgments about the rightness and appropriateness of the response. She 
believes that ethical thought thoroughly alters the nature of the inner life in the morally 
educated, developed, and mature thinker. 
 
In contrast to Singer, Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelianism claims that ethical understanding 
“must take place from within an acquired ethical outlook, not from some external 
‘neutral’ point of view”87, for there is “no basing knowledge on an independent 
foundation”:  
 
One’s detailed grasp of what is involved in acting virtuously, in acting for 
the right reasons, is not separable from one’s grasp of what each of the 
virtues involves, and one’s grasp of that is not separable from possession 
of the virtues themselves, at least to some degree.88 
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It is from within some ethical outlook that one considers whether, e.g. 
charity or temperance or impersonal benevolence is a virtue; those traits 
cannot be given a neutral, scientific, specification.89 
 
According to philosophers with a “foundationalist” leaning, Hursthouse explains, 
 
 what I must do is throw out every ethical belief I have, take what I am left 
with as certain knowledge (facts recognizable from the ‘neutral point of 
view’, science, logic) and try to reinstate my ethical beliefs on those 
foundations. In the course of this attempt I will discover what in my 
acquired ethical outlook was right (if anything) and what was wrong (if 
anything).90  
 
This, Hursthouse thinks, misrepresents what we aim to do in training our children “from 
infancy to feel joy and grief at the right things”91. It also misunderstands, she argues, the 
important concept of moral maturity. Maturity, uniquely possessed on our planet by 
human animals, is only reached in what she dubs the “major stage” in a developing 
human individual’s life: 
 
Maturity is emotional or psychological as well as intellectual, and it is part 
of our concept of it that with maturity comes wisdom. The sort of wisdom 
it brings is not the sort that can be learnt entirely from books or lectures, 
but the sort that comes from experience of life, and it is wisdom about life. 
And this is precisely the wisdom which, according to neo-Aristotelianism, 
is fully possessed only by the fully virtuous human being.92 
 
Philosophers like Singer may agree with Hursthouse that emotional training is 
instrumentally vital for intellectual development and for promoting ethical activity and 
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success in human beings. But the virtue theory tradition claims that our cultural education 
and emotional constitution is internal to understanding. Indeed, Hursthouse stresses the 
importance to the virtues of responses like shame, love, disgust, remorse, regret, apology, 
and horror.  
 
However, Hursthouse does not lay much stress on our reflective means of determining 
what Gaita calls the real forms of these responses and their false semblances. “Practical 
rationality”, as it is often portrayed in virtue theory, does not much attend to these more 
specific cognitive details of reflection in the realm of meaning. In that condition, virtue 
theory has fewer resources to defend itself against attempts at noncognitivist reduction by 
those like Peter Singer who are skeptical of its emphasis on the virtues.  
 
Virtue theory, then, does not mark out as clearly as does Gaita a distinctive cognitive 
domain. Perhaps because of this, it sometimes feels the pressure from rival theories and 
from the conception of objectivity and justification promoted by foundationalism, to 
fortify itself, in part, by standing on the same ground as its opponents.  An example of 
this pressure can be seen in the use to which Hursthouse puts ethical naturalism. 
Naturalism is meant to mark the “criterion for a particular character trait’s being a 
virtue”93. Singer (as we saw) holds that even an amoralist can understand the cognitive 
foundations of ethical belief even though he does not have any. Hursthouse never 
withdraws from her claim that ethical understanding is available only to those who 
display in their lives a degree of virtuous ethical response. As she has it, the naturalistic 
project necessarily “proceeds from within our ethical outlook”94. This approach contrasts 
somewhat with the approach in the book Natural Goodness, where Phillipa Foot argues 
that the nature of the good can, against appearances, be discovered through a conceptual 
analysis concerning “quite general facts about human beings”95.  
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Yet Hursthouse’s idea of “radical ethical reflection” 96 is that which avoids speaking 
entirely “from within an acquired ethical outlook – in which case we will not validate our 
ethical beliefs, but merely re-express them”97. For evaluations that do “not depend in any 
way on my wants, interests, or values” are “‘objective’ in the most straightforward sense 
of the term”98. Her tentative, but she thinks promising, proposal is that real scrutiny and 
objectivity – “not a priori or scientific objectivity – but a kind of objectivity appropriate 
to the subject matter”99 – may proceed in a “Neurathian” manner, apparently 
simultaneously from “within our ethical outlook” 100 and by way of a version of ethical 
naturalism.   
 
Hursthouse’s naturalism says that  
 
there is a structure…in the botanical and ethological evaluations of other 
living things as good or defective specimens of their kind, which 
supervenes on evaluations of their parts and behavior as good or defective 
in the light of certain ends, and this carries over (mutatis mutandis) into 
evaluations of ourselves as ethically good or bad as human beings in 
respect of our characters”.101 
 
Naturalism gives us two ways in which the “virtues make their possessor a good human 
being”102. The first is that the virtues are a kind of excellence for our kind. Whilst 
“amongst the social animals, both wolves and elephants have patterns of action that 
resemble our charitable or benevolent acts”103, the notion of human excellence is 
significantly expanded by the fact that humans are characteristically reflective. Unlike 
animals, human beings can “contemplate alternatives and decide to change things, or 
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choose to try a new way”; whereas animals “are biologically determined, we are not”104. 
Hursthouse argues that by and large “we can’t identify what is characteristic of human 
beings as a species…there is too much variety”105. Human beings can excel through 
exercise of the virtues in numerous ways. 
 
The second strand of Hursthouse’s naturalism is that the “virtues benefit their 
possessor”106 and enable her to flourish by conferring joy, warmth, and happiness.107 The 
“smile factor” is her shorthand term for the “zest and enthusiasm”108 typically afforded an 
individual by the standard virtues. She is aware that there are exceptions to the rule, 
including happy sadists and the rare occasions when virtue requires tragic self-sacrifice. 
She simply claims for the standard virtues like courage and justice a general tendency to 
promote individual happiness.   
 
Hursthouse contends that it is no accident the virtues are not typically disastrous for their 
possessors and she argues that consequently her naturalism poses no serious danger to her 
defense of the virtues. For if these character traits were often enough personally 
damaging, then  
 
the whole history of our ethical thought would be unimaginably different, 
for amongst the natural facts that underlie our concept of virtue are the 
following: the fact that virtue is not unhealthy, nor vice healthy, [and] that 
the virtuous are no strangers to enjoyment.109  
 
She backs this up by saying virtuous people themselves identify the virtues in part 
because such virtues are generally productive of happiness as well as constitutive 
components of a good life. That naturalistic language partly characterizes our ethical 
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language is for Hursthouse a “grammatical idea”110. Her conclusion is that, despite the 
anti-foundationalist framework in which it operates, what ethical naturalism makes of the 
fact that we are social animals really does “constrain what will pass reflective scrutiny as 
a candidate virtue”111.   
 
As an example of the constraints of naturalism in operation, Hursthouse cautiously 
considers Singer’s ostensible virtue of “impersonal benevolence”112. Someone who 
possesses such a character trait “does not think of ‘That’s a fellow human being’ or 
‘She’s my child/parent/friend/partner’ as…[a] reason for seeking another’s good”113. This 
person’s emotions, “being in harmony with her reason, do not particularly engage with 
her fellow human beings”114. On the face of it, Hursthouse guesses, such a character trait 
would seem not to “foster” the “the continuance of the species and the good functioning 
of the social group”115. Moreover, we are social animals, strongly “‘partial’ to our own 
species and children”116. This ingrained partiality is, perhaps, more plausibly connected 
with the virtues and with flourishing than is the impartial consideration of interests. 
Singer himself, as we saw, admitted something like it. 
 
Hursthouse hopes that this sort of rational or more objective justification will give any 
two moral disputants genuine reason to “think the other is in error, not merely digging in 
their toes about what they personally value or desire”117. That type of disagreement, of 
course, is what Singer would say is all you can reasonably hope to get, at the end of the 
day, from the ethical “arguments” bestowed by virtue theory, so long as they insist on a 
“subjective” element informed by feeling. But there is a separate tension too.  
Presumably, Hursthouse would feel that Singer’s fall-back suggestion grounding the 
ethical point of view in human nature – specifically in the unabashed and ultimate self-
interest we have in personal fulfillment - is inimical to possession of the virtues. For this 
                                                 
110 On Virtue Ethics, p.259. 
111 On Virtue Ethics, p.226. 
112 On Virtue Ethics, p.224. 
113 On Virtue Ethics, p.225. 
114 On Virtue Ethics, p.225. 
115 On Virtue Ethics, p.225. 
116 On Virtue Ethics, p.225. 
117 On Virtue Ethics, p.247. 
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undermines the virtues by contaminating the purity of their underlying motivation – an 
effect that occurs even when, as Singer requires, the motivation is kept at the requisite 
distance from action, making it possible to intelligibly call it “ethical”. Singer might then 
question how this problem, given Hursthouse’s understanding of virtue, is to be 
successfully skirted by her “validation” project, which appeals not only to “excellence”, 
but to the zesty enjoyment in her so-called “smile factor”. 
 
As Hursthouse says, her naturalism imposes constraints on ethical thought, and on what 
passes as a virtue and thus as ethical understanding. One thing it rules out are ethical 
positions which, like extreme asceticism, are likely to be positively ruinous for the 
individual. But, as we saw, even Singer goes to some effort to show that the model 
spectator at the heart of his own brand of an “absolute” ethic is not to be studiously aped, 
as William Godwin thought he or she must, at the risk of losing our minds. Still, 
Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelian claim also appears to rule out virtues and forms of 
understanding which are not strongly conditioned by the concepts of excellence, 
flourishing, and happiness.        
 
There are two ways in which this naturalistic constraint might operate. The first is 
Hursthouse’s notion that this is an “objective” constraint that all rational people can 
appreciate, regardless of their life experience and individual point of view “within an 
acquired ethical outlook”. This is real or genuine justification (albeit modified by the 
Neurathian method), she thinks, not two people just digging in their toes. In the next 
chapter, we will look at philosophical attempts to lay down prescriptive rules on what 
genuine reason, or real attempts at seeing things as they are, should come to. For now, we 
might note the difficulty (detectable perhaps in the “speculative” aspect of Hursthouse’s 
project) of demonstrating that the naturalistic concepts of excellence and happiness – as 
reasonable as they may be in their own biologically evaluative way – also provide a 
rational and (quasi) objective grounding of ethics. Just as we might say to Singer that 
when we converse about ethical matters we are using a genuine form of thinking that 
cannot be reduced to arguments between rational primates, we might in a similar vein 
point out to Hursthouse that in serious ethical discussion, in the attempt to see things as 
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they are, the notions of attaining excellence and flourishing may be furthest from our 
minds, and do not in any case inform such thought. And if they do not at some level (as 
she tenders, “grammatically”) characterize our most serious ethical thought, what role 
can they have in rational justification? 
 
The second form of the naturalistic constraint, as Hursthouse presents it, is that the 
connection between flourishing and wisdom is something that we can see from “within 
our ethical outlook”. And presumably, this will tend to favor the standard virtues that 
appear in virtue theory. However, if we accept Gaita’s elaboration of the fundamental 
role of the critical concepts in thinking well and badly, then we can notice that the 
naturalistic link between wise and perceptive thought and flourishing is itself subject to 
those terms of appraisal. We might find the notion that there is depth in virtues that 
promote the smile factor a compelling notion, or we might find it banal.  
 
Furthermore, any virtues on the list, irrespective of their tendency to lead to eudaimonia, 
can be assessed in all sorts of ways in the realm of meaning. Consider, for instance, 
Hursthouse’s suggestion of a virtue of “animal concern”118. This seems to be a virtue that 
is connected to virtues or vices like callousness, compassion, and cruelty119. Hursthouse 
would be the first to say that applying a virtue like “animal concern” is very difficult in 
practice and requires delicate judgment, experience, and maturity. It might also require 
the input of cultural forms like film and literature120 which help us to see more truly. 
Indeed, virtue ethicists like Hursthouse do not ignore the fact that we respond to others, 
including animals, in a variety of ways. For example, we may respond to the “wonder and 
beauty of the animal kingdom”, seeing how “touching and lovable, or strange and 
fascinating, instructive, inspiring, amusing, and so on animals are or can be”121.    
 
But once again, we do have other critical means of taking these many different forms of 
response seriously or finding them frivolous. Indeed, it will shortly be argued that it is 
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Human Situation), (London: Routledge, 2000), p.155. 
120 Ethics, Humans and Other Animals, p.162.  
121 Beginning Lives, p.240. 
 82
through certain critical responses to human beings and to animals that we build up a 
sense of what they are. There is no reason to assume, however, that what we find out 
about humans and animals in the realm of meaning will be powerfully influenced by 
notions like flourishing. We might discover that the most important thing about human 
beings and animals is that they are capable of excellences and flourishing. On the other 
hand, we may find that these are of lesser significance to a sense we might have of their 
individuality. In either case, to possess the resources we need to critically assess these 
questions, and to properly appreciate (as Hursthouse says) the rich moral texture of our 




Chapter 4 Imagination and Thought 
 
Rosalind Hursthouse said that “sensitivity, perception, and imagination”1 are necessary 
parts of ethical understanding. In this chapter, I shall look at how Gaita’s explication of 
thought about meaning compares with the thought of two other contemporary 
philosophers who have written on animals. In particular, the aim of this chapter is to 
examine the human imagination and its contribution to thinking seriously. I will first 
consider Cora Diamond’s views on the role of the imagination in ethical reflection and 
development and then go on to consider Stephen Mulhall’s commentary on some 
problems raised with the work of Diamond, influenced as it is by Wittgenstein.   
 
It seems fair to say that for Diamond, “imagination” is a focal ethical concept. She is not 
claiming an exclusive usage for this word; can she can admit that there are very different 
activities that fall under the label of “imagination”, such as imagination in science, 
advertising, mathematics, or business. Her specific aim is to show us what place the 
imagination can have in ethical thought in particular, and in philosophy more generally. 
Literature figures prominently in her work: we may, Diamond says, “learn from our 
reading of such works, and from reflection on them, terms of criticism of thought 
applicable to discussions of practical issues and to moral philosophy itself”2. 
 
The sort of imagination Diamond concentrates on is clearly a prominent human activity. 
Individuals who lack a substantial imaginative capacity appear to be excluded from 
significant areas of human life, experience, and discussion; while others who lack certain 
kinds of imagination we may simply find, occasionally or pervasively, shallow and crude. 
One of Diamond’s examples of a lack of imagination comes from DH Lawrence’s 
description of an American sportsman in Africa who shot an “infant still clinging to the 
breast of its mother, a gorilla, whom he had just murdered; so he shot the infant without 
                                                 
1 R. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.159. 
2 C. Diamond, The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy and the Mind, (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 
1995), p.377.  
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remorse, because he was acting scientifically”3. Diamond then quotes Lawrence’s 
expression of antipathy towards such sportsmen: 
 
[It] is not mere pity on our part for the gorilla. It is an absolute detestation 
of the insentience of armed, bullying men, in the face of living, sentient 
things. Surely the most beastly offence against life is this degenerate 
insentience. It is not cruelty, exactly, which makes such a sportsman. It is 
crass insentience, a crass stupidity and deadness of fibre. Such 
overweening fellows, called men, are barren of the feeling for life. A 
gorilla is a live thing, with a strange unknown life of its own. Even to get a 
glimpse of its weird life, one little gleam of insight, makes our own life so 
much the wider, more vital.4  
 
Diamond remarks that the “imaginative sense of strangeness of these creatures’ lives in 
Lawrence’s own prose”5. She thinks that seeing these things requires an “imaginative 
grasp”6 or the ability to be touched or pierced or shaken or troubled, to be “moved to 
wonder or deep confusion”7. She brings to our attention the fact that we often respond to 
an expression or occasion of significance with pain and horror, or with pleasure and 
laughter. Diamond also talks of us being awakened to things in life and of coming alive 
to something we see or hear.  
 
Ethical understanding, she argues, depends upon the resources of our humanity and 
culture, resources that allow us to use ethical language “at full stretch” and with an active 
“responsiveness to life”. If our reasons are “heart-indifferent”8, our emotional life 
undeveloped and our thinking not “charged with appropriate feeling”9, or if, like 
                                                 
3 C. Diamond, “The Importance of Being Human” in D.Cockburn, (ed.) Human Beings, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.40. 
4 Human Beings, p.40. 
5 Human Beings, p.41. 
6 C. Diamond, “How Many Legs” in R. Gaita, (ed.) Value and Understanding: Essays for Peter Winch, 
(London: Routledge, 1990), p.176. 
7 Value and Understanding, p.177. 
8 C. Diamond, The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy and the Mind, (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 
1995), p.293. 
9 The Realistic Spirit, p.298. 
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Dickens’ character Gradgrind, we are “cold and even insolent” 10 and invulnerable to the 
“force of the heart’s responses”11, then we have in the relevant sense “not learned to 
think”12.  
 
The imagination for Diamond is not exhausted by fairy tales and “inspirational 
rhetoric”13. And because it is not a mystical, metaphysical, or intuitive faculty, Diamond 
(like Gaita) eschews a theoretical account of her focal concepts. Thus, while various 
technical and psychological analyses may be possible, we do not need to “know more 
about imagination in order to give it its place in the philosophical treatment of human 
nature”14. Rather, we should be content to describe and give examples of various uses of 
the imagination.  
 
A key aspect of the imagination in Diamond’s view is the way it shapes our moral 
concepts15. Although in life we constantly encounter this “imaginative shaping of 
meaning”16, philosophy is typically uninterested in that phenomenon. Consequently, it 
“alienates people from what unreflectively belongs to their sense of their humanity”17. 
Such philosophy, she argues, looks at the world as if the objects in it have only 
descriptions existing independently of a more humanly imaginative point of view. Yet 
there is also “a world whose deepest difficulties include difficulties of description”18, 
going well beyond the factual and scientific.  
 
These imaginative makings, descriptions, and elaborations, she argues, are a 
“characteristic human activity”19. Human beings and cultures create these notions 
multitudinously and not always deliberately. Indeed, we make and create them through a 
mass of ways of thinking about, and responding to, customs, practices, words, speeches, 
                                                 
10 The Realistic Spirit, p.300. 
11 The Realistic Spirit, p.298. 
12 The Realistic Spirit, p.298. 
13 Human Beings, p.48. 
14 Human Beings, p.47. 
15 Value and Understanding, p.177. 
16 Human Beings, p.48. 
17 Human Beings, p.57. 
18 The Realistic Spirit, p.378. 
19 Human Beings, p.48. 
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literature, institutions, philosophy, and law. The description or redescription of a 
situation, act, thought, character, or object in imaginative terms, Diamond believes, may 
fundamentally change our understanding of these things, and with that the moral 
possibilities associated with them.  
 
One of the ways in which philosophy has taken the “facts constituting the situations in 
which we act as straightforwardly describable” 20 is, as Iris Murdoch argued, in reducing 
the phenomena of interest in moral philosophy to action and choice21. But as Martha 
Nussbaum has suggested, literature holds the promise of widening the subject matter of 
ethics beyond action to (in Diamond’s words) “gestures, manners, habits, turns of speech, 
turns of thought” as these are “morally expressive – of an individual or a people”22. Such 
accounts are aspects of the intelligent and “sharp-eyed, description of life”23.  
 
However, Diamond is also critical of Nussbaum, on the grounds that her neo-
Aristotelianism appears to confine the imaginative subject matter of ethics to “what 
generally belongs to the empirical and social conditions of human life”24. What sense of 
things we may make is then pinned down, by prior conditions, to a particular view of life 
and flourishing, rather than allowing responsiveness to life to enter our thought in all its 
conceivable variety. As Diamond says: “Ethics comes from our thought about all the 
things that can strike us as revealing something significant about the kind of beings we 
are”25.     
 
A further example of the constraints philosophy can put on ethical phenomena comes 
from attempts to link an ethical concern with the outward extension of sympathy and 
empathy, sometimes through imaginative literature, to the “sufferings or the humiliation 
of a wider range of human beings”26 and/or nonhuman animals. Diamond has argued that 
philosophies which argue for an expansion of sympathy and empathy can restrict their 
                                                 
20 The Realistic Spirit, p.377. 
21 The Realistic Spirit, p.376. 
22 The Realistic Spirit, p.375. 
23 The Realistic Spirit, p.375. 
24 The Realistic Spirit, p.375. 
25 Value and Understanding, p.175. 
26 The Realistic Spirit, p.49. 
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possible subject matter when the objects of their concern are described in non-
imaginative terms. What she means is illustrated in Lawrence’s insistence that his 
concern for the gorilla is not mere pity. Another limiting move, to be addressed in chapter 
6, is to think that objective descriptions of animals and human beings must be in factual 
terms, often biological ones, perhaps conjoined with principles of action describing their 
moral status.  
 
Diamond does not suppose that literature is the only domain in which this imaginative 
thought is located. There are many nonliterary places where understanding requires 
combinations of “moral energy, discipline, imagination, creativity, wit, care, patience, 
tact, delicacy”27. Nonetheless, literature’s importance for Diamond is that we can learn 
from our reading of genuinely imaginative literary works, as we have noted, the “terms of 
criticism of thought applicable to discussions of practical issues and to moral philosophy 
itself”28. Furthermore, literature is a source of nourishment for thought and is of the 
“greatest importance in developing and strengthening our moral capacities, and turning 
them in new directions”29. Certainly in our culture (Diamond would say), literature is a 
fundamental source of a widened imaginative grasp of our moral concerns. We may look 
more closely at how Diamond thinks something like a “literary sensibility”30 is related to 
ethical discernment.         
 
There is, she thinks, a kind of learning to think which “plays a role in the education of the 
emotions and in the development of moral sensibility”31. She describes that learning in 
the following terms: 
 
We develop the capacity to make such judgments through habits of 
awareness, reflection, and discrimination. That is, we come across all sorts 
of things which invite an emotional response, or invite the taking up of an 
attitude or mode of thought – including here such ‘issuers’ of such 
                                                 
27 The Realistic Spirit, p.377. 
28 The Realistic Spirit, p.377. 
29 The Realistic Spirit, p.307. 
30 The Realistic Spirit, p.372. 
31 The Realistic Spirit, p.303. 
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invitations, works of literature and philosophy. At first such responses will 
not be considered ones at all: we respond (let us say) with delighted 
amazement and wonder at fairy tales, in a wholly unreflective way. But we 
can come to be aware of what makes for deeper understanding and 
enriching of our own thought and experience; we can come to have a sense 
of what is alive, and what is shallow, sentimental, cheap; as we make 
comparisons, we come to know what are the reasons for our interest in 
this, our feeling that that is important. We thus learn also to support our 
judgments with arguments, which in many cases depend on the kinds of 
comparison we are able to make: the shoddy thought can be shown up by 
being placed alongside the genuine.32 
 
Diamond distinguishes between the presentation of a work and its “extractible content”33. 
She claims the style of a work may fail in a number of distinctive ways. A work of 
literature, and even philosophy, might fail because it is heavy-handed and sententious. 
She would agree that it may also fail because it is moralizing, pompous, ludicrous, 
arrogant, sentimental, or crude. On Diamond’s account, we need a developed and 
educated imaginative intelligence to see and discuss things in these terms, and so in this 
way to learn about ethics from literature, some philosophy, and from other sources.  
 
Diamond’s conception of literature’s relation to philosophy may be usefully contrasted 
with Peter Singer’s. In The Moral of the Story: an Anthology of Ethics through 
Literature, he and Renata Singer claim that “ethics comes squarely within the field of 
literature, as well as within the field of philosophy” and that “each approach has its own 
strengths and weaknesses”34. Philosophy is more rigorous and reduces confusion, but 
literature can also “throw light on some of the perennial questions of ethics”35. The 
Singers remain agnostic on “whether great literature should have high moral values”36, 
                                                 
32 The Realistic Spirit, p.303. 
33 The Realistic Spirit, p.300. 
34 P. Singer & R. Singer, (eds) The Moral of the Story : An Anthology of Ethics Through Literature 
(Wiley&Sons, 2004), x 
35 The Moral of the Story, xi 
36 The Moral of the Storyy, xi 
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but are sympathetic to the evaluation of “literature in strongly ethical terms”37. Good 
imaginative writing “can help us to understand more about ourselves, and how we ought 
to live”38.  
 
Singer says that literary creations display a “depth” that creative philosophical examples, 
which are more like a “piece of equipment for a scientist”39, can lack. Whereas 
philosophical thought-experiments and illustrations are usually schematic and unmoving, 
literary works can have a rich context, making an ethical idea more engaging, concrete, 
nuanced, and plausible. Hence, we can learn from literature more about some of the real-
life implications for, and possibilities of, ethical views. This knowledge, no doubt, would 
be important for applied ethics, and for a two-level utilitarian view.  
 
Singer has extended his appraisal of literature in the introduction (co-written with Anton 
Leist) to a more recent book. In JM Coetzee and Ethics: Philosophical Perspectives on 
Literature, he and Leist distinguish between traditional analytic philosophers, who follow 
Enlightenment ideas, and the motley crew of pragmatists and postmodernists, who are 
intent on “discarding truth”40.  
 
Singer and Leist identify Wittgenstein as a pragmatist who wished to “rid philosophy of 
its traditional burdens and get rid of philosophy itself, more or less directly, making room 
instead for other practices, especially art and politics”41. In contrast, traditional 
philosophers “give an objective meaning to central concepts of knowledge”42. 
Furthermore: 
 
Philosophers who still favor the ideas of the Enlightenment see literature 
as a supplement to philosophy and sciences, something to be made use of 
educationally and politically for an improved way of life. Literature’s 
                                                 
37 The Moral of the Story, xi. 
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39 The Moral of the Story, x. 
40 A. Leist, & P. Singer, (eds.), J. M. Coetzee and Ethics: Philosophical Perspectives on Literature, (New 
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41 J. M. Coetzee and Ethics, p.3. 
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innovative power, its extension of the imagination, surely has an 
advantage within the nonrationalized (and nongeneralizable) parts of 
individual lives, within the nonrational pockets of the 
private…Philosophers in this tradition do not think that literature could 
pull the carpet from under their feet as philosophers because for them 
literature, even its most provocative creations, fails to penetrate the hard 
shell of rational concepts or serious argument. This goes for naturalist 
philosophers even more than for concept-bound ones, as their infatuation 
with the sciences fixes their interest more on the material basis of our 
existence than on the full experience of human life.43 
  
Singer says that literature is “frequently a more natural and more human way of 
expressing oneself. In the hands of great artists, it portrays our elementary experiences”44. 
Literary imagination is especially useful for applied ethics and the “practical problems of 
the real world”45. Its potential for innovation, however, is partly a result of not being tied 
down to the state of play of an academic subject like philosophy; it is relatively free to be 
more creative and, as Coetzee does, to make radical critiques of traditional philosophy. 
Thus it can “yield insights hard to come by in the usual academic style of philosophical 
work” and it could even make “philosophy more imaginative”46. Literature is also 
particularly well placed to track philosophical trends, such as the recent interest in 
philosophical approaches in which the “aptness of rational argument itself is 
questioned”47 by, say, new forms of skepticism and relativism. 
 
Finally, it is consistent with Singer’s position here that the sensitive reading of good 
writing can help us to recognize styles of expression and “techniques like parody, 
playfulness, surrealism”48. Diamond provides examples of the need for sensitivity when 
                                                 
43 J. M. Coetzee and Ethics, p.5. 
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45 J. M. Coetzee and Ethics, p.13. 
46 J. M. Coetzee and Ethics, p.14. 
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she talks about David Hume’s use of irony49, and William Frankena’s failure to see when 
Socrates was not making a rational argument but rather an “extraordinary 
improvisation”50.   
 
In summary, Singer acknowledges that the interpretation of philosophical ideas does 
sometimes, in part, depend upon a literary sensibility and its receptiveness to competing 
and even open-ended determinations of a work’s point or meaning. Further, because of 
his belief that good literature can move and engage us, Singer would no doubt say that 
literature’s form cannot be separated from its content without losing a good deal of 
literature’s contribution to ethics, reason, and philosophy.  
 
However, even with all these acknowledgments, the distance between Singer and 
Diamond on this question has hardly been shortened. In the following passage, Diamond 
characterizes the idea that, in essence, literature merely supplements rational 
philosophical argument:  
 
Literary skill, if a philosopher has it, may then make his ideas strike us 
more forcefully (if we have the requisite sensibility as readers), but the 
important thing for a philosophical reading is the ideas themselves, and 
whatever considerations may rationally support them. Such a view of 
philosophy may go with a narrow conception of the kind of weakness we 
need literary sensibility to see: a narrowing of the notion to weaknesses of 
style in a fairly superficial sense, which might make philosophical ideas 
less striking, less immediately attractive, but not less cogent. Failure of 
style as philosophical failure has then no place.51  
 
                                                 
49 The Realistic Spirit, p.302. 
50 The Realistic Spirit, p.312. Another example is Diamond’s claim that Singer himself initially misread 
Elizabeth Costello’s “arguments” about animals by taking them to be standard philosophical ones rather 
than an extended and nuanced expression of a sense of the horror of what we do to animals – an expression 
that also challenges philosophical preconceptions. In J.M. Coetzee and Ethics, Singer recognizes the 
possible radical nature of Coetzee’s views. 
51 The Realistic Spirit, p.372. 
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For Bernard Williams, style has some role to play in science, and so, indispensably, does 
the imagination. But the styles in science and moral philosophy are crucially different, 
because the scientific imagination “tends to be creative rather than expressive”52. In 
effect, this is another way of saying that Diamond’s criticism – that there is a distinctive 
and irreducible form of ethical thought which employs the imagination and must also 
transform philosophy - cannot be met by repeating Singer’s recent defense of the 
relevance of imaginative literature for serious ethical reflection. Sometimes, Williams 
argues, moral philosophy itself only succeeds if it is expressive and displays the right 
style, to some extent like literature. It may sometimes do this blatantly, as in Nietzsche, 
and as we will see, in the work of poetically inclined philosophers like Vicki Hearne. 
Even when it is not “literary”, moral philosophy must always pay attention to the right 
expressive forms, if it is not to lose some of its subject matter. This matter will be 
returned to.  
 
The possibility of an “extraordinary improvisation” is another of Diamond’s reasons for 
invoking literary imagination. Diamond has drawn attention to the ethical possibilities of 
adventure in writing and in reading. She talks of the “magic worked by a vivid 
imagination” 53 and of the “genius for appreciation”54, which she likens to the 
“improvisation of an actress”55. We may now ask how Diamond’s making or creating 
“something entirely unexpected”56 of facts and situations fits in with Gaita’s 
understanding of the realm of meaning.      
 
Such understanding, Gaita argued, is available to the virtuous peasant, who is 
unreflective but still lucid. This person has moral understanding on Diamond’s account 
too, because she can respond imaginatively in the right way. But although they are 
capable of a kind of transforming perception”57 of facts and things, virtuous peasants, 
                                                 
52 B. Williams, Philosophy as a Humanistic Principle, (Moore, A.W. ed.)(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2006), p.205. 
53 The Realistic Spirit, p.315. 
54 The Realistic Spirit, p.316. 
55 The Realistic Spirit, p.311. 
56 The Realistic Spirit p.312. 
57 The Realistic Spirit, p.313. 
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perhaps, are “bad readers”58. Or at least, they are not as alert as the creative mind is to 
“alarming and unprecedented possibilities, inviting, demanding, improvisation”59.  
 
As we saw, the nature of the unreflective person’s understanding is determined by her 
lucid response to the conceptions of meaning bestowed on her by a culture that has depth. 
Her own insight is also reliant on her culture’s dependence on innovators, perhaps a 
Coetzee or a Lawrence. The sort of wisdom the virtuous peasant has, and the sort she 
lacks, may be acutely relevant in the case of animals, insofar as her society’s sense of 
them is highly variable and, quite probably, relatively unimaginative. But that, of course, 
was why Diamond suggested, as a new movement was getting underway, that leading 
innovators like Singer and Regan had got us off on the wrong foot. In her terms they, in 




The Wittgensteinian influence present in the writing of philosophers like Cora Diamond 
has come under attack from the Kantian philosopher Onora O’Neill. In The Wounded 
Animal, Stephen Mulhall discusses this disagreement against the background of the 
“ancient quarrel” between philosophy and literature stretching back to Plato’s 
“exclusionary gesture”60 - his rejection of poetry as “essentially nonrational activity”61.  
 
In “Anything But Argument”62, Diamond attempted to reveal O’Neill’s misunderstanding 
of one kind of ethical thought. O’Neill had argued63 that Stephen Clark’s The Moral 
Status of Animals mostly failed to provide genuine “argument” which could bring about 
the conviction he sought to effect. Clark’s eclectic work of philosophy is radical in its 
suggestion of a peaceable animal kingdom. It also has a non-metaphysical approach. As 
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Mulhall puts it, Clark “envisages complete detachment from the heart as one way in 
which thinking can exhibit deficiency qua thinking (not: one way in which thinking can 
be caused to be deficient, but rather: one form that rational deficiency may take)”64.  
 
O’Neill’s objects that Clark’s methodology resorts to mere assertion or persuasion. Clark, 
she says, practices a kind of polemical emotivism which can only strike a chord with 
those whose hearts are similarly inclined. One of Diamond’s points is that this claim is 
just empirically untrue – enlarging the hearts affections is just what fine imaginative 
writing, such as Charles Dickens’ engaging fictional writing on children and social 
injustice, aims at and sometimes achieves.  
 
Diamond also suggests that merely rational/metaphysical argumentation can be too 
uncompelling to change minds. Singer, as we saw in the Introduction, holds an opposing 
view that “reason is more universal and more compelling in its appeal”65 than is relying 
on goodhearted-ness. There may be some truth in that – and indeed Singer has been a 
most influential thinker, not least in the way he has applied his philosophical position to 
animals. But his position does not support O’Neill’s blanket empirical claim against 
Clark. Who is to say that some readers were not moved and changed after reading Clark’s 
vision of a peaceable kingdom?  
 
Mulhall’s response to O’Neill’s critique resembles some earlier points. Mulhall says that 
philosophy and literature are “autonomous but internally related” 66. The O’Neill point of 
view, he thinks, is too restrictive about the kind of ethical reflection that goes on in 
literature, and too restrictive also about the nature of reflection in philosophy, with its 
“preference for theoretical principle over the exercise of right judgment from case to 
case”67.  
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In “The Power of Example”68, O’Neill extended her criticism of the idea of philosophy 
informed by literary style and the heart’s affections in a response, if an indirect one, to 
Diamond’s position. Effectively, O’Neill carelessly puts Diamond in an “abstract 
category of ‘Wittgensteinian moral philosophers’”69, and then proceeds to characterize 
the category’s supposed view on the ethical relevance of examples. O’Neill claims that 
Wittgensteinian philosophers: 
 
regard examples not as mere illustrations of theory and principles, or as 
models for action, or as vehicles of moral education, but the pivot of moral 
thought in themselves: attention to them is not a means of getting 
elsewhere, but an end in itself .70 
 
The examples must therefore be “detailed, elaborate, and fully worked out” rather than 
schematic or sketchy71 . Mulhall identifies three problems O’Neill has with this 
ostensible Wittgensteinian deployment of examples.     
 
First, the detailed and concrete examples that are chosen, often from the classics, are 
likely to substantially guarantee shared responses. For they must “presuppose sufficient 
community of moral views” if they are not to result in a “breakdown in communication, 
an impasse of incommensurable frameworks”72, and thereby defeat the appeal the 
examples are supposed to have. Such selection methodology, O’Neill thinks, “leaves little 
room for moral disagreement”73. Second, the meaning and interpretation of the examples 
are constrained by their textual warrant. Third, the literary examples impose a spectator 
perspective by requiring us to “judge characters in their imaginary situation”74 – 
characters whose actions may already have been completed. The examples thus leave us 
“with no responsibility to carry over such judgments into real situations”75.  
                                                 
68 O’Neill, O. ‘The Power of Example’, in Philosophy, 61, 1986, pp.5-29. 
69 The Wounded Animal, p.11. 
70 The Wounded Animal, p.11. 
71 The Wounded Animal, p.11. 
72 The Wounded Animal, p.12. 
73 The Wounded Animal, p.11. 
74 The Wounded Animal, p.12. 
75 The Wounded Animal, p.12. 
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The upshot for O’Neill is that the method of appealing to and eliciting responses from 
richly textured examples collapses into “moral conservatism and moral relativism”76. Or 
of not that, then it degenerates into “mere aestheticism” and irresponsible “moral 
connoisseurship”77. 
 
But for a start, says Mulhall, there is a presumption about the range of philosophy 
influenced by Wittgenstein. In particular, Diamond does precisely the opposite of 
assuming, as O’Neill thinks she must, that “all justification is relative to locally accepted 
practice”78. Diamond explicitly talks about how literature can “enlarge the reader’s moral 
and emotional sensibilities”79, and she believes that it can “enlighten the understanding”80 
not just in relation to private aesthetics but in terms of broader questions in life. And 
there are of course traditions of literary criticism which involve open-ended disputes 
about the “content and significance of a literary text”81. These discussions, too, may have 
broad application to life.   
 
Diamond’s use of literary examples is neither emotivist, relativistic, nor merely aesthetic. 
The very act of choosing the precise examples and elaborating them is important, because 
it may manifest success or failure in showing us how to enlarge our perspective. This 
applies as much to philosophy as to ethical discussions outside that discipline.  
 
Often our interest in literature (and other arts) is not just in the important task of literary 
interpretation, but in the example’s truthfulness. Does it move us – and move us rightly? 
Answering that question also requires, as Leavis indicated, an open-ended discussion. 
When Diamond says we ought to “put our own pressure on the novel itself”82, she has in 
                                                 
76 The Wounded Animal, p.12. 
77 The Wounded Animal, pp.12-13. 
78 The Wounded Animal, p.13. 
79 The Realistic Spirit, p.297. 
80 The Realistic Spirit, p.297. 
81 The Wounded Animal, p.17.  
82 The Realistic Spirit, p.316. 
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mind that we should look dispassionately at the hidden ethical significances and layers of 
meaning (value) which a text might powerfully and authoritatively reveal.  
 
Putting pressure on the text is further to reflect, given any general interpretation we 
manage to find, on whether the content is not after all sentimental or pompous, and 
whether it is therefore trivial and untrue to life. Far from being constrained by the text, 
then, this critical process is liberated in response to it, since its very authority to shed 
light on questions in our lives can be brought into question, or affirmed. The use of the 
text would still require a community of people who can grasp and discuss it, but it would 
not imply a community of members who either happen to agree, or are always bound to 
agree, with one another.    
 
O’Neill is not attentive to the fact that examples can be used as invitations to respond 
variously to them, but always in a critically modulated arena of meaning. This is why the 
examples, even in ethics, are often rightly textured and detailed (whether definite and 
“completed” or ambiguous and open-ended) rather than sketchy and schematic. They 
must not be colorless – they must have “tone”, and the tone must be right, which is to 
say: genuinely convincing and truthful. Such invitations are appeals not to theory, nor to 
creative rational solutions, but to our disciplined use of the imagination.  
 
Clearly, examples that illustrate or influence principles and theories differ from examples 
given in the hope they have a structure capable of affecting our sensibility in certain 
critical ways. Philosophers like Gaita who use examples of the latter kind know that those 
who receive them are responsible in a special way if they are to respond well. The 
responsibility they have is not merely to muster all their rational and logical powers, but 
to be thoughtfully engaged in the right critical fashion. And this requires that they allow 
themselves, to some degree, to trust in rather than dismiss their critical responses when 
they are moved. That trust may be a difficult thing, partly because of the fat, relentless 
ego and the strength of conventional pressures, and also because of the sense that the 
ways we are moved are poor or indulgent modes of thought and are simply not to be 
trusted. Of course, they are only to be trusted when they are disciplined. O’Neill 
 98
exemplifies the philosophical pressure which impels us to mistrust them, that is, almost 
completely mistrust them.  
 
Critical responses also depend crucially on a culture which has the right examples, 
resources, and language to make them engaging – to give them color and life. However, 
there is no a priori reason to predict or insist, as O’Neill does, that this particular use of 
examples to inform arguments – that is, examples upon which we reflect independently 
of theory on what we want to say about them - cannot have unconventional and radical 
implications concerning what matters in life. That was Diamond’s point about Charles 
Dickens’ invitation to re-conceive our sense of the preciousness and irreplaceability of 
children, by producing (sometimes) unsentimental fiction that not only explores their 
misery, but also encourages wonder at their strange and vivid imaginations which are 
bound up with their developing perspectives on the world.         
 
Mulhall makes a further point Diamond’s defense. He says that: 
 
Diamond’s Wittgenstein is precisely someone who sees the original sin of 
philosophy as that of attempting to lay down requirements on the reality it 
aims to contemplate, and who accordingly sees its possibility for 
redemption as lying in the attempt simply to attend to what is there to be 
seen, in all its variety and complexity…Diamond is not even attempting to 
argue that it is a requirement on all competent moral beings that they 
acknowledge the reality of the convictions of the heart, or the relevance 
and importance of literature to philosophy; she is not trying to – she is in 
fact trying not to – lay down any requirements at all. Her aim is simply to 
remind us that it is perfectly intelligible to talk of convictions of the heart, 
and to regard literature as having moral force because of its ability to 
address them – that these ways of conceiving morality and rationality 
exist, and can be explained, and even rendered convincing (although not, 
of course, to everyone). But all that follows from such reminders is that 
philosophers can have no business laying down requirements on the nature 
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of moral thought such that these possibilities entirely disappear from sight. 
To argue against their cogency or plausibility is one thing; to write as if 
their very intelligibility is ruled out in advance, as if by the nature of the 
subject matter or the nature of human reason, is quite another.83 
 
This passage can be unpacked a little. It is a philosophical mistake, Mulhall says, for 
O’Neill or anyone else to attempt to restrict a priori the nature and range of intelligibly 
cogent ethical thought. The warning against being prescriptive about “what is there” 
applies generally: to metaphysics, pure rational argument, and theorizing, to a prior 
conception of the good or of flourishing for human beings, and to the “non-imaginative” 
extension of sympathy and empathy. In her attack on Clark and on the Wittgenstein-
inspired use of examples, this is a Wittgensteinian point O’Neill does not address. 
 
Diamond is aware that, philosophically speaking, one of her insights into the nature of 
ethical thought – namely, the nature of the imaginative intelligence and its role – is 
“highly disputable; and it is perfectly all right for philosophers to dispute it”84. Here can 
be seen her careful refusal to be prescriptive and close-minded concerning the nature of 
thinking about value. It is part of philosophy’s task, she thinks, to argue over that nature. 
The basic philosophical mistake, in her opinion, is to “lay down exclusive ground rules” 
in “blithe unconsciousness” of other views of what “morality and its relation to human 
nature” can consist in85. Such dogmatism constitutes “philosophical obtuseness”86.    
 
However, Diamond does not conceive of such philosophical blindness as a wholly 
impersonal matter87. If it were that, then the most that philosophers like O’Neill and 
Singer would have to admit is that, in addition to its rational elements – however thickly 
or sparely those elements are spread in ethical practice – much of the moral discussion 
that actually goes on is indeed emotivist waffle; that in making ethical judgments people 
                                                 
83 The Wounded Animal, pp.14-15. 
84 The Realistic Spirit, p.307. 
85 The Realistic Spirit, p.307. 
86 The Realistic Spirit, p.316. 
87 The Realistic Spirit, p.307. 
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too often, perhaps more often than we have hoped and assumed, go in for mere cajoling 
and emoting.  
 
Boiled down to its essence, of course, that is what these philosophers would say about 
Diamond’s account of the nature of the imagination. So she would not necessarily get 
very far with opponents like Singer were she simply to say that there is more imaginative 
activity and language in ethical practice than people have thought. Nor, it seems, would 
her opponents thereby be forced to abandon their favored position on ethical reason.  
 
Yet the assertion that there is a wholly impersonal way of adequately determining the 
range and nature of ethical thought – including the nature of its cognitive features 
assuming it has them - is itself an unwarranted assumption. As Mulhall puts it, there is 
“no evaluatively neutral way”88 of properly appreciating the nature of intelligible and 
cogent modes of attention: “To think otherwise is to commit oneself to the all-too-
familiar fantasy of an abyssal distinction between the domain of value-neutral facts and 
the evaluative systems we superimpose upon it”89.       
 
In other words, a thinker cannot properly grasp the nature and significance of thinking in 
the realm of meaning if she is not vulnerable to making sentimental judgments or to 
being moved by how some things are really hollow and vapid, rather than merely 
irrational. As Diamond says, this is akin to a live literary sensibility. 
 
Nor can our thinker grasp the cognitive role of the critical concepts if, under 
philosophical pressure or for other reasons, she tries to distance herself from them in 
serious ethical reflection. If she is of a certain temperament, she may want to confine the 
deployment of those concepts to (as Singer said) the nonrational and “more human” 
pockets of life. But these pockets are large and deep. In so denying her critical responses, 
she will have entirely failed to understand how a major part of ethical language is used. 
                                                 
88 The Wounded Animal, p.9. 




In practice, such a person might be called shallow. In philosophy, Diamond and Gaita 
would say it represents an unwillingness or incapacity to look fairly at ethical practice. 
 
In the lengthy passage above, Mulhall attacks the prescriptive tendency in philosophy to 
rule out forms of reason or thought without paying close attention to them. Further, he 
thinks, to do that in a non-evaluative manner would be to misunderstand them. In that 
passage he also wrote: “Diamond is not even attempting to argue that it is a requirement 
on all competent moral beings that they acknowledge the reality of the convictions of the 
heart, or the relevance and importance of literature to philosophy”. 
 
It is certainly not a requirement imposed by rationality or reason per se that we 
acknowledge these modes of response. We need to look at and see what the genuine 
“requirements” of critical thought in this realm are like. Singer retains, of course, a 
preference, indeed a reverence, for strictly rational thought – limiting his appeals, for 
instance, to the essentially non-imaginative and rational faculties of other reasoning 
beings.  Even assuming his style of thought is not fallacious or conceptually mistaken – 
no doubt a big assumption – we can still raise the question whether Singer’s thinking is 
appropriate to its subject matter and lives up to our sense of its gravity. 
 
We have observed the philosophical error involved in laying down any a priori 
requirements on ethical thought. What may we say after surveying the terrain as best we 
can? Diamond identifies another kind of obtuseness in ethics which occurs at a different 
level. Moreover, her body of work as a whole is strongly critical of certain normative 
forms of thinking about ethical issues. Thus, she claims that moral theories like 
utilitarianism have “nothing to do with moral thought”90 and that they have, not only 
unjust or mistaken implications, but ludicrous ones. Mulhall notes that for Diamond it 
would be “sheer comedy”91, say, to try to justify Dickens’ sense of the preciousness of 
children by appealing to their properties. That applies even to the property of the child’s 
propensity for imaginative fancy.  
                                                 
90 Value and Understanding, p.174. 
91 The Wounded Animal, p.8. 
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Again, Diamond is not here responding “emotively”. On the contrary, her attunement to 
(unintentional) comic effect - a sensibility regarded as unimportant in this domain by 
many theorizers - is related to the type of effect to which we must remain attuned and 
thus susceptible if we are to appreciate satisfactorily the nature of ethical thought. More 
precisely, what Diamond is responding to are some of the products of a form of thought 
that has no ear at all for comedy, or more generally, for “tone”. It has been Raimond 
Gaita’s contention that the critical terms of appraisal in subject matter of this type, unlike 
in mathematics and science, cannot afford to be tone-deaf. 
 
Diamond’s claim is that thinking well about the meaning of human and animal life is 
only possible when, in addition to our rational commitments and understanding of the 
facts, we can be imaginatively moved; it is distorted or undermined by attempts at 
justification that go on quite independently of such imaginings. Diamond argues that: 
 
a reflective appreciation and judgment of our mode of response is possible 
without that view of justification. We can reflect on the experience we 
have of life with a concept and can intelligently judge it to be better (say) 
than life without that concept, or with it but radically changed, would be.92 
 
One aspect of seeing our lives as better off with Gaita’s critical concepts is not just that 
our lives would be better or richer. It is rather that they are the right concepts; if our lives 
are better, it is because these categories help us to see things as they are. An imagination 
that is not “heart-indifferent” and which appeals to our sensibilities and even “affections” 
is not a mere aid or a mere encumbrance to ethical thought, as O’Neill believes. It may be 
those things, of course: daydreaming and creative flights of fancy, like the fat, relentless 
ego, can be bad (or good) for any effort to see truly. But it is also wrapped up inextricably 
with a distinct kind of understanding. A range of responses, such as horror, revulsion, 
joy, wonder, love, respect, and humor can conceptually build up our sense of other beings 
including animals (though such responses cannot be independent of a range of ordinary 
                                                 
92 Human Beings, p.61. 
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facts about them). Furthermore, as the Lawrence example indicated, the recognition of 
the reality of others, gorillas or people, cannot occur without a personal element of 
imaginative responsiveness.  
 
We might agree with Diamond that there are some important conditions of educating a 
human being into a mature and critical “responsiveness to life”, as Henry James put it. 
Children must be taught certain imaginative ways of responding, even creatively and 
adventurously responding, if they are to develop the thoughtfulness and insight needed to 
see things the way they are. This, no doubt, will involve exposure to art and story, and to 
serious and gripping discussions about meaning. It will involve engaging children in the 
sort of conversation in which human beings and their lives – and other things, like 
animals and their ways of living – are spoken of in a particular manner, perhaps with 
imaginative tones of horror, confusion, joy, sadness, and wonder. 
 
But it should not be forgotten that the reason Diamond’s sense of the imagination is 
inseparable from the grasp of certain meanings is that this imagination partakes in, and is 
subject to, the critical terms of review which identify a distinctive domain. This domain is 
not self-enclosed and isolated: it is conceptually related to all kinds of rational thought, 
factual understanding, creative endeavor, and imaginative response. Nonetheless, it is 
distinguished from them to the extent that its cognitive dimension has a particular 
character.  
 
D.H. Lawrence’s prose, evoking the mysterious individual being of a gorilla, which for 
Lawrence is inseparably connected with the deeper respect that failed to impress itself 
upon the hunter’s deadened sensibility, was an exercise of the imagination that can be 
judged according to its capacity to ring true. Gaita would say that this is neither the kind 
of judgment that is merely aesthetic nor the kind that may be improved upon – say, by 
appeal to higher cognitive standards which might be accessible if only human beings 
were not so restricted by their primate heritage.  
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Yet the point is there are no other adequate standards and no higher courts of appeal. The 
right standards are those which, in a special fashion, combine heart and head, imagination 
and rationality. In particular, the critical concepts Gaita speaks of, which recognize 
cognitive content only when it exists in certain forms, and truthful content in even fewer 
of them, are not inferior or just-good-enough tools of understanding. Instead, our 
immersion in them allows us to appreciate that they are the only critical terms with which 
we can adequately make sense of the character of certain realities. And in doing that, this 
critical language gives rise to the sense that rival philosophical options (often “theories”) 
are inadequate, often ludicrously inadequate, to the common cognitive task of making 
sense of things.        
 
Many people will most readily see that a mode of thought which must attend to “tone” 
applies to reflection on literature. But Gaita’s recognition that this general form of 
thought is as fully cognitive as ethical thought intelligibly can be, and that it also applies 
more generally to questions about value and meaning, bridges the gap that many 
philosophers believe separates the kind of thinking (or “thinking”) that is embodied in 
imaginative literature and other forms of art from genuinely ethical reflection.  
 
So: in the light of the previous exposition, what in terms of our topic is the proper role of 
the imagination and of culturally resonant and creative activity? The next chapter 
discusses some so-called imaginative makings of human life; imaginative responsiveness 


















Chapter 5 – Difference and Differences 
 
Part I of this thesis sought to develop a contrast between two broad ways of thinking 
about ethical matters and, in consequence of that, two different conceptions of doing 
moral philosophy. The first of these, encompassing a variety of traditional methodologies 
in the subject, relied upon a view of reason or cognitive activity as essentially “rational” 
activity. Different meta-ethical views, of course, spell out the nature of rationality in 
ethics differently. For example, Singer’s “foundationalism” considers Regan’s 
“coherentist” methodology, which is permissive towards ethical “intuitions” and beliefs, 
to be less than fully rational. Singer even seems to believe that over time and in principle 
(if not in practice) a convergence in ethical belief might emerge, because ethical reason, 
like the scientific method, has a “vindicatory” dimension (to use Bernard Williams’ 
word). Though lacking Singer’s strictness, many other philosophers who are critical of 
foundationalism often retain an assumption about the nature of objectivity in ethics and 
the importance of theory. Rosalind Hursthouse is one of these, despite her insistence that 
ethical belief and understanding is inseparable from slowly acquired experience and from 
a background pattern of behavior that gives our ethical life its rich texture and 
complexity. In different degrees, then, the dominant philosophical options tend to picture 
ideal and objective ethical reflection, and the ideal ethical agent, in a “rational” way. 
They also leave out some or much activity that is of an imaginative sort.       
 
The alternative conception of reason considered in Part I was that genuine thinking in 
ethics could be understood through Gaita’s concept of the “realm of meaning”. Reflecting 
on meaning, it was argued, is a bona fide form of thinking which has its own critical 
vocabulary and which is equally an attempt to see things as they are. This conception 
views the ethical agent as an individual who can be critically moved in response to the 
way in which ethical ideas are presented. Moreover, while it is not opposed to more 
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strictly “rational” forms of thought, and indeed depends on them, reflecting and arguing 
in the realm of meaning is arguably the only means by which genuine and serious ethical 
understanding can be achieved. That itself is a view that can only reached by individuals 
who can be critically moved. We can now extend this argument a little further. 
 
Someone who could not be moved in regard to ethical matters would not be able to use 
the terms of appraisal in that field intelligently, any more than a person who was 
unresponsive to art could be in a position to intelligently assess it. By way of contrast, 
suppose a person who is indifferent to painting, film, and literature or who, while having 
a tendency to be moved, is dismissive of the usual patterns of aesthetic response. A 
person in that state of indifference or antipathy might assume that aesthetic judgment is 
merely subjective or emotive. And indeed, some people do deny that the realm of the 
aesthetic is genuinely cognitive. But it would be strange for anyone to think that there are 
strictly rational criteria which distinguish good art from bad, deep from shallow, and 
which determine the appropriate kinds of responses. We know that in art, form and (in 
some sense) “tone” are essential. Furthermore, anyone who is moved by some works of 
art, and is acting under no restrictive assumption about the nature of reason, can hardly 
believe that purely rational argument is a serious rival means of obtaining genuine 
understanding with this subject matter. That is because in this domain, serious 
understanding for such respondents is about understanding the artistic forms that have 
richness and depth, or which are trite, naïve, and so forth.   
 
If a subject matter – including, perhaps, the most abstract forms of art - can be appraised 
through the previously identified critical terms which emerge from lived experience and 
response, then the subject matter belongs to the realm of meaning. But clearly, the realm 
of meaning is also concerned with questions of how we are to live and of what really 
matters in life - questions that appear in art as well as in other places. As was flagged in 
the Introduction, such general matters may be called, in line with Williams’ 
recommendation, “ethical”. The ethical includes, and (as we shall see) is conceptually 
connected to, “morality” but is not limited to it. It was also argued that if the view from 
the realm of meaning can be defended, the range of possible ethical positions cannot be 
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fixed a priori. That is, the content of the realm of thought in which ethical meaning is 
discovered cannot be predetermined or prescriptively ruled out by the requirements of 
naturalism, universal prescriptivism, reflective equilibrium, the “rational basis” of ethics, 
etc. To be sure, a person may claim to be moved by (say) only those ethical judgments 
determined by the criteria of natural excellence and flourishing, or (say) by the process of 
engaging hypothetically in argument with other rational and self-interested beings of any 
kind. But always it must be recognized that any such views are themselves subject to 
criticism as being shallow, inhuman, irrelevant, and so on. This can occur in an opened 
ended and ever deepening manner. Those approaches and requirements thus have no 
privileged status and must fend for themselves by reference to forms of appraisal of a 
very different sort. 
 
What this means is that there can be no restrictions laid down in advance of entering that 
realm concerning the content of possible ethical views about humans and animals. There 
are of course rational constraints on what may, in an ethical sense, intelligibly be thought 
about animals and humans - what makes them valuable or constitutes their ‘individuality’ 
for example - but there are no rational and factual constraints upon the range of 
substantive and intelligible views about them in the realm of meaning. Further, if it were 
proposed that the content of that realm could or should be justified, grounded, or 
underwritten by purely rational argument independent of the special terminology of 
criticism previously identified, then it should be recognized that this proposal moves the 
assessment to a place outside the realm of meaning. The relocation, it must be said, 
necessarily undermines the possibility of wisdom or lucidity, because an insightful, 
estimable, or wise understanding cannot be achieved independently of lived experience, 
and independently of critical contact with cultural forms like art and story-telling, as well 
as with serious human conversations with people whose quality of lucid thinking we 
respect. 
 
There is, it was stressed, no a priori restriction on content. Nonetheless, people like 
Singer are not wrong to say that we are animals, and that ethics developed naturally from 
the circumstances of one peculiar and intelligent animal. Part of the significance of this 
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for Singer is that it brings creatures (usually kin) that can feel and have preferences into 
the arena of otherwise selfish concern, forming a small circle of beings which can be 
greatly expanded with the help of reason’s strict impartiality. When Bernard Williams 
deems Singer’s radically “impartial” view of sentient life unintelligible, he does not 
primarily mean that it is logically incoherent; he means that it is inhuman or simply 
crazy1. He thinks Singer’s view is too far removed from the “peculiarities of the human 
enterprise” and from the responses of “wonder, joy, sympathy, disgust, horror”2 that 
structure our ethical lives. 
 
Williams uses the fact that ethics is a practice amongst human beings – in particular the 
fact that “we” are the ones who discuss ethics, not with animals or with nature but with 
each other - to suggest that it is 
 
unsurprising that “this ‘we’ often shows up within the content of our 
values. Whether a creature is a human being or not makes a large 
difference, a lot of the time, to the ways in which we treat that creature or 
at least think that we should treat it.3  
 
Williams thinks that our humanity and our peculiar human disposition lead naturally to a 
strong sense of our “ethical identity as a species”4. For him, the content of ethics is both 
anthropocentrically conditioned and centered on the primary significance of human life.   
 
The question of what kind of animals we are is partly connected to how we see ourselves 
as importantly different from other animals; and what we make of our “animality” can 
have implications for ethics. It is usual in the animal ethics literature for authors to allude 
to the views on human nature of great philosophers like Descartes, Kant, and Aquinas. 
Mary Midgley regards Enlightenment thought in general as favoring the “exaltation of 
Reason”, despite the presence of thinkers like Bentham, Montaigne, and Voltaire, who 
                                                 
1 B. Williams, Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p.147. 
2 Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, p.147. 
3 Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline p.138. 
4 Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, p.152. 
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had a more inclusive perspective on man’s place in the universe5. Stephen Clark thinks 
the “rational hierarchy” is a “paranoid fantasy”. JM Coetzee’s character Elizabeth 
Costello characterizes the general idea with these words: “animals, lacking reason, cannot 
understand the universe but have simply to follow its rules blindly, proves that, unlike 
man, they are part of it but not part of its being: that man is godlike, animals thinglike”6. 
Costello sees in this view of “Reason” simply “one tendency of human thought”, a 
limited “spectrum of human thinking”7, rather than the whole of serious human 
reflection.         
 
Still, it has been emphasized that there is no telling in advance of thinking in a certain 
involved and critical manner what to make of being human and of being animal. Like 
Kant, Singer’s Enlightenment reverence for “Reason” leads him into very different places 
to Williams. Williams has emphasized a broader conception of human thinking which he 
believes will result in “values that express our humanity”8 and will therefore leave human 
beings as central subjects of ethical thought and concern. In a somewhat different way, 
human beings are central to ethics in the work of Cora Diamond,  not least in her essay 
‘Eating Meat and Eating People’, an essay that was important to the subsequent work of 
Raimond Gaita.  
 
Soon after the publication of Animal Liberation, Diamond responded to the style of 
argument, propounded especially by Singer and Regan, which says that the concept of a 
human being plays no significant role in ethical thought. Singer argued that it is not being 
human as such that is of moral importance, but rather the possession of sentience and 
preference-interests. Regan was to argue in The Case for Animal Rights that the thing that 
grounds equal moral status amongst creatures is being a “subject-of-a-life”. Such a 
subject has “beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including 
their own future; an emotional life together with feeling of pleasure and pain; preference 
and welfare interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a 
                                                 
5 Mary Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983), p.11. 
6 J.M. Coetzee, Elizabeth Costello: Eight Lessons (2nd ed.), (Melbourne: Knopf, 2003), p.67. 
7 Elizabeth Costello, p.67. 
8 Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, p.138. 
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psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their 
experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independently of their utility for 
others and logically independent of their being the object of anyone else’s interests.”9  
 
So in the view of these two philosophers, it is having preferences, or meeting the 
conditions of a subject-of-a-life, that are the centrally significant facts or characteristics 
in ethics. These are, of course, only two well known examples; there is no shortage of 
candidate facts or properties which are thought to help establish the moral irrelevance of 
being human, or which are offered as examples of morally irrelevant characteristics, or 
which are used to help justify the significance of human life. For example, there are the 
biological facts – perhaps those that mark off species in terms of genetics, decent and 
breeding group, anatomy, physiology, function, and/or behavior. Naturalists like Phillipa 
Foot, and in a complex way Rosalind Hursthouse, make much of “biological” evaluations 
concerning excellence and flourishing, and the way these determine the good and the 
value of life. Or again, there are what James Rachels calls “biographical” features, which 
are those features that allow animals with “fairly sophisticated mental capacities” 10 to 
“have a life”, a biography, rather than to merely “be alive”11. Such biographical features 
include familiar items in this strain of moral thought: capacities, abilities, relationships, 
interests, and projects.  
 
Yet again, some philosophers point to relational properties, such as those of belonging to 
the human kind. David McNaughton, for instance, regards it as a fact of basic moral 
importance that severely retarded humans, unlike chimpanzees who belong to a different 
kind, can be said to have missed out on typical “human” lives12. These facts and 
circumstances gain their relevance, for these moral philosophers, in the first place from 
the principles and theories which pick them out. But often the arguments that are used 
simply appeal to our sense, independent of any philosophical or theoretical commitments, 
                                                 
9 T. Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p.243. 
10 J. Rachels, Created from Animals: the Moral Implications of Darwinism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), p.208. 
11 Created from Animals, p.199. 
12 In D. Cockburn (ed.), Human Beings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.79. 
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that certain capacities or features are morally relevant or irrelevant and arbitrary as the 
case may be.            
 
Diamond notes that it is characteristic of philosophers such as Singer and Regan, in the 
prosecution of their arguments for forms of human-animal equality, to stress that we are 
animals too, and that other animals are less prejudicially described as “nonhuman 
animals”. According to scientists like Richard Dawkins and Jared Diamond, it would 
make more scientific sense to place chimps and humans in the same animal genus. This 
reclassification would make humans “the third chimpanzee”13, thereby overturning a 
misleading taxonomy that, as Singer says, springs from the “desire to separate us from 
other animals”14. It is also characteristic of this style of argument to point out that 
differences between human beings and animals are differences of degree and not of kind, 
and that science and increasingly careful attention to animals is closing the gap, showing 
us that the differences are not as sweeping and as sharp as we naturally thought.  
However, it is part of Cora Diamond’s unusual response to this style of argument, and to 
related arguments which rather attack animal life, that she does not exactly dispute these 
allegations. Rather, she asks us to question its assumptions by isolating a certain 
distinction which is being ignored. This distinction she describes as being between 
“differences” and “difference”. Here is the key extract: 
 
The difference between human beings and animals is not to be discovered 
by studies of Washoe or the activities of dolphins. It is not that sort of 
study or ethology or evolutionary theory that is going to tell us the 
difference between us and animals: the difference is, as I have suggested, a 
central concept for human life and is more an object of contemplation than 
observation (though that might be misunderstood; I am not suggesting it is 
a matter of intuition). One source of confusion here is that we fail to 
distinguish between ‘the difference between animals and people’ and ‘the 
differences between animals and people’; the same sort of confusion 
                                                 
13 P. Singer, Writings on an Ethical Life (Salisbury South: Griffin Press, 2000), p.81. 
14 Writings on an Ethical Life, p.81. 
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occurs in discussion of the relationship of men and women. In both cases 
people appeal to scientific evidence to show that ‘the difference’ is not as 
deep as we think; but all such evidence can show, or show directly, is that 
the differences are less sharp than we think. In the case of the difference 
between people and animals, it is clear that we form the idea of this 
difference, create the concept of the difference, knowing perfectly well the 
overwhelmingly obvious similarities.15 
   
To put this in the terms developed in Part I of the thesis, the difference between human 
beings (or people) and animals is one that is discovered in the realm of meaning. This 
means its nature and its reality would need to be revealed by a critical examination of the 
forms or styles in which the difference is presented. That is why Diamond speaks, not 
about what the facts are, but about what we have made and can make of human life 
compared to animal life, and of whether what we have made is of any value. The so-
called “difference” emerges in our practices, institutions, literature, art, and language. 
Our sense of this “difference”, of course, is something that is set in train, as  Hursthouse 
might say, from the way human children develop and are taught. Regan and Singer are 
right to point out how deep in human life this sense of difference goes, and how it is 
reinforced in our relationships and in our cultural products over and again.  
 
It is one of Diamond’s contributions to this debate that this “difference” is something 
philosophers routinely overlook, or do not in any case address, often because they assume 
it is emotivist “waffle” and adornment. Usually, they attack suggestions of a divide 
between human beings and animals as irrelevant to the substance of the claims or 
prescriptions we actually make, and they think such talk is recognizable, once we have 
sifted through the outpourings of emotion, as ultimately based in some matter of natural 
(or supernatural) fact. It is often thought by these critics that talk of human preciousness 
or sacredness is essentially grounded in metaphysical religious beliefs or their vestiges, 
                                                 
15 C. Diamond, The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy and the Mind (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 
1995), p.324.  
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and/or in its essence reduces to prejudiced claims about membership of the favored 
group.  
 
This typical tendency to pass over Diamond’s distinction leads to misconceptions about 
what people are doing when they appeal to the fact that someone is a human being, or 
“one of us”, or ought to be treated in a certain way merely because they are human and 
not animal. Singer’s suggestion is that “human being” can mean either member of Homo 
sapiens or “person” - that is, having the capacities of persons: being rational and self-
conscious16. Since people do not usually mean “Lockean person” when they use the term 
“human being”, Singer and some other philosophers tend to assume they can only mean a 
member of  Homo sapiens – that is, a biological grouping determined by several or a 
cluster of the characteristics mentioned above. Hence their accusation of speciesism, 
which parallels the meaning they attach to racism – a meaning that is similarly based in a 
biological distinction. Given the complex ways we think and talk about ethical matters, 
this assumption about what people really mean by “human being” or “people”, or by 
“men and women” or “fellow human”, is obviously a big one to make. 
 
Diamond suggests that it is a matter of central importance in ethics to know “what kind of 
beings” there are17  in our lives. The sort of “kind” she has in mind is, she stresses, “not a 
biological concept”18. If the imagination is one of her focal meta-ethical concepts, then 
her focal normative concept is that of “merely being human”19. Such an idea is for her 
central because it affects the nature of most of the other moral ideas, including ideas 
about duty, virtue, and justice. In fact, Diamond regards many of the constituents of her 
(culturally mediated) idea of the human, such as the names we give new-born children, 
not so much as moral notions but as elements which are the “source of moral life”20. She 
means by this that they are the sorts of things that constitute our sense of the kind of 
animal we are dealing with and that give the moral notions their sense and character. 
Without them, our familiar, and to a significant degree shared, moral life would look 
                                                 
16 P. Singer, Practical Ethics (2nd ed.) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.87. 
17 The Realistic Spirit, p.323. 
18 The Realistic Spirit, p.328. 
19 D. Cockburn (ed.), Human Beings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.59. 
20 The Realistic Spirit, p.326. 
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totally different. As we will see, some of the constituents of a widely shared conception 
of human life are straightforwardly moral; but others are, following Williams, perhaps 
better called “ethical”. They could also be known as meanings or as basic values.  
 
Certain conceptions of “human being”, Diamond argues, are formed from a background 
comprising a “mass of ways of thinking about and responding”21. Many of these are so 
commonplace and deep in human life that we do not notice them. Yet it is those 
background conditions which give rise to quite fundamental values and meanings, for 
they enter conceptually into their substance. When Diamond calls some of the common 
practices and ways of responding and relating, like giving babies names, the “source of 
moral life”, she does not simply mean the causal and developmental conditions of 
morality, as important to the nature of morality as those conditions are. Instead, she 
means that these pervasive and powerful background responses and interactions which 
are of an ethical nature, especially those that give rise to a sense of the “difference”, 
become the essential constituents of our more overtly moral beliefs and responses. In 
other words, these deep value commitments,  provide the direction and the complexion of 
our moral lives.  
 
The “difference” is, according to Diamond, signaled by our talk of “animals and 
humans”, and of “us and them”. In this sort of talk we set ourselves apart from the rest of 
creation - from even the most intelligent mammals. We also speak of our fellow human 
beings and of a common and shared humanity. The distinction between humans and 
everything else is indicated by Diamond when she refers to our fellows “in having a 
human life to lead”22, and to Joseph Conrad’s “feeling of unavoidable solidarity” in 
“mysterious origin, in toil, in hope, in uncertain fate, which binds men to each other and 
all mankind to the visible world”23.  
 
An illustration of our sense of the difference is provided by Peter Singer, who uses a 
thought-experiment to show just how deep this sense of difference runs. He asks us to 
                                                 
21 The Realistic Spirit, p.331. 
22 Human Beings, p.43. 
23 Human Beings, p.50. 
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reflect on a new kind of institution found in the Netherlands which houses people who 
are physically normal but intellectually “well below the normal human level”24. These 
people, Singer explains, were given extensive freedom within the institution. Despite 
having greatly diminished minds compared to normal human beings, they were permitted 
to communicate in various ways with one another, cooperate intelligently on shared 
projects, have strong relationships, develop a kind of political structure with leaders and 
followers, display a rudimentary form of justice or fairness, and exercise their 
intelligences in solving problems and puzzles. But in addition, we are told, the inmates 
were given free rein to have sex with one another, to fight over sexual partners, and to 
raise children together. Singer also asks us to reflect on what we might say if we found 
out that the inmates were later used in experiments which infected them with HIV and 
hepatitis25, and were treated as if they “did not have the same right to life as normal 
human beings”26. 
 
No doubt, Singer observes, we would feel “shock and a sense of outrage”27 at the 
treatment these people received and the way they were regarded. Obviously, our sense of 
their undignified and appalling treatment is informed by the fact that, in the above 
scenario, we take these “people” to be disabled human beings rather than the 
chimpanzees who, as a matter of fact (he reveals), were the “inmates” in the Dutch 
“institution”. Singer wants us to acknowledge how our response changes (he thinks 
unjustifiably) when it is revealed he is using the term “people” in the reported situation to 
simply imply “person”, in the sense here defined by John Locke: “A thinking intelligent 
being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking 
thing, in different times and places”28. Chimpanzees, whales, dolphins, elephants, and 
perhaps even dogs, pigs, and cows may possess this capacity, Singer believes. His point 
is not that we aren’t outraged and shocked by the prospect of infecting chimps with HIV 
and hepatitis, but that our “automatic assumption” is that there is a fundamental ethical 
difference between the two kinds of individuals in the thought-experiment, even though 
                                                 
24 Writings on an Ethical Life, p.73. 
25 Writings on an Ethical Life, p.75. 
26 Writings on an Ethical Life, p.75. 
27 Writings on an Ethical Life, p.76. 
28 Writings on an Ethical Life, p.76. 
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both are equally “persons”. All things being equal (in two-level utilitarian terms), he 
wants us to respond ethically to harmful experiments upon retarded human beings or 
young children, and harmful experiments upon intelligent animals, in exactly the same 
manner: with an equal level of reluctance and dismay. 
 
It can be guessed from the possible “mass of ways of responding” to which Diamond 
alludes that the conceptual unraveling of “people” or “human being” is going to be a 
complex affair. Diamond gives several key examples, one of which is that we do not 
normally eat our dead or the amputated limbs of human beings29; and that when we think 
we may or must, we only do so with the reluctance and distress that comes from finding it 
always horrible, and in normal circumstances unthinkably Swiftian. In fact, we may 
regard our reactions of horror, absurdity, and disbelief to such ideas as eating children or 
babies as paradigm examples of those responses. Hardly anything, it seems, is so basic 
and irrevocable in our sense of life as these things.  
 
Another of Diamond’s basic examples, one I have already mentioned, is that as a matter 
of course we find it, if not exactly morally wrong then certainly inconceivable - and as 
Charles Dickens shows sometimes comic - to give human children numbers instead of 
names30. Failing to name children is not thought to be just eccentric or morally 
imprudent. Nor is it something we simply do not do and find unthinkable because we are 
human: our finding it impossible is mediated by our sense that it is inhuman and 
ludicrous. We would think that there was something so deeply wrong with someone who, 
though quite rational still forgot to name their children, that we surely could not find our 
feet with them – and not simply because we think they failed a test of sound prudential 
and moral thinking. At the same time, everyone responds to the careful selection and 
unveiling of names for children as a joyful, meaningful, and indispensable ceremonial 
part of introducing a new human being to its family and to society.  
 
                                                 
29 The Realistic Spirit, p.321. 
30 The Realistic Spirit, p.323. 
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Although Diamond talks about some often unnoticed and very elementary ways of 
responding to people and animals, and although she draws attention to the “source of 
moral life”, she does not mean that these responses are merely the psychological building 
material of morality. Reactions of horror, joy, love, revulsion, and so on are sources of 
the notion of “kind”, and thus of morality, in the sense that they are reactions wholly 
made from within the realm of meaning. As such, they are made out of, and are subject to 
assessment from, the critical concepts. They are, that is, forms in which we are critically 
moved, and they are indispensable for acquiring the right sort of perspicacity or lucidity 
in ethical thought. Her view is thus diametrically opposed to the view expressed recently 
by Singer when he spoke of literature’s ability to shed light upon the more personal and 
“human” parts of our lives31.  For Singer, our personal and human selves are obviously 
important to us, and this is one major reason we love literature and consider it important; 
but those selves are not necessarily relevant to moral argument.  
 
The above forms of response are part of what someone may mean in using the term 
“human being” or “person”, where this has the implication that a human being is not a 
thing, an “it”, or an animal, and must be addressed by name. Such responses help build 
up the notion we may have of a certain “kind” of creature. Further examples of 
Diamond’s include the “difference between giving people a funeral and giving a dog 
one”32, and the need people feel to honor the human dead, even those who are 
anonymous and whose identity has been lost to human history33.  Again, we may be 
moved by the idea that there is something uniquely strange and “mysterious in human 
life”34, something highly peculiar, and this may also be part of registering the 
“difference”.          
 
To Diamond’s way of thinking, Singer and Regan do not realize the possible ethical 
implications of the fact that sometimes “we eat them”35. Strangely enough, Diamond 
                                                 
31 A. Leist & P. Singer (eds.), J.M. Coetzee and Ethics: Philosophical Perspectives on Literature (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2010), p.5. 
32 The Realistic Spirit, p.322. 
33 Human Beings, p.58. 
34 Human Beings, p.40. 
35 The Realistic Spirit, p.324. 
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thinks, Singer’s and Regan’s arguments entail that there is nothing odd or curious about a 
vegetarian eating a cow that has been struck by lightning 36 and that there is no essential 
“difference between miscegenation and chacun a son gout with consenting gorillas”37. 
But there is, she suggests, something that needs explaining about a person who is 
seriously appalled by the (‘humane’) raising, of animals for food, and who casually eats 
them when they are killed accidentally. And, she thinks, it is obviously bizarre for anyone 
to believe that bestiality is not something to be repelled by. As it happens, Singer himself 
rejects her accusation by reminding her of the nature of his theory. He is puzzled as to 
why Diamond thinks the vegetarian who eats animals that are accidently killed 
“curious”38 given the structure of certain vegetarian stances such as his own; and (in an 
article called “Beastly Passions” posted on his website) he shows his commitment to 
theory, as well as his deep suspicion of language used in the realm of meaning, by finding 
no good reason to object in principle to bestiality. Underlying Singer’s reaction is the fact 
that his theory does not, in a basic ethical sense, take seriously such notions as respect for 
dead bodies and sexual dignity.   
 
The way people respond to the killing and eating of animals also delineates the 
“difference”. This is noted by Gaita when he claims that “we do not and cannot respond 
to what happens in the abattoir as we respond to murder”39. He says “no one can 
seriously wish to respond, to the slaughter of animals as though it justified taking up arms 
against farmers, butchers, and people who work in abattoirs”40. It is for this reason that 
Gaita criticizes Elizabeth Costello’s apparent moral assimilation of animal consumption 
and the Holocaust in Coetzee’s much discussed book. Costello errs, he thinks, not 
primarily because she misuses the Holocaust, but because she forgets the very elementary 
ethical difference between killing a human and killing an animal.     
 
There is another and larger reason why Gaita thinks we cannot respond to the killing of 
animals as murder. Throughout his work, Gaita has developed the idea that human 
                                                 
36 The Realistic Spirit, p.322. 
37 The Realistic Spirit, p.322. 
38 P. Singer, ‘Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 9, no. 4, 1980, p.327.  
39 R. Gaita, The Philosopher’s Dog (New York: Random House, 2005), p.217. 
40 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.216. 
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beings, like nothing else in nature, are “unique and irreplaceable”. His argument 
describes, more fully than in Diamond’s work, some of the most significant reasons for 
thinking there is a difference between human beings and all other animals. It will be of 
interest to look (too briefly) at Gaita’s understanding of this supposed difference, because 
it pushes apart the gap between human beings and animals – a gap that Singer and others 
want to close - and it does so very markedly. At the same time, his sense of the difference 
will allow us to inquire into how it is that our peculiar human animality - the fact that we 
share obvious characteristics and vulnerabilities with animals while being the only 
animal, to discuss ethics amongst ourselves -  affects our understanding of both humans 
and nonhumans.      
 
The topic can be approached by way of Rush Rhees’ reflections in Moral Questions. 
Rhees’ first claim is as follows: 
 
We might say that an animal’s life does not go one way rather than 
another. It just goes on. (The animal may be comfortable or 
uncomfortable. It may suffer much or little. But you cannot talk of 
direction, because you cannot talk of goals, or of success or failure in its 
life, or of progress or degeneration.)… 
You cannot say that the animal just lets himself be carried along by 
circumstances (as you might say of some men) any more than you can say 
that it tried to shape the course of its own life… 
An otter cannot lead one kind of life rather than another.41   
 
Rhees arguably misleads by denying that animals can have “goals”. Nevertheless, 
animals and humans, according to his claim, have fundamentally different ways of living 
and of participating in life42. The phrases “ways of living” and “forms of life” apply, 
Rhees believed (following Wittgenstein), to human beings in a way they do not apply to 
                                                 
41 R. Rhees, Moral Questions, ed. D.Z. Phillips (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), pp.168-169. 
42 Moral Questions, p.169. 
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animals – their use in each case is different. A person’s actions are “intelligible”43  in a 
way an animal’s aren’t, goes his claim, because only in human life is there discussion and 
“participation in a form of intercourse”44. We can ask of a human being what they are 
doing when they act in some manner; ask what their actions or words mean. As Singer 
believes, it is possible for a human being to reflectively form and criticize plans, shape 
the course of his or her life, and take a (subjective) attitude towards its meaning or point. 
Rhees points out that the notion of meaning still plays a defining role even when a person 
does not do these things, allowing themselves to be swept along by circumstances. These 
things are possible only because, once we have the requisite grasp of a human being’s 
language and culture – mastering to some extent their own peculiar way of living or form 
of life - it is intelligible to discuss with them what they mean when they do or say 
something.  
 
However, Rhees makes a second and more fundamental point intended to show that 
understanding people is different from understanding animals. The point relies upon the 
notion that human actions and words can have meaning in the above sense, but it goes 
beyond it. Rhees claims that “although there is certainly suffering, and although there is 
certainly grieving and joy, there is not what you would call either comedy or tragedy in 
the lives of animals”45.  
 
If I am to understand what someone is saying I must know the language. 
But what must I know if I am to understand the course of a man’s life? 
…If understanding Anna Karenina’s life is like understanding what is said 
– then it is like understanding the depth or the horror or the humor of what 
is said…For that is how people are moved: by depth, by horror or by 
humor, for instance. This is the form their understanding of one another 
takes.46       
 
                                                 
43 Moral Questions, p.167. 
44 Moral Questions, p.169. 
45 Moral Questions, p.183. 
46 Moral Questions, pp.236-237. 
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Again, a person’s life has meaning even when they are unaware of it and do not or cannot 
respond to questions of meaning. For the meaning that exists in their lives only makes 
sense against the background possibility of their being creatures who can be moved in 
recognition of depth, humor, and horror. In contrast, Rhees says, animals  
 
do not have language; and they do not have literature and they do not have 
art and they do not have music...Take these things away, and you take 
away what we mean by ‘human life’ altogether.47  
 
Clearly, this second kind of meaning is the sort which exists in “the realm of meaning”, 
and is the kind Gaita refers to when he makes the claim that the “lives of animals have no 
meaning, or they have meaning in only an attenuated sense” 48. 49 This also is the way in 
which humans, but not animals, have a “rich inner life”50 and can be “fully another 
perspective on the world”51. Human beings are “fully” another perspective on the world 
and their inner lives – the way they love, feel joy, grieve, appreciate virtue, etc. - are 
“rich” only if they are capable of fully-fledged ethical response to meaning, to its revision 
and supplementation, and to the great many forms in which notions of value may appear 
(which is not to say that lucidity demands they be conversant with every serious art form 
or means of expression in their culture and beyond it). To be this sort of fully-fledged 
reflective being they must, in other words, be subject to no constitutive limit on the 
possibilities of genuine reflection, discussion, and ethical experience.   
 
Our usual notion of a biography – a notion not mentioned by James Rachels when he 
distinguishes between the biographical and biological lives of animals - has its locus in 
human life and in the way a biography, or for that matter a novel like Anna Karenina, can 
“disclose a distinctive identity” by telling us “who someone is rather than the sum of their 
                                                 
47 Moral Questions, p.194. 
48 R. Gaita, Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception (2nd ed.) (London: Routledge, 2004), p.116. 
49 Though it is hard to see how their lives can have even an attenuated meaning if “meaning” is meant in 
the current sense - that is, as requiring the possibility of lucid response. But see later on the question of 
attenuated meaning. 
50 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.19. 
51 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.82. 
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achievements”52. Humans thus have very different “selves” than animals. The kind of 
selves humans have, and this sense in which we speak of “who” they are, underpins the 
meaning of the names we feel we must give them when they are born. The particular 
notion of a biography which tells us who someone is loses its meaning entirely in the case 
of animals, as Gaita argues:     
 
We tell stories about animals…but the stories do not add up to a biography 
because nothing counts as Orloff or Gypsy or Jack the Cockatoo making 
or failing to make something of their lives, nor even of life making 
something of them. Life neither presents them with nor denies them 
opportunities. They cannot rejoice in their life nor can they despair of it.53  
 
Tom Regan thought that some animal deaths, like the death of a whale, can be tragic. But 
only human animals can experience the sort of “tragedy” which is related to having a rich 
inner life, or to failing to acquire or losing it, or to being unable through misfortune to 
develop such an inner life. The inner life of meaning in a human being, then, affects our 
understanding of the nature of the tragic. In Gaita’s view, human beings are “unique and 
replaceable”; they appear to be the only creatures to have lives of this kind. They are the 
only animal, he thinks, that can “transcend the characteristics of their species”54  in this 
particular way. He reminds us that the disappearance of a human personality, even 
someone we did not know, can move us as being especially mysterious on account of the 
extinction of a perspective on the world. Animal deaths are not mysterious in this precise 
and peculiar way.  
 
A further reason Gaita has for calling humans “unique and irreplaceable” concerns the 
nature of the attachments we can form with them. Here is a relevant and important 
passage from A Common Humanity: 
 
                                                 
52 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.19. 
53 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.79. 
54 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.78. 
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Our sense of the preciousness of other people is connected with their 
power to affect us in ways we cannot fathom and in ways against which 
we can protect ourselves only at the cost of becoming shallow. There is 
nothing reasonable in the fact that another person’s absence can make our 
lives seem empty. The power of human beings to affect one another in 
ways beyond reason and beyond merit has offended rationalists and 
moralists since the dawn of thought, but it is partly what yields to us that 
sense of human individuality which we express when we say that human 
beings are unique and irreplaceable. Such attachments, and the joy and the 
grief which they may cause, condition our sense of the preciousness of 
human beings. Love is the most important of them.55 
 
It is the fact that other humans can be unique perspectives on the world that informs the 
kind of relations we can have with them and informs our sense, from within the realm of 
meaning, of the legitimate and proper nature of those attachments. Our sense of what it is 
to legitimately love, grieve, care for, and take an interest in other human beings must be 
defended by appealing to the terms of criticism that, as Gaita puts it, distinguish the real 
and the counterfeit forms of such relations and attachments. This is what allows Gaita to 
say to those who protest claims about the “difference” – citing perhaps the strength and 
power of our relations with animals - that our relations with human beings are 
transformed by the unique kind of creatures they are and also by the fact that the ethical 
nature of those relations are determined completely by a style of critical thought which is 
quite different from an appeal to biological facts, to capacities, and to strong feelings and 
attitudes.  
 
Furthermore, Gaita argues, the fact that humans are “unique and irreplaceable” helps to 
explain the different ways in which they can be wronged, even when their injuries are no 
different to those that could be inflicted on an animal. The sort of attachments human 
beings are able to have partly determines the kind of beings they are, and this affects the 
character of our moral relations with them. In addition, the nature of those distinctive 
                                                 
55 R. Gaita, A Common Humanity (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 1999), pp.26-27. 
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wrongs is something that further explains the idea that only human beings are “unique 
and replaceable”. As Gaita claims: “Human beings limit one another’s wills as does 
nothing else in nature”56. In particular, Gaita argues, remorse for seriously wronging 
human beings, especially when it involves killing them, is “fundamental amongst the 
ethical determinations of human individuality”57. Remorse must be distinguished from a 
“mere feeling, or a mere attitude”58 because it includes “a disciplined remembrance of the 
moral significance what we did”59: 
 
Pained bewilderment is the most natural expression of remorse. ‘What 
have I done? How could I have done it?’ These questions express a 
shocked realization of the meaning of what one has done, a shocked 
realization that anything could have that meaning.60         
 
Again, Gaita stresses remorse has a critical dimension that distinguishes its false 
semblances and corruptions from its lucid forms. The killer who is haunted by remorse or 
guilt may think of suicide. Now, even if we finally consider suicidal thoughts or actions 
misguided or wrong, Gaita argues, we might find them an intelligible reaction to murder. 
Such pained and haunted responses, though perhaps not justifiable, would then not only 
be understandable, they would also inform our sense of human irreplaceability. A similar 
case could be made out for grief. In contrast, Gaita contends, it “is not even intelligible 
that a person should wish to kill himself because he had killed microbes or insects, and it 
would show a moral failing rather than a virtue if they should want to do it having killed 
an animal”61. Indeed, suicidal remorse or grief for the killing of an animal would imply 
that a person is becoming “unhinged”62. The murderer who is suicidal may be unjustified 
in considering an exit from life but is not being sentimental; the killer of an animal who 
becomes suicidal is surely being both. 
 
                                                 
56 Good and Evil, p.141. 
57 Good and Evil, p.78. 
58 Good and Evil, p.59. 
59 Good and Evil, p.59. 
60 A Common Humanity, p.31. 
61 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.170. 
62 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.170. 
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On Gaita’s account, there is a further dimension to responses like remorse, love, and grief 
that are built into his notion of human preciousness or irreplaceability, and which adds 
substance to his claim that human beings are individuals like no other animal. These 
responses (love, grief, remorse, etc.) to “the particularity”63 or singularity of the 
individual who is the object of the response must resist allowing her “to become a mere 
instance of a unique mode of human individuality”64 or a “representative of humanity”65, 
as many moral theories do imply. This kind of remorse (for example) cannot be 
indifferent to the fact that the person who has been wronged has a particular name, 
history, body, and characteristics that distinguishes her from others. However, Gaita 
argues that if the response is to properly recognize its object as “unique and 
irreplaceable”, it must also, as part of the very sort of response it is, acknowledge that the 
object belongs to the kind of being whose nature is determined, amongst other things, by 
the idea a full-fledged ethical understanding. Therefore, the remorse (for example) would 
have had the same character “had it been someone else”66. Nevertheless, Gaita argues, 
such responses are what they are because they focus on the particular individual. By 
doing this, they ethically individualize the human being in a way that is different to any 
other being we know of.  
 
The preceding paragraphs have touched on some possible ways of describing the sense 
that we are “different in kind” from everything else on the planet. Diamond’s first move 
was to show that some philosophers who identify speciesism as a common human error 
have overlooked these ways of speaking. Singer attacks the idea of human special-ness or 
“sanctity” as a “doctrine that places the lives of members of our species above the 
members of other species”67. He concurs with Diamond when he says that the 
“distinction between human beings and all other animals is fundamental to our ethical 
attitudes toward ourselves, toward the rest of nature, and toward ethical problems of life 
and death”68. But he has argued repeatedly, and for many people persuasively, that this 
                                                 
63 A Common Humanity, p.32. 
64 Good and Evil, p.149. 
65 Good and Evil, p.148. 
66 Good and Evil, p.149. 
67 Practical Ethics, p.117. 
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distinction is routinely grounded at the end of the day in a biological group difference. Of 
course, philosophers have attempted to skirt or rebut Singer’s charge of speciesism by 
appealing to this or that capacity or feature or relation or to a complex combination of 
such facts. Yet Singer has managed to show that in virtually every case – save in the odd 
case where the proponent has been willing to relegate to a lower moral status restricted 
classes of incompetent or undeveloped human beings – that the presumed distinctions in 
the philosophical refutations are finally, as Bentham suggested, biological or species-
based ones. That is to say, in these arguments against Singer it is the biological 
distinction that appears to play a large role in the human-animal distinction and of the 
elaborate and desperate arguments that follow. Given this situation, one can see why 
Colin McGinn has called Singer’s argument against speciesism “a won argument”69.   
   
There is no reason to say that “human being” or “one of us”, as these terms are often 
used, must essentially mean homo sapiens. Indeed, there is no reason to conclude that our 
sense of “human beings” must have precisely the same extension as the biological 
conception. This could mean that individuals who are not homo sapiens may be “human 
beings”, or at least, that they may be “one of us”, sharing with us a full “humanity”. Also, 
there may be some things that are arguably homo sapiens but which are not equal fellows, 
such as embryos and fetal monsters.  
 
One consequence of the possibility of there being alternative meanings of “human 
being”, or of the possibility of ethically different ways of talking about “us and them”, is 
that the people who speak in this way cannot be accused of speciesism in the sense the 
critics like Singer intend. It may be possible to criticize such people on other ethical 
grounds; but they cannot be accused of appealing essentially to one feature, or a cluster of 
biological features, to trace out a difference in kind. Nor can they necessarily be accused 
of appealing to capacities or “differences” to explain their notion of “kind”, a notion that 
achieves its moral relevance by way of correct moral principles. Though facts form part 
of its content, the ethically relevant notion of “kind” is not purely factual in nature. 
Instead, its sense must be understood in the realm of meaning.   
                                                 
69 P. Singer, Animal Liberation, (London: Pimlico, 1995), p.xix. 
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Because it is important to be clear about the conceptual nature of “kind” in this ethical 
context, it may be worth considering a relevant criticism recently made of Gaita, and to 
some extent of Diamond. In a soon to be published book edited by Chris Cordner, the 
philosopher Lars Hertzberg argues that Gaita’s discussion of speciesism and humanity in 
some of his work is “somewhat problematic”70. Hertzberg’s concern is that Gaita 
“occasionally argues as though the concept of humanity had a grounding role in 
morality”71. He worries that Gaita  
 
speaks of our sense of belonging to a common kind as forming our 
responses (while also being formed by them). In other words, thoughts 
about who I am and what I share with the other are assumed to have a role 
in the way I respond to him. Also, Gaita writes that “[a]ttitudes towards a 
soul mark out a kind”, and he speaks of the “conception of humankind that 
is built out of our responses” – though admittedly it “takes little notice of 
the scientific criterion for homo sapiens [and] is not a rival species 
classification”.72   
  
The problematic way of arguing which Hertzberg identifies is the claim that certain facts 
about, say, human beings, and certain responses to them, justify or ground moral claims - 
showing, for example, that human beings are more, or differently, morally significant 
compared to other animals. The implicit methodology Hertzberg suspects sometimes 
applies to Gaita and Diamond would have the effect of putting their arguments on the 
same level as the arguments and the theorizing they are questioning, by treating facts 
about humans and imaginative responses to them as justificatory premises in an 
argument. Accordingly, it would shift much of our thinking about human and animal life 
to a position outside discourse about meaning. Clearly, that is not a consequence that 
Diamond or Gaita would welcome.    
                                                 
70 L. Hertzberg, ‘Gaita on Recognizing the Human’ in C. Cordner (ed.), Philosophy, Ethics and a Common  
Humanity: Essays in Honour of Raimond Gaita (London: Routledge, 2011), p.13. 
71 Philosophy, Ethics and a Common Humanity, pp.15-16. 
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Hertzberg believes the mistake is to think that human practices, ceremonies, literature, 
feelings, imagination, capacities, features, responses, or anything else could be used to 
justify ethical or moral perspectives about humans, or for that matter, animals. Although 
these ingredients may help to build particular conceptions of “kind”, they cannot be used 
to lay down rational rules about how we should respond morally. In contrast, the right 
way to regard the variety of facts and responses is simply to describe how they might 
figure in one or other conceptions about human and animal kinds in the realm of 
meaning. Therefore, it is not the mere fact that, for example, human beings are born of 
human parents, or are given names, which justifies or dictates such ideas as “fellow 
humans”. Instead, these facts and responses may conceptually become a part of moral or 
other ethical ideas – or not. It depends on what we make of them.    
 
However, it is clear from Gaita’s work in more than one book that he thinks our 
responses to human beings do not justify anything, but rather help to build our sense of 
human “uniqueness and irreplaceability”. The same goes for what sense we make of 
animals: neither facts about behavior or bodies, nor our responses to them, are given a 
“grounding role” in moral reflection. About different sorts of animals, he writes: 
 
But our sense of why we should not distinguish so radically between 
individual animals or between kinds of animals will not, I think, show that 
we have come to believe that objective, empirical differences between 
them do justify the different ways we treat them. 
 
…I suspect it is not their objective differences in themselves that matter to 
us so much as the relations those features make possible for us. Even then, 
the features themselves never fully explain the relations they make 
possible.73 
 
                                                 
73 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.37. 
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Some objective facts and some imaginative responses may be constituent elements of 
ideas discovered by thinking in the realm of meaning. The point is simply that they must 
not be seen as parts of a rational argument, since the place that they do rightly have can 
only be determined by that ideal of thinking Gaita calls lucidity. So while Diamond refers 
to “the concept human being” 74 and to “our notion of human beings”75, we are free to 
accept or reject this idea, so long as we remember that such freedom is associated with 
the trust and responsibility that goes with the fact we can be perspicuously moved. It goes 
with the observation that there is not necessarily one single conception of “human being”, 
and none which we are bound a priori to accommodate. There are instead many possible 
conceptions, which may vary in small ways or in the large ways that arise in the thought 
of writers as different as Kant and Nietzsche, and Rawls and Nussbaum. In principle, no 
coherent conception of human life whatever can be excluded, by philosophical or rational 
argument, from the realm of meaning. There are no limits, in this sense, on our freedom 
of thought. Lastly, the forms or styles which are thought to support even very similar 
conceptions of “human being”, including the ones we tend to accept, may be argued over 
in the open-ended and ever-deepening fashion described earlier.   
 
One mistake that may be made about the place of human responses in the realm of 
meaning is to see them, as Onora O’Neill might, as giving rise to descriptions that are 
merely relative to a given practice. Diamond herself, in “Eating Meat and Eating People”, 
is aware that some people are likely to feel that she has left herself with no means of 
criticizing the practices of, say, slavery or racism - on the grounds that she must 
acknowledge that whites once responded, and may occasionally still respond, to those 
practices as if they were entirely obvious rather than odious. In a related example, David 
McNaughton is concerned that appeals to concepts which involve responses are 
ultimately circular. Taking up Diamond’s example that we do not eat our pets and that 
that is part of the concept of a pet, McNaughton claims that the “objection to viewing an 
appeal to the fact that Larry [the lamb] was a pet as a justification for treating him in a 
particular way was that it was hopelessly circular, since Larry’s being a pet was 
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constituted by his being treated in that way”76. McNaughton would say something similar 
about the triviality of appealing to the notion of “fellow humans”, or to the idea that 
humans are “unique and irreplaceable”. What we need, according to McNaughton, is not 
a trivial reiteration of our moral obligations and responses to humans but an argument 
that picks out morally salient properties to show why we should accept those feelings and 
responses.   
 
However, because of his philosophical preconceptions of what moral argument can 
consist in, McNaughton misunderstands the place these descriptions can have in ethical 
thought. One point of invoking the notion of a “pet”, for example, is not to attempt to 
rationally justify treating animals in particular ways. After all, it is quite true that there is 
no good argument emanating from the surface meaning or conceptual parameters of “pet” 
that could rationally compel someone to refrain from detesting pets, or that could by 
force of reason stop them from deciding that it is OK to eat the lamb rather than continue 
keeping it as a pet. It is quite true that, conceptually or logically speaking, no one can eat 
their pet; it is true also that it is quite useless to appeal to the logic of “pet” to convince 
anyone about the moral status of certain animals. The legitimate place that descriptions 
like “pet” and “fellow human being” can have is that of being subject to the critical form 
of thinking that can determine whether they are vulgar or important. It is only in this way 
that they might have moral implications and occupy a nontrivial place in moral argument.                          
 
Of course, McNaughton, Singer, and others may come to agree that, as we typically use 
them, the notions of “difference” and of “kind” do not play the role they may at first have 
supposed them to play in rational argument or in the derivation of more specific moral 
concepts and judgments. Nevertheless, talk of “different kinds” is likely to continue to be 
greeted with skepticism about its value in genuine ethical reflection. One reason for this 
is Singer’s feeling that they are the emotivist residue of our history as social animals with 
primate dispositions. Another and related reason is that their origin is entirely contingent 
on cultural and material processes. The accidental nature of the possible content of the 
realm of meaning strikes many people as an offence against reason. That sense of a 
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violation of objective thought can lead them to say that the content of ethics must be left 
to be determined wholly by rational argument, even if that means seriously distancing 
ourselves from many of the beliefs we presently hold dear. How else can we reasonably 
identify and be rid of abominations like slavery and racism, except by luck? And isn’t it 
likely that we are presently doing things, to humans and to animals, that are also 
abhorrent and that need to be exposed by reason? 
 
The proponents of the alternative view should not deny that critical appraisal is required 
to determine the cognitive worth of ethical practices and judgments. Nor should they 
deny that reflection on ethical mores can be creatively imaginative, courageous, and lucid 
enough to invite us to deepen or to revise our present, deeply-entrenched stances. For 
example, perhaps some ideas of the “difference” between humans and animals should be 
subject to criticism. However, there is as yet no reason to conclude that the content of 
ethics (within its essential conceptual limits) must be indefinitely revisable on pain of the 
failure to follow reason wherever it leads; no reason, that is, so long as our conception of 
reason is not captured by the image of Singer’s escalator, which may go up and 
completely out of sight. The matter may be examined by way of some examples. 
 
In his discussion of Elizabeth Costello, Gaita writes:  
 
I have heard people say that meat is murder, but I have not met anyone 
whom I credit with believing it. No one I know or have even heard of 
treats people who eat meat as though they were murderers or accomplices 
to murder.77  
 
Replying to this claim, Elisa Aaltola argues that “Coetzee’s take on the matter is deeper 
than that of Gaita”78, partly because “[g]unning down meat eaters is a futile option” 79, 
and partly because Costello is an example of someone who shows in her (often 
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“perplexed”) behavior a belief in “the animal murder all around her”80. It is not 
absolutely clear that Costello, irrespective of her deep woundedness and the radical 
nature of what she says, does behave precisely as Aaltola describes. In any case, Gaita’s 
point is that however shocked and outraged by the practice of meat-eating we may be, 
and however impractical and futile it may be to act in the animals’ defense, virtually no 
one could be critically moved by the thought that we might one day be just as revolted by 
eating pigs as we are by the prospect of eating babies, or by the thought that, when the 
conditions are right, armies might be organized to attack thousands of human beings in 
order to protect the lives of millions of animals.  
 
Another example Gaita discusses is Singer’s suggestion in Practical Ethics that we 
should try to recognize that a failure to give money to Oxfam to save lives is on the same 
moral level – given certain practical conditions are met - as going over and shooting a 
few Ethiopian peasants81. Singer wants us to resist the common assumption that that is 
self-evidently absurd82. Singer’s argument, Gaita points out, trades on the assumption that 
we react to the prospect of shooting peasants with shock and abhorrence. Part of the 
reason for that, no doubt, is that we think remorse, as he has described it, is a proper and 
lucid response to murder, and essential to what murder is. For Singer, if all things are 
equal - as that condition is determined by his two-level utilitarian theory - we have 
roughly equal reason to be either remorseful or not remorseful in the one case as in the 
other. For example, we may reach a stage in our culture where most of the “extrinsic 
differences”83 between the two cases are eliminated: giving money to Oxfam is as easy, 
as harmless, and as efficient a means of saving lives as is refraining from shooting 
peasants. The point is not that we would not recognize the failure to donate as gravely 
wrong. The point is that Singer believes there may be some future conditions under 
which we might reasonably come to believe that selfishly failing to save starving people 
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by not donating money to aid organizations (assuming that is done without homicidal 
intent) is, or is very close to being, the moral equivalent of murder84.  
 
But, Gaita wants to ask, which of us would claim that there might be conditions under 
which it could be intelligible, rather than hopelessly shallow, to feel the sort of remorse 
that could isolate a person from others, and destroy her life and maybe result in her 
suicide, on account of a failure to save lives by giving money to charity? And who can 
honestly say that circumstances might morally justify dispensing with the belief that 
remorse is a proper and lucid response to murder? A similar question may be posed in 
regard to Singer’s earlier contention that we should respond morally in the same way to 
the Dutch institution, irrespective of whether its inmates are chimpanzees, or humans at 
comparable stages of mental development. He would think that there are circumstances in 
which we ought to feel more of less the same about the cruelty, indignity, and damage to 
interests taking place in that Dutch zoo – assuming the level of preference frustration is 
roughly the same - as in an institution for the mentally ill. To reach that conclusion, is to 
agree with Singer that our sense of a “difference” resembles antiquated views on racism 
and slavery.            
 
Our sense, that adopting certain new ethical responses in the realm of meaning is 
unthinkable, and that it also is unthinkable that other deeply felt responses should be 
consigned to a morally primitive past, is linked to a sense of the seriousness of morality 
and meaning. Without certain basic critical responses, what we would be left with may 
still be “ethics” or “morality” in some conceivable sense, but it would not be ethics or 
morality as we (or most of us) understand it, for it would have been drained of the very 
substance that gave it weight and authority. That feeling would not necessarily be 
defeated by arguing, as Singer might, that our powerful desire for meaning and 
fulfillment can be satisfied by commitment to an ethical point of view which is informed 
by the moral ideal of the impartial spectator (a view which may even induce our 
admiration and reverence). For any thirst we possess for meaning and fulfillment (let 
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alone the possession of love or reverence for lucid ethical thought) is going to be 
inseparable from the nature of the elementary critical responses that compose the “source 
of morality”.            
 
Philosophers sometimes champion pure rationality in ethical reflection by claiming that 
reliance on “emotional responses” risks entrenching prejudices like sexism and 
homophobia. But it is not usually rational argument that explains the reaction most 
people have to past or present injustice. Moreover, if it is true that our ethical thinking 
must be done in the realm of meaning, then we can after all only tell what is historically 
good or appalling by thinking in media res. This means that we must think for ourselves 
and in ways that call on a fully-fledged responsiveness.  
 
It is true that the content of the realm of meaning is conspicuously contingent on the 
necessary personal dimension of ethics and on cultural factors. Writers like Diamond and 
Gaita admit that the accidental nature of ethical thought is a strange fact of life. 
Furthermore, they can acknowledge how odd it can seem that judgments which have and 
need no rational support can be the right ones. Diamond, for instance, could grant that it 
does indeed appear strange, perhaps incredible, that what separates us so significantly 
from animals derives not from “timeless criteria of moral relevance”85 but from human 
products and artifacts. Not only does it seem tailor-made for prejudice; what is of 
fundamental value seems to have been conjured out of thin air. Perhaps because we are so 
accustomed to types of argument that idealize purely impersonal forms of objectivity, 
more personal types of argument seem peculiarly to insult a sense we have of the nature 
of reason.  
 
Yet the view of the nature of reason in ethics from inside the realm of meaning is very 
different from the view outside it. From the former location, the background “sources of 
morality” look indispensable to any serious understanding of ethics, and the deliverances 
of theory can appear reductive and even comical, in much the same way that, for 
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example, archaic Greek views of slavery, or (increasingly) homophobia, can now strike 
us as both baffling and, despite being disconcerting, simply laughable.  
 
In “Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline”, Bernard Williams entertained the possibility 
that science may be as fully non-contingent and “objective” as it is feasible for any mode 
of thought to be, such that even the scientific judgments of alien beings with very 
different sensory apparatus may non-contingently converge with ours upon the truth. 
However, he left it open that convergence in science with the aliens may not be possible - 
because it may be that the requirements of scientific thinking and judgment as we 
understand it are not quite so universal.  
 
Science might, for example, require a more substantial overlap in forms of life which 
could give rise to sufficient sharing of the relevant concepts that partake in scientific 
reasoning and conclusions. But if that were so, we would not lose faith in the truth of 
human science. That is because, knowing what science is through an understanding of its 
method and from familiarity with it, we can recognize that it owns the peculiar cognitive 
character and degree of objectivity which confers upon it legitimacy as that particular and 
genuine form of thought. Primitive tribes, by comparison, may not know what to make of 
modern science before they have had some contact with the way it is practiced. Until they 
are conversant with it, science may strike them as unintelligible, its counterintuitive 
claims wild and incredible. Or it may be that science will seem to them an inferior 
method to their own means of investigating nature, even in a value-neutral sense. 
Somewhat similarly, being conversant with the use of critical modes of ethical reflection 
- something that can only be obtained from actually using them - reveals to us its 
cognitive bona fides. This is true even though understanding in the realm of meaning is 
not to be compared to the “objectivity” promised by science. Williams’ commentary is 
relevant: 
 
Precisely because we are not unencumbered intelligences selecting in 
principle among all possible outlooks, we can accept that this outlook is 
ours just because of the history that has made it ours; or, more precisely, 
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has made both us, and made the outlook as something that is ours. We are 
no less contingently formed than the outlook is, and the formation is 
significantly the same. We and our outlook are not simply in the same 
place at the same time. If we understand this, deeply understand it, we can 
be free of what is indeed another scientistic illusion, that it is our job as 
rational agents to search for, or at least move as best we can towards, a 
system of political and ethical ideas which would be the best from an 
absolute point of view, a point of view that was free of contingent 
historical perspective.86                 
 
The general and contingent processes which formed us and our capacity for scientific 
understanding have, by giving rise to additional contingencies, also formed our capacity 
for thinking critically about in the realm of value. But they have also helped form what it 
is for something in this realm to be reality rather than appearance, and what it is to 
distinguish them. So although such things have been shaped by certain contingencies, 
those forms of thought are not themselves merely contingent. It makes no sense to say 
that there is another, less unacceptably contingent form of thought that would allow us to 
get things right. 
 
The only way to tell whether the style of thought is real or bogus is to examine its nature. 
At the end of the day, some philosophers may feel that rationality, and perhaps a few 
(conceptually and/or causally necessary) psychological dispositions and outpourings, are 
at the heart of serious ethical reflection. Such a position may not be irrational, but 
because it is dramatically divorced from ethical practice as most of us know it, it is 
unlikely to win many adherents after its character is exposed. It may not be incumbent 
upon us as rational beings to inhabit the realm of meaning, just as, as Singer reasonably 
claimed, it is not irrational for anyone to abandon the ethical point of view in favor of 
amoralism. The requirements of the realm of meaning, and the fact that it binds us to a 
certain mode of thought and way of living, only arises for beings who can go well beyond 
(mere) rationality.    
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In the previous chapter, we began to look at what an understanding of human and animal 
life might come to. Drawing on the work of Wittgenstein, Cora Diamond and Raimond 
Gaita suggest that a deeper understanding of “us and them” will require attention to the 
way that certain concepts are formed from our responses. This is the only way, they 
believe, to see animals and humans as they really are. As we shall see, these “response-
dependent” concepts are involved in two different kinds of understanding – a kind that is 
essentially about the facts of sentient life, and a kind that quite is different from this. The 
second kind was discussed in previous chapters, when we contemplated the nature of 
thinking with certain critical concepts that determine meaning. Neither of these kinds of 
understanding involves the spectator’s passive perspective. In this chapter, I shall be 
concerned with how science and philosophy both rightly conceive and also misconceive 
the nature of the task of finding out about us and the animals on our planet. 
 
Gaita says this about our understanding of humans and animals:    
 
The responses that form and are formed by our sense of belonging to a 
common kind cannot be elicited by beings that do not look like and behave 
like us. This is…because those responses are built into the concepts with 
which we identify what could be appropriate objects for our responses. 
This is a circle – a non-vicious circle – from which we cannot escape 
without losing the relevant concepts…For the same reason we 
cannot…tell in advance all that we will count as looking and behaving like 
us. We have to see how we respond. And reflect on our responses of 
course.1 
 
                                                 
1 R. Gaita, A Common Humanity, (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 1999), p.269. 
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Commenting on this passage, Lars Hertzberg claims that it is not clear “why the notion of 
sharing something with the other should play anything but an accidental part here”2. As 
an example of what he means, he says that where “compassion is pure, no thoughts about 
myself enter in, nor are these thoughts required in order to justify my compassion”3. Of 
course, it is true that a person’s compassion does not make explicit or conscious reference 
to themselves when it is “pure”. But that is not the only way in which a reference to self 
may be present in the conception of the situation which the person with pure compassion 
has.  
 
Hertzberg downplays the fact that for Gaita it is of central importance that I relate to 
human beings, not as alien outsiders, but as one amongst my own kind. Thus, in his 
example of the nun who displays a pure and non-condescending love towards mentally ill 
patients who have virtually no capacity for distinctive human behavior4, it is crucial to 
the nature of our understanding of her behavior, and indeed to our wonder it, that she 
responds to the patients not just as the moral equals of other humans but as her fellows. 
She is one of them and they are the same as her; they are her kind. That recognition is 
there in her response, and it is part of why her love is uncondescending.  
 
Although the patients might be “struggling on the ground like a half crushed worm”, the 
nun’s behavior  reveals her understanding that the patients are unique and irreplaceable5 
in precisely the same way as herself. Likewise, we may find the fact that we are each 
individuals, “here, on this planet, now”6 as Williams put it, living amongst other creatures 
who are nonhuman, is important to our understanding of who or what they and we are. 
Through concepts formed in part by our responses and our interaction with others, human 
and nonhuman, a sense of belonging, or not belonging, to a common kind of one sort or 
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4 Philosophy, Ethics and a Common Humanity, p.18. 
5 A Common Humanity, p.18. 
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another may emerge. The sense we have of a common kind may be important, without 
being grounded in, and without grounding, anything else.  
  
Many people feel that science holds the best promise of deepening our understanding of 
common or dissimilar kinds. So we should ask what science does have to offer our 
enquiry. I shall mention some ways in which science does assist us, or might assist us, 
and some ways in which it may lead us astray - in part because of some assumptions that 
it shares (perhaps in a mutually reinforcing manner) with a lot of philosophy. Certain 
large assumptions those two disciplines share, about the place and proper nature of the 
concepts we may use in our thinking about the lives of animals are arguably misguided. 
Bringing out certain arguable or misconceived presuppositions will help to sharpen the 
focus of the enquiry. 
 
One of the first things to mention is that science has often been used to reject the notion 
of “us and them”, or at least certain emphases of that notion. Indeed, the rejection is one 
strand of the modern scientific and philosophical temper - even if it does not have large 
moral consequences in, say, animal experimentation. Influenced by science, Mark Bekoff 
disdains the language of “us and them” as arrogant dualism.7 James Rachels thinks 
science has enabled us to recognize at last a “morality without the idea that humans are 
special”8. His book Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism 
prosecutes “Darwin’s thesis that the differences between humans and animals are matters 
of degree, not kind.” 9 In Darwin’s own words: 
 
Man in his arrogance thinks himself a great work worthy the interposition 
of a deity. More humble and I think truer to consider him created from 
animals.10 
 
                                                 
7 M. Bekoff, ‘Animal Passions and Beastly Virtues: Cognitive Ethology as the unifying science for 
understanding the subjective, emotional, empathic, and moral lives of animals’ in Zygon, Vol. 41, No 1 
(March 2006) p.81. 
8 J. Rachels, Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism, (Oxford: Oxford University  
Press, 1991),  p.173. 
9 Created from Animals, p.189 
10 Created from Animals, p.1. 
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Rachels goes on to claim that we should radically recast our perspective on our lives here 
on earth amongst the animals, by recognizing there is no basic and inherent difference 
between human beings and other animals. Others, too, will feel that Gaita and Diamond 
underplay the role of science in helping establish the deepest truths about humans and 
animals. From the beginning, it should be said that neither Gaita nor Diamond denies that 
science can yield important information about animal life and nature. What they do say is 
that it is not the differences so much as what we make of them that has a bearing on the 
most important kind of understanding.  
 
In itself, that does not imply that the deliverances of science will be irrelevant to what we 
say about “us and them”. On the other hand, they feel that the assumptions of science and 
philosophy have resulted in some wrong approaches to the question. In particular, the 
problem is that these disciplines often assume we are in a certain epistemic situation with 
respect to other minds, behavior, and life: the position of the passive, rational spectator.     
 
In the Introduction to this thesis, it was made clear that its argument about the nature of 
animality will not turn specifically on rejecting the empirical claims about animals made 
by the philosophers in the more traditional mould. Such claims include animal capacities 
for grief, anger, happiness, jealousy, fear, and more. For example, the eminent 
philosophical and scientific contributors to The Great Ape Project accept claims about 
the “advanced cognitive and emotional capacity of the great apes”, as a New Zealand 
politician put it11. Singer cites Geza Teleki’s report of an encounter he had with two adult 
male chimpanzees, each of whom climbed separately up a ridge from opposite sides: “As 
they met at the top they stood upright, face to face, and clasped hands, while softly 
panting. Then they sat down together and joined Teleki in watching the sunset”12.  
 
Singer’s aim in cataloguing such examples is not to provoke wonder or sympathetic 
involvement – though he may well hope that happens. His aim is to provide evidence that 
animals such as the great apes have relatively sophisticated capacities, like self-
                                                 
11 P. Singer, Writings on an Ethical Life (Salisbury South: Griffin Press 2000), p.84.  
12 Writings on an Ethical Life, p.83. 
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consciousness and Lockean “personhood”. It is true the attributions countenanced by 
some philosophers can be charitable. For example, Singer declares that some animals 
have “the capacity for conceptual thought without having a language”13 . But although 
some philosophers like Davidson have cast doubt on claims that animals have concepts 
and therefore beliefs, such arguments will not be relevant to the discussion. 
 
One reason for thinking science has much to offer in the case of animals is that we often 
know so little about animals and their lives. To some extent, this explains the interest in 
Goodall, Fossey, and Attenborough. Singer mentions the view of one primate scientist 
who says that the Tanzanian chimps he has observed for twenty-five years “continue to 
be the source of astonishment, interest, and pleasure” 14. According to Singer, “apes who 
have learned sign language also continue to display previously undreamed-of 
capacities”15.  
 
On more familiar ground, philosopher, animal trainer, and poet Vicki Hearne questions 
the common understanding of the “mythical emotional independence of the cat”16. We 
are mistaken if we think “there is no theme, no focus, to a cat’s activities” 17. She claims 
that it is inattentiveness and “imaginative failure that obscures our view of the ways in 
which the house cat cooperates deeply in the domestic enterprise”18. By comparison, it 
easy to  
 
achieve general agreement on the interpretation of a doggy action. But cats 
take the task of pleasing us far more seriously. Science has shown this19.  
 
Some aspects of the behavior of common animals, let alone exotic ones, are not yet well 
understood.    
 
                                                 
13 P. Singer, Practical Ethics (2nd ed.), (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.114. 
14 Writings on an Ethical Life, p.83. 
15 Writings on an Ethical Life, p.83. 
16 V. Hearne, Adam’s Task: Calling Animals by Name (New York: Akadine Press, 2000), p.57. 
17 Adam’s Task, p.237. 
18 Adam’s Task, p.57. 
19 Adam’s Task, p.226. 
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Hearne thinks that we learn most about animals, not through science, but through 
“intimate acquaintance”20. Her thought, which as we shall see there is good reason to 
believe, is not opposed to the idea that we need science to reveal certain animal 
behaviors. And indeed science, and its contagious attentiveness to nature, has enabled 
discoveries of remarkable similarities and evolutionary connections between humans and 
animals.  
 
Here are two examples. They represent the sort of results that generate great interest 
amongst a public curious about our kinship with strange “others”.  
 
Field studies by scientists such as Cynthia Moss have revealed an intriguing interest 
elephants have in their own dead. In one case, a group of females were trying to lift up 
the body of a young elephant, who had been shot in the right lung. The female elephants, 
says Moss, “gave up but they did not leave”. Instead, they 
 
stayed around the carcass touching it gently with their trunks and feet. 
Because it was rocky and the ground was wet, there was no loose dirt; but 
they tried to dig into it with their feet and trunks and when they managed 
to get a little earth up they sprinkled it over the body…by nightfall they 
had buried her with branches and earth.21 
 
As Moss reports it, these female elephants stood over the body of the young elephant for 
the rest of the night.  
 
A more controversial example, from the “laboratory”, is the famous ape-language 
experiments. Though the results of the studies are contested for scientific and 
philosophical reasons, they have suggested some highly developed nonhuman behaviors. 
Sue Savage-Rumbaugh’s work with a bonobo called Kanzi is more recent than the work 
with the famous chimp Washoe. Earlier experiments, by failing to “enculturate” the 
                                                 
20 Adam’s Task, p.113. 
21 C. Moss, Elephant Memories, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), p.73. 
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experimental subjects, did not treat the apes like children who are learning language. 
Some allege this resulted in underestimations of their communicative potential. Savage-
Rumbaugh, says Steven M Wise, relates what happened when Kanzi clearly 
misunderstood one sentence in which she asked him to ‘put the paint in the potty’. Kanzi     
 
promptly picked up some clay (a similar play object to paint), and 
put it in the potty. I said ‘What about the paint?’ Kanzi put more 
clay in the potty. I said ‘thank you’, but ‘now put the paint in the 
potty’. Kanzi clearly thought me a little dumb, and so he brought 
me the potty and placed it right in front of my face so I could see 
that he had done what I was so persistent in asking for.22 
 
Savage-Rumbaugh’s work uses scientific techniques to eliminate confounding factors in 
the analysis of “sign language”. Those experiments raise difficult issues of syntax, 
structural complexity, and grammar for the science of linguistics. Nonetheless, they 
suggest “undreamed-of capacities”, and more remarkable overlaps between human and 
animal behavior than was once believed. 
 
Nonetheless, there are also more obvious questions about what is going on. What, for 
example, is the cognitive nature of ape “signing” when they communicate, when they use 
signs to “comment” on things, and when, unprompted by “Clever Hans” cues, they 
carefully teach their young signs? 
    
As the controversy indicates, science needs to be aware of the concepts it uses in its 
investigations. In the ape studies, there are looming conceptual questions about language, 
intention and orders of intention, belief, deliberation, self-consciousness, second or third-
order desires, deception, “theories of mind”, and so on.    
 
                                                 




Something similar goes for tool-use. Is it a learnt but mechanical action, as it might be in 
lower animals? Does tool making in great apes involve foresight? When Maya, a 
chimpanzee from northern Congo, modifies the standard technique by carefully fraying 
the end of a twig between her teeth to make a brush-like implement, capable of catching 
ten times the number of ants per scoop, is she using a kind of means-ends reasoning and 
creative problem-solving ability similar to a young child?23          
 
Clearly, some such questions need cooperation between scientific minds and minds of a 
philosophical bent. The reason this does not always happen is that scientists can readily 
fall for a kind of scientism, which says that science is the model for objective 
understanding. Thus, it is not uncommon for scientists to overlook the critical importance 
to their work of understanding the concepts they use. In those cases, interdisciplinary 
dialogue with philosophy would be valuable. But in parts of science, there is clearly a 
scientistic impulse to see science as the prototype of genuine understanding of human and 
animal behaviour 24.  
 
For example, there is an inclination, by ethologists and veterinary behaviorists, to treat 
the analysis of animal behavior as a matter for careful experiment and observation, 
without paying close attention to concepts such as self-awareness, communication, 
intention, boredom, aggression, and anxiety. That is a reason why some scientists tend to 
make hasty announcements about chimps being able to use “language”, or about them 
having self-consciousness because they react in interesting ways to their reflections in 
mirrors.       
 
But now a more fundamental philosophical matter arises. Science, influenced by and 
influencing philosophy, has a tendency to a conceptual mistake that can lead to an 
overstatement of its claims and a distortion of its application. The source of this error is 
an even deeper lack of conceptual sophistication about the nature of other minds and 
other beings. The fault is shared by many philosophers. It is also shared, as Gaita points 
                                                 
23 National Geographic, February, 2010. 
24 R.Gaita, The Philosophers Dog, (New York: Random House, 2005), p.114. 
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out, by those who (like popular writer Jeffrey Masson) reject the grandiose scientistic 
claim that only science can illuminate animal behavior25 . This matter of conceptual 
understanding needs to be examined, because it has important consequences for our 
reckoning with animal/human life.  
 
As mentioned earlier, there are in fact two related conceptual assumptions, each of which 
imagines a passive, spectator stance toward human and nonhuman beings. The first is to 
do with understanding others and their behavior in an ordinary factual, empirical, and 
“tone-free” manner – whether others are, for example, sensate creatures or have mental 
states. The second assumption is that science and philosophy can fully reckon with 
animal and human life in a “tone-free zone”, that is, in a place outside what Gaita calls 
the realm of meaning, in which a different kind of thinking comes into play. Let us 
consider now the first assumption.     
 
It seems unlikely that many biologists would unhesitatingly grant that there could in 
reality be “something that looks like green slime but [that] engages in complex 
behaviors” and has “rational, autonomous agency”26, to quote a thought experiment. Yet 
the first assumption is of this general sort. It can result in unwarranted skepticism, as in 
Steven M Wise’s representative contention, that despite: 
 
100,000 years of companionship, we know surprisingly little about how 
dogs communicate; we’re just starting to figure out what barking means. 
Some say it doesn’t mean anything but excitement, but research is 
beginning to contradict that claim. 27  
 
                                                 
25 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.114. 
26 D. Jamieson, (ed.) Singer and his Critics, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1999),, p.103. 
27 S. M. Wise, Drawing the Line: Science and the case for Animal Rights (Cambridge: Perseus Publishing, 
2003), p.122. 
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But the very same presupposition can also (paradoxically it will be seen) result in 
excessive open-mindedness, like the speculation that “Sperm whale culture…might 
encompass abstract concepts, perhaps even religion”28. 
           
Often science excels when it imaginatively frames hypotheses about animal behavior and 
consciousness. However, science and much philosophy in general takes up a skeptical 
attitude towards other minds. This skepticism can be about the very existence of other 
conscious beings, or about the precise nature of their subjectivity, as when Thomas Nagel 
says of finding out what it is like for a bat to be a bat, that “extrapolation must be 
incompletable”29.  
 
In fact, this passive, spectator stance towards the inaccessible private lives of other beings 
does usually seek to extrapolate outwards from the human subject to animals. For apart 
from prejudice and unfamiliarity, many people believe that the extra difficulty with 
animals lies in the physical and behavioral differences, including perhaps the absence of a 
human language. Nevertheless, many scientists and philosophers believe that, thanks to 
modern science, the evidence has sufficiently mounted that we can effectively be certain 
that animals are conscious.  
 
A nicely representative example of what Tom Regan calls the “cumulative argument” for 
animal minds30  comes from Animal Liberation. Singer starts from the basic assumption 
that “mental events” can “never be observed”31 and that behaviors like writhing, 
moaning, yelping, and screaming are “not pain itself”32 but only its manifestations. On 
this skeptical premise, it is conceivable that “one of our close friends is really a cleverly 
constructed robot”33. 
 
                                                 
28 Zygon, p.72. 
29 T.Nagel, ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1979), p.169. 
30 T. Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p.1.  
31 Writings of an Ethical Life, p.36. 
32 Writings of an Ethical Life, p.36. 
33 Writings of an Ethical Life, p.36. 
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The modern form of the argument continues by enumerating pieces of evidence for an 
inference that some animals have minds based on similarities to humans like behavior, 
physiology, anatomy, and (often the trump card) modern evolutionary theory. The 
evidence may be backed up by the principle of parsimony34 and the argument’s predictive 
power. Also, some behavior, like Maya’s fraying the end of a twig to make a brush-like 
too, is more easily explained when mental causes are posited. Such behavior, unlike the 
mechanical behaviour of an insect, is complex, unconditioned, and adaptable.35  
 
Proponents of this approach typically ignore or dismiss Wittgenstein’s work. He has been 
called a logical behaviorist.36 Singer claims Wittgenstein says that we “cannot 
meaningfully attribute states of consciousness to beings without language”37. Animal 
ethics philosopher Bernard Rollin considers Wittgenstein to be viciously skeptical:  
 
His works are peppered with cryptic, skeptical remarks about predicating 
mentalistic attributes to animals. In one famous passage, he tells us that of 
a lion could speak, we couldn’t understand him; in another he suggests it is 
conceptually impossible for an animal to smile. He also suggests that a 
dog cannot simulate pain or feel remorse, that an animal cannot hope or 
consciously imitate, and that a dog cannot mean something by wagging its 
tail.38       
 
Of course, this is not the only view of Wittgenstein’s input. If Peter Winch and Raimond 
Gaita are right, Wittgenstein’s insights into the nature of our conceptual understanding of 
animals and humans have been overlooked. Following Wittgenstein’s thought has two 
advantages for us. First, it clarifies our certainty that animals are sensate beings of a 
certain type(s), and further, it reveals the nature of our understanding of them in this 
sense. Second, it points the way to the more complete understanding that was mentioned, 
                                                 
34 Writings of an Ethical Life, p.38. 
35 Created from Animals, p.145. 
36 A. Hills, Do Animals Have Rights? (London: Icon Books, 2005), p.36. 
37 Writings of an Ethical Life, pp.39-40 
38 B.E. Rollin. The Unheeded Cry, (Ames: Iowa University Press, 1998), p.137. 
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both by illuminating the concepts which become part of that understanding and by 
exhibiting the way in which it may be formed.  
 
The Wittgenstein-inspired argument starts by noting that the skeptical position claims our 
friends might conceivably be robots and that their writhing and moans are mere 
“colorless bodily movement”39. Speaking against the skeptic’s claim that there will 
always be some degree of doubt about other minds, if only in principle, Gaita argues that 
we can be “absolutely certain” 40 about the existence and nature of “mental states” like 
sensation in other creatures. He has two general things to say about the skeptical position.  
 
The first need only detain us momentarily. Gaita claims that attempts to refute the skeptic 
on her own terms will not be “adequate to our certainty”41. In other words, it is inclined 
not to take skepticism fully seriously. Even if, granting the premise, the anti-skeptic has 
some success in showing the likelihood of animal consciousness; it will not add up to the 
certainty which is hoped for and which everyone just has. The usual response from many 
scientists and philosophers to skepticism is that we can now be “almost certain”, or as 
certain as we need to be, for ethical purposes, for example. But trouble is brewing. Gaita 
asks: “on what rational grounds are such probabilities calculated?”42 . The problem is that 
once the “doubt is raised, nothing can allay it”43. The argument, after all, was never 
strictly scientific, and this contributes to an air of desperation. Yet it posed as an 
empirically convincing one.  
 
Unsettling questions follow. For example, what scientific warrant is there in the claim 
that “mental events” must be posited as causes of behavior or else some other cause 
invented? We do not have an established scientific theory of mental causation in human 
beings; and anyway, it is usually supposed that “mental states” have neurological or other 
physical correlates of such super-computer-like complexity that a deeper explanatory 
potential - unlike that of (say) crude Skinnerian behaviorism - cannot be dismissed. A 
                                                 
39 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.62. 
40 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.44. 
41 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.47. 
42 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.47. 
43 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.47. 
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similar maneuver can be made on the supposed Darwinian trump card – the 
correspondences between the central nervous systems of humans and those of the higher 
animals. Unlike modern Darwinism, this argument is just not scientifically conclusive. So 
the usual anti-skeptical position tends to help itself to more certainty than it is entitled to. 
 
Actually, it will always – necessarily always - be left with the intelligible possibility of 
doubt, and this residue is at odds with our absolute certainty. Our certainty, for example, 
is impervious to conspiracy theories and pseudoscience, as Darwinism is not. The more 
important and Wittgensteinian reply to skepticism gives an account of why this is so. For 
it seeks to dissolve the problem rather than refute it; and it does so by questioning 
skeptical assumptions about the uninvolved, speculative stance towards other minds.  
 
The presupposition of the standard anti-skeptical argument is that our epistemic relation 
to other human beings and to animals is characterized as something like an “assumption, 
a conjecture, a belief, or even knowledge”44, or perhaps as a special or intuitive mode of 
access. All of these epistemic modes can in principle result in mistaken propositions. In 
Gaita’s exposition, our understanding that there are other sensate beings, of this or that 
kind, does not involve the epistemic concepts of belief or knowledge. Such understanding 
is more a matter of mastering a concept or set of concepts. Our certainty is better 
understood, then, as an inability to doubt which arises from the possession of a concept. 
The sort of concept that “sensate being” is, is more like the concept “physical object”, 
than the concepts “gryphon” or “Martian”. And yet, as we shall see, “conscious being” 
has a significantly different conceptual structure from “physical object”, and is connected 
with the understanding in a different way. 
 
Unlike our empirical knowledge, the kind of certainty we have about other minds “is 
without evidence – completely without evidence – and is none the worse for that”45 . In 
“Eine Einstellung zur Seele”, Peter Winch discusses this famous passage: 
 
                                                 
44 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.61. 
45 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.64 
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“I believe that he is suffering” – Do I also believe that he isn’t an 
automaton?  
It would go against the grain to use the word in both connexions… 
“I believe that he is not an automaton”, just like that, so far, makes no 
sense. 
My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul…I am not of the 
opinion that he has a soul.46  
 
Gaita explains that “soul” (in German, “seele”) here simply means “a being with thoughts 
and feelings”47; it “means an inner life” but not one “with deeper and shallower 
possibilities” 48. Furthermore, “attitude” in the passage does not imply an “arbitrary and 
subjective” 49 projection onto an objective world described by behaviorism. Winch argues 
that the concepts of pain and of sensate creature arise from our unreflective reactions to 
particular objects. The “primitive material”50  of our “unhesitating interactions”51 helps 
form the concept of pity. Such widely shared and inescapable 52 human patterns of 
response 53, together with their objects, build the concepts of pain and sensate creature. 
Winch points out that for this range of concepts, response and object are internally related 
54: there would be no concept of pity without the specific object(s) it is commonly a 
response to - and vice versa.  
 
Furthermore, our own affective reactions, on this view, are conceptually tied to our 
individual understanding of “other minds” or “sensate beings”. That is why Wittgenstein 
said that pity is “a form of conviction that someone else is in pain”55. But now, while it 
may make sense to say I believe or know that a dog is in pain, it makes no sense to say 
that I believe or know that this dog is a sensate creature. For my understanding of 
                                                 
46 P. Winch, Trying to Make Sense (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), p.140.  
47 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.60. 
48 The Philosopher’s Dog, p..60. 
49 Trying to Make Sense, p.141. 
50 Trying to Make Sense, p.147. 
51 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.63. 
52 Trying to Make Sense, p.149. 
53 Trying to Make Sense, p.152. 
54 Trying to Make Sense, p.147. 
55 R. Gaita, Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception, 2nd Ed, (London: Routledge, 2004),  p.176. 
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“sensate creature” is conceptually embedded in my actual and possible background 
responses to such beings and is not grounded in any evidence that they are conscious. 
 
On the standard, strongly non-anthropocentric picture, the “affective dispositions of any 
particular person” 56 may causally affect their cognitive achievements but they are strictly 
unnecessary for understanding. The standard picture regards it as perfectly intelligible 
that such a person can be indifferent to the pain or other subjective states of creatures. It 
also treats subjectivity as an interior, occult phenomenon. This passive epistemological 
stance, aspiring to “the view from nowhere”, is evident when we speak of “ascriptions” 
or “attributions” - rather than descriptions - of animal mental states.  
 
It will pay to dwell on the conceptual interdependence of object and response. Consider 
what Gaita says: 
 
Such reactions – a variety of interacting responses to the demeanors of the 
human form – are partly constitutive of those concepts with which we 
describe the forms of bodily expressiveness – groans, smiles, grimaces, 
and so on. They are the concepts with which we describe what we 
ordinarily call ‘behavior’, all the subtle inflections we bring under the 
notion of ‘body language’, and which distinguish behavior from ‘colorless 
bodily movement’. Binding a person’s wound while looking into his face 
is an example of an attitude towards a soul.57         
 
A Rogers and Hart song contains the line, “wait ’til you feel the warmth of his glance”. 
The behavior of others does not strike us as robotic or “colorless” because the concepts 
we use to describe thoughts, emotions, beliefs, intentions and moods are assembled from 
responses to particular bodies and faces. So, despite Singer’s claim, writhing and 
screaming do not represent evidence of feeling; these descriptions are already expressive 
                                                 
56 Good and Evil, p.176. 
57 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.62. 
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of feeling. This is clear in the case of human beings. But not all organisms have obvious 
expressive potential.  
 
An example is the fly. When Gaita says that “we do not know what to make of the idea 
that a fly might be in agony”58, he does not mean that we may not feel pity for the fly. In 
this case, our pity does not give rise unequivocally to the concept of “pain” or of “sensate 
creature”. The “tender compassion” 59 we may have for an insect is a response to an 
animate body with agency, which can be killed and mutilated, but does not have anything 
like the demeanor and face of a human being. Here we see clearly the second element in 
the conceptual interdependence: the expressive body. 
 
When Gaita refers to “a kind of naturalism of the surfaces”60, he means an understanding 
we have of other people and of animals that cannot come about because of a special 
epistemic relation to something essentially inaccessible. “Everything is on the surface”, 
he writes, “provided of course one has an imaginatively rich sense of the surface”.61 On 
this account, it is only through our own living and expressive body’s relation to other 
living and expressive bodies that we can “understand how it is with” 62 another, and 
“what it is to be one who suffers” in a certain way, “with the resonance which Nagel 
wants for that expression, but cannot get with bats”63.  
 
Lars Hertzberg acknowledges that Gaita has identified a mutual conceptual dependency 
between response and object – a circle that is “non-vicious” because it shows how the 
concepts are formed together. But Hertzberg claims that Gaita is prone to a misreading of 
Wittgenstein’s insight: 
 
                                                 
58 Good and Evil, p.179. 
59 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.136. 
60 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.200. 
61 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.131. 
62 Good and Evil, p.185. 
63 Good and Evil, p.185. 
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It comes to this: only of a living human being and what resembles 
(behaves like) a human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is 
blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious.64 
 
He believes the mistake is to read this as expressing the view that the general category 
“human being” – that is, our “common kind” 65 - provides grounds for the idea that other 
beings are conscious, on the basis of a resemblance in behavior and our responses to it. 
This approach, says Hertzberg, involves “laying down rules for the use of certain 
expressions, rather than simply describing their use”66. It undermines the right way to 
understand the subjectivity of humans and animals, by supplanting an active cognitive 
relation involving our responses, with a passive observer relation.      
   
David Cockburn, he says, was right when he said the “notion of resemblance should not 
be taken to refer to geometrical or other physical similarities between human and other 
forms of expression; rather, the resemblance should itself be understood as involving the 
expressive nature of the behavior”67. In other words, any similarities we find between 
“flies that writhe or squids that flee” 68 and human behavior is a reflection, not a 
grounding rule or condition, of those common descriptions (not “ascriptions”). We 
should not be prescriptive about the criteria of concepts, but should simply look at how 
language is intelligibly used in different contexts.    
 
As we shall see, Gaita’s work does not suggest that we can determine “kinds” – either 
sensate kinds or “ethical” kinds - in this non-Wittgensteinian manner. Hertzberg’s 
criticism might have been better directed at Michael Leahy. In Against Liberation: 
Putting Animals in Perspective, Leahy contends that Singer, Regan, Hearne, Rachels, and 
Clark are guilty of far-reaching anthropomorphism.69  
  
                                                 
64 Philosophy, Ethics and a Common Humanity, p.16 (Philosophical Investigation no 281). 
65 Philosophy, Ethics and a Common Humanity, p.16. 
66 Philosophy, Ethics and a Common Humanity, p.18. 
67 Philosophy, Ethics and a Common Humanity, p.19. 
68 Philosophy, Ethics and a Common Humanity, p.19. 
69 M. P. T.  Leahy,  Against Animal Liberation: Putting Animals in Perspective (London: Routledge, 1993), 
p.253. 
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A crucial part of Leahy’s argument comes from Zettel, where Wittgenstein discusses “a 
primitive reaction to tend, to treat, the part that hurts when someone else is in pain”70:  
 
But what is the word “primitive” meant to say here? Presumably that this 
sort of behavior is pre-linguistic: that a language-game is based on it, that 
it is the prototype of a way of thinking and not the result of thought. 71        
 
Leahy argues that animal attributions depend on “pre-linguistic prototypes of behavior 
upon which the primary language-game of pain [for example] is based”72. More 
precisely, animals must display characteristic prototypes to “provide grounds”73 for the 
attributions. Otherwise, anthropomorphism results. 
 
Thus, our attributions to animals are grounded “in their contiguity to the human 
paradigm” 74 and are “parasitic” 75 upon it. How then do we judge rightly the sufficiency 
of the prototypes?  Leahy allows a place for our “instinctive responses”76, saying that “we 
feel impelled to mark the similarity of their behavior to that of human beings situated 
likewise whilst allowing for the inability to describe what they feel.”77  
 
Yelps and whines are examples of prototypes. But Leahy warns that the “similarities of 
their pre-linguistic reactions to human responses serve as constant temptations to treat 
them and speak of them in ways that are perhaps too reminiscent of the human 
paradigm”78. In fact, the absence of language, self-awareness, and conceptual 
understanding in animals means these “attenuated language games” begin to “misfire 
with uncertainty”79.  
 
                                                 
70 Against Animal Liberation, p.125 (Zettel nos. 540, 541). 
71 Against Animal Liberation, p.126 (Zettel no. 51). 
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Leahy claims he has shown that animals cannot fear or flee death, nor manifest virtue, 
vice, hope, grief, joy, or grief: 
 
Animals can, of course, manifest relatively short term distress at, say, the 
loss of a mate, but it shows itself only in a disruption of behavior. Without 
language it cannot consider its plight. Furthermore, as with hope and 
remorse, there are not characteristic prototypes: pulling a long face or 
weeping frenziedly would be inadequate simulations of grief.80 
 
He concludes that the reality of animal life is that they are “dumb brutes” or “true 
primitives”.  
 
Leahy’s exposition would raise Hertzberg’s eyebrows. For a start, Leahy largely ignores 
the role of the responses which help form our concepts of understanding other minds. His 
prosecution of the argument suggests he is relying on his own “guiding criteria” 81. It also 
suggests that the concepts can be determined independently of how they are actually 
used.  
 
Whereas Wittgenstein uses the term “prelinguistic prototypes” to refer to human 
behavior, Leahy extends the concept to animals. With that move, he seems to be directing 
us to weigh the geometric resemblance of the prototypes with human behavior, and 
perhaps our reactions, to ground the relevant attributions. Hertzberg parodies this method 
with the image of checking our responses in a mirror to see whether they are adequate to 
the concepts we entertain.82  
 
Leahy’s idea of “substantial similarity”83 appears to justify his attributions only because 
we already recognize behavior as more than lifeless action or “colorless bodily 
movement”. For example, he claims that canine tail-wagging is a grounding prelinguistic 
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prototype. Yet it is very difficult to see tail-wagging, let alone the powerfully odd 
behavior of sperm whales when they raise their flukes or send a jet of water into the air 
from their spouts, as comparable to human “prototypes” of linguistic behavior. What is 
there in our behavior to “resemble” the sperm whale’s use of fluke and spout? Yet we do 
think of their behavior as resembling ours. Resemblance comes down to the fact that 
animals express pain, friendliness, anger, frustration, and enjoyment. In this respect, they 
and we are of a common kind.     
 
In many places, Gaita is at pains to argue that our responses to particular objects - our 
attitudes towards “souls” - do not justify concepts but help form them. For example:  
 
When dogs respond to our moods, to our pleasures and fears, when they 
anticipate our intentions, or wait excitedly to see whether we will take 
them for a walk, they do not assume that we are sensate beings with 
intentions. I imagine that it was the same for us in our primitive state. Out 
of such unhesitating interactions, between ourselves, and between us and 
animals, there developed – not beliefs, assumptions, and conjectures about 
the mind but - our very concepts of thought, feeling, intention, belief, 
doubt, and so on.84  
 
Furthermore, Gaita’s argument shows that, ironically, Leahy’s position is itself 
illegitimately anthropomorphic. “There is no reason to think we form the concept of 
intention”, Gaita argues, 
 
first in its application to human behavior and that we then apply it to 
animals, when, for example, we see a dog running after a cat. That is 
assumed when people speak of anthropomorphism – that we illegitimately 
apply to animals concepts of conscious states that we have legitimately 
developed in relation to human beings. But such concepts, I have 
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suggested, are formed in responses to animals and to human beings 
together.85 
 
“That is the deepest reason”, Gaita argues, “why it is not anthropomorphic”86 to say that 
animals can have intentions. His argument undermines the basic assumption of a great 
deal of philosophy and science: that we must extrapolate outwards from our own human 
case to the strictly inaccessible minds of other beings. That, too, is an illegitimate form of 
anthropomorphism.87 
 
We understand animals - and they understand us to a degree - only because we share 
animal bodies that can be “inflected, so to speak, in interacting responses to the forms of 
the living body’s expressiveness”88. For Gaita, here is “a kind of naturalism of the 
surfaces”89: “Everything is on the surface, provided of course one has an imaginatively 
rich sense of the surface”90. Thus, it is through our own living body’s relation to other 
expressive bodies that we can “understand how it is with”91 another. This picture has a 
“resonance which Nagel wants for that expression, but cannot get with bats”92.  
 
Some philosophers and scientists are therefore wrong to think that there are special 
philosophical obstacles to being certain of, and (moreover) understanding, the 
subjectivity of animals, even bats or sperm whales. Their assumption is that we must 
infer the hidden inner lives of others in order to understand them. The first key 
assumption I referred to was about factual or empirical understanding – whether animals 
have subjective states like belief and fear. I will reflect further on this assumption now. 
Following that, I will address the other assumption – that factual understanding is the 
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only real form of understanding of what animals and humans are like. In addressing that 
claim a richer range of concepts to describe other beings will emerge.      
 
In one sense we can sympathize with Nagel. Animal bodies and modes of living are often 
alien and can be puzzling. But to understand the subjectivity of animals (even outside the 
realm of meaning which we have not entered yet), we need to have a certain form of 
intersubjective interaction. Partly, this means being free of misconceptions and prejudice. 
It means having an imaginative openness of response, of a kind not on display in the 
writings of scientists like Skinner and philosophers like Leahy. 
 
With that responsiveness, in the face of behavior, some descriptions can be irresistible. 
Bekoff quotes an expert on elephant behavior, who said that after watching a female 
elephant with her dead newborn: 
 
I got my first very strong feeling that elephants grieve. I will never forget 
the expression on her face, her eyes, her mouth, the way she carried her 
ears, her head, and her body. Every part of her spelled grief.93  
 
Here is another example. When Vicki Hearne visited “Gentle Jungle” to find out about 
ape “language”, she was startled by what she found: 
 
The conversation with Washoe and Moja is about breakfast: ‘Do you want 
an apple?’ ‘Give Moja fruit juice!’ and so forth. I can’t read Ameslan, or 
not much of it, but I experience, as do most people who happen on these 
conversations, a shock of recognition. This is language, I think, or at least 
what I call language. The pattern of immediacy and response seem 
unmistakable. I find that trying to have recourse to the ‘Clever Hans 
fallacy’ as an explanation seems alien to my intuitive reading as a trainer.94  
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Hearne talks of those who can respond well to body language in a way that is not affected 
by “fantasies of power”95 or contaminated by the 
 
attempt to infer whether or not the dog will bite, jump on them or 
whatever. Instead of reading the dog… they cast about for some premise 
from which they can draw an inference that will give them certainty about 
the dog’s behavior.96  
 
This may involve “a certain steadiness of gaze” 97 that is opposed to one kind of scientific 
detachment. “To be [scientifically] ‘objective’”, Hearne says, “is to try to approach the 
condition of being No One in Particular with a View From Nowhere”.98 Rush Rhees said 
something similar about the spectator’s stance: 
 
You will no more understand animals – understand what animals are like – 
by trying to establish causal laws of their behavior, than you will 
understand what people are in that way. Nor will you see the difference 
between animals and human beings.99 
 
Look on animals as companions – or antagonists – rather than as 
experimental subjects. ‘Subjects of experiments’. Learn from animals in a 
way more comparable to that in which you may learn from human 
beings… 
If you were unarmed in the jungle, you would look on animals differently. 
And you would not think of them all as ‘lower’.100   
 
A revealing example of “epistemological heavy-handedness” 101 comes from Hearne’s 
observation of visitors to “Gentle Jungle”:  
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The handlers, I noticed, walked in with a soft, acute, 380 degree 
awareness; they were receptively establishing mute acknowledgment of 
and relationships with all the several hundred pumas, wolves, chimps, 
spider monkeys and Galapagos tortoises. Their ways of moving fit into the 
spaces shaped by the animals’ awareness. [In contrast the academics] 
failed to radiate the intelligence the handlers did. Their very hip joints 
articulated the importance of their theories, they had too many questions, 
too many hidden assumptions about their roles as observer.102      
 
J.M. Coetzee’s character Elizabeth Costello marvels at the powers of expression 
belonging to human bodies: 
 
which not in a thousand years could she have dreamed up…How on earth 
can bodies not only keep themselves clean using blood (blood!) but 
cogitate upon the mystery of their existence and make utterances about it 
and now and again even have little ecstasies?103  
 
Costello also points out that animals, which do not cogitate upon mysteries, show 
intriguing forms of expressiveness. As Gaita says, she is intolerant of the assertion that 
“animals cannot know that they die and therefore cannot fear death because they do not 
possess concepts – of self and of the future, for example – necessary for such 
knowledge”104: 
 
Anyone who says that life matters less to an animal than it does to us has 
not held in his hands an animal fighting for its life. The whole of the being 
of the animal is thrown into that fight, without reserve. When you say that 
the fight lacks a dimension of intellectual or imaginative horror, I agree. It 
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is not the mode of being of animals to have an intellectual horror: their 
whole being is in the living flesh. 
 
If I do not convince you, that is because my words, here, lack the power to 
bring home to you the wholeness, the unabstracted, unintellectual nature, 
of that animal being. That is why I urge you to read the poets who return 
the living, electric being to language; and if the poets do not move you, I 
urge you to walk, flank to flank, beside the beast that is prodded down the 
chute to his executioner.105       
 
Costello stresses the imaginative responsiveness of poets who bring to life the living, 
electric being of animals. For example, Ted Hughes gives us a big cat that is much more 
alive and full of intelligent feeling than the “baffled will” of Rilke’s panther, dulled and 
inert in captivity. Costello notes: 
 
Fullness of being is a state hard to sustain in confinement….it is on 
creatures least able to bear confinement – creatures who conform least to 
Descartes picture of the soul as a pea imprisoned in a shell, to which 
imprisonment is irrelevant - that we see the most devastating effects: in 
zoos, in laboratories, institutions where the flow of joy that comes from 
living not in or as a body but simply from being an embodied being has no 
place.106  
 
Nevertheless, or because of this, she admires Ted Hughes’s captive jaguar. Here is a 
portion of  Hughes’ poem, Second Glance at a Jaguar, which Stephen Mulhall quotes:   
 
Skinful of bowls he bowls them, 
The hip going in and out of joint, dropping the spine 
With the urgency of his hurry 
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Like a cat going along under thrown stones, under cover, 
Glancing sideways, running 
Under his spine… 
He’s wearing himself to heavy ovals,  
Muttering some mantra, some drum song of murder 
Intolerable, spurred by the Rosettes, the Cain-brands, 
Wearing the spots off from the inside, 
Rounding some revenge. Going like a prayer-wheel, 
The head dragging forward, the body keeping up,  
The blackjack tail as if looking for a target,  
Hurrying through the underworld, soundless.107 
  
In her lecture, Costello argues that this caged jaguar, which mesmerizes zoo visitors and 
poet alike, is an animal whose “consciousness is kinetic rather than abstract”: 
 
Hughes is feeling his way towards a different kind of being-in-the–world, 
one which is not entirely foreign to us…In these poems we know the 
jaguar not from the way he seems but from the way he moves. The body is 
as the body moves, or as the currents of life move within it. The poems ask 
us to imagine our way into that way of moving, to inhabit that 
body…poetry that does not try to find the idea in the animal, that is not 
about the animal, but is instead the record of an engagement with him.108 
 
It is the poet’s “attentiveness to animals”109 - combined with his ability to capture the 
rippling energy of the surface (perhaps, the “joy”), and his way of bringing out the color 
rather than colorlessness of the bodily movements - that offers us one form of 
understanding that is opposed to that of Nagel. Nagel’s thought does not allow us to 
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authentically take hold of the subjectivity of different others, because when the view from 
nowhere is adopted, animals become, to different degrees, unknowable. 
 
Now, however, we have at hand a philosophical view that is opposed to the passive 
spectator stance. This view suggests that properly understanding animal behavior is to 
have a kind of responsive relation – an attitude toward a “soul” - in which we recognize 
in them a kind of presentness. In this field, response-dependent concepts are internal to 
our understanding. More precisely, we could say, these concepts are response-and-
surface-dependent. Because of its preconceptions, science, and to some degree 
philosophy, are typically unaware of this form of recognition or understanding. But now 
we come to their second large assumption. 
 
This assumption is that “factual knowledge is the prototype for all knowledge”110. Gaita 
answers it as follows:  
 
But there is no good reason to think that those prototypes should determine 
the meaning of all substantial applications of the concepts of 
understanding, of objectivity, of trying to see things as they are. I grant 
readily and fully that the understanding of the heart will never lead to 
knowledge of the kind that can accumulate through the ages and become 
settled in the great encyclopedias of our culture. But that does not mean 
that it is not a genuine form of understanding.111                        
 
By an “understanding of the heart”, Gaita means to invoke his conception of the 
inseparability of thought and feeling in the constitution of critical modes of thought 
which apply in what he conveniently calls the “realm of meaning”. As we have seen, 
these critical concepts determine the sort of cognitive success or failure that depends on 
the form of an idea being inseparable from its content.  
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There are, then, two senses in which Wittgenstein’s phrase “attitude towards a soul” is 
important. The first is Wittgenstein’s own meaning of “soul” as something like “creature 
with subjectivity” or “inner life”. The second meaning of “soul” we might point to, 
however, is this: only an individual who can suffer but also has a rich inner life - rich 
because of the possibility of depth and shallowness – has a ‘soul’. As Gaita says, animals 
suffer, “but they cannot reflect upon their suffering, they cannot be driven to despair 
about it”112. A dog can love its master; but does not love in sentimental or self-indulgent 
ways – no matter how intense and striking the nature of its attachments. Specifically, 
animals lack the sort of reflection that is characterized by the presence of the critical 
modes which allow us to understand meaning. Disregard for an understanding which can 
only be obtained in this way is common in much philosophy and science. But philosophy, 
at least, must concern itself with this other way of thinking if it is to do justice to 
questions about what kind of things animals and human beings are.  
 
As a matter of fact, the failure to engage with the form of understanding that depends on 
these specific critical capacities does not apply only to the crude assumption, also found 
in a good deal of science and philosophy, that factual knowledge, in emulation of the 
“view from nowhere”, is the prototype of all understanding. Alasdair MacIntyre believes 
that our experiences, responses, and characters are internal to a part of ethical 
understanding of the virtues. In Dependent Rational Animals, he gives a scientifically 
literate and sensitive account of the nature of animals, taking on board Wittgenstein’s 
insight about the response-dependent nature of concepts about behavior and subjectivity, 
and stressing that our understanding of animals is partly formed from direct acquaintance 
with them. He writes there is a kind of 
 
practical knowledge, a knowing how to interpret, that arises from those 
complex social interactions with others in which our responses to others 
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and their responses to our responses generate a recognition by them and by 
us of what thoughts and feelings it is to which each is responding.113  
   
MacIntyre argues that animals can act for reasons and have a kind of phronesis or 
practical rationality. Dolphins, for example, display intelligent activity by engaging in the 
“purposeful pursuit of characteristic goals”114. This capacity gives rise to excellences and 
goods which constitute flourishing in “their own specific mode”115. He also believes that 
the relationships between some nonhuman animals and some human animals are more 
analogous to human relationships that some philosophers recognize, and that close 
cooperation between humans and animals is possible.  
 
MacIntyre believes that, in an important sense, humans and animals belong to a common 
kind, since “in our own beginnings as rational agents we are very close to their condition 
and…our identity was then and remains an animal identity”116. We are “redirected and 
remade animals and not something else”117. Many philosophers, he says, have 
exaggerated the differences between humans and animals and have overlooked the 
resemblances and commonality118 by drawing “a single line between all non-humans on 
the one hand and humans on the other”119. One way we are similar is that we are each 
mortal and vulnerable and, in the case of the higher animals, we are each (though 
differently) susceptible to losing the capacity to act intelligently on reasons. But at the 
same time they are different to us, and belong to a different kind, because they cannot 
reflect upon their histories and futures, their births and deaths, and enter discussions 
about value. Intelligent animals are not “independent practical reasoners”.  
 
Human beings, MacIntyre thinks, can have a kind of understanding which is not purely 
rational or factual, but which emerges from their animal directedness and capacity for 
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virtue. This includes sympathies and affections, although these are changed by our 
capacity for reflection. Yet MacIntyre’s conception of how we understand animal life 
leaves out virtually all that might come from the critical modes of reflection that Gaita 
explores. Despite his awareness of some response-and-surface-dependent forms of 
understanding, therefore, what he provides is a detailed naturalistic description of animals 
- their mode of intelligence, species excellences, and their flourishing – which exists 
outside a zone in which meanings are critically explored. Thus, MacIntyre’s approach 
allows no room for descriptions of the reality of animal being which stand or fall 
according to whether their form is sentimental or banal. 
 
In stark contrast, Gaita insists that we should take seriously the fact that there might be “a 
distinctive role that storytelling can play in showing us how we can apply to animals 
concepts we had previously thought had no application to them”120. Story-telling can also 
deepen our understanding of meaning-concepts which we had previously applied to 
animals, by allowing us to see these concepts – say, the concept of animal dignity - in 
new compelling forms. This was, I argued, the second way that our understanding can be 
enriched; indeed enriched in an ever-deepening manner, for we can come to see general 
things, which we had already believed, in a new light, and sometimes in a light under 
which they seem even more insightful. 
 
This does not mean that we must reject the important role that science plays in our 
knowledge of animality, including bringing to light certain animal behaviors. But it does 
mean that we should correctly position science. First, we should notice its limitations in 
terms of understanding which is not about value, but it more naturally thought of as 
empirical or factual (such as whether they have certain emotional states). Not all 
understanding needs validation or can meaningfully be validated by science; and as we 
saw, much or most of our understanding of mental and conscious states comes from 
direct acquaintance, and interactive and responsive living – by looking at animals, as 
Rhees advised, as if we had met them in the jungle. Second, we should realize that this 
kind of understanding of behavior is itself only a small part, if sometimes a constituent 
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part, of a deeper, more comprehensive understanding of what it is to be an animal or a 
human being.  
 
We can acknowledge that the former “non-evaluative” kind of understanding may help 
build those critical concepts that partly constitute the realm of meaning without playing a 
grounding role. So we should also grant that exploring meaning and animal life requires 
sensitivity both to ethically evaluative and non-evaluative modes of appreciation. 
Because of the interdependent surface-and-response way in which conceptions of 
meaning are formed, we will often need to be sensitive to both types of understanding 
together. 
 
In Hughes’s jaguar verse, a poem in which the aura of sensitive life is intermingled with 
an evocation of wonder at the animal’s charged presentness, there is already a movement 
beyond an active grasp simply of the presence of conscious life in one form or another. 
Chapter 7 contains more examples of how a sensitive and imaginative approach to certain 
facts of animal behavior is integrated into a kind of reflection disciplined by the critical 
concepts. Here it must be recalled that attention to animal behavior comprises only half 
the conceptual equation - human responsiveness must also be in the spotlight. The 
examples in the next chapter involve story-telling and writing which require an 
understanding of the hear as well as the head. Specifically, form and content in these 
examples cannot be pulled apart without undermining their “tone” and thus their 
cognitive content and value.  
 
The reason for providing these examples is not that they must compel assent in all 
rational people – that would be against the spirit of the preceding argument. Nor will all 
thoughtful people who strive for lucidity necessarily agree with every point. Rather, the 
reason for discussing these examples is to illustrate why the most serious kind of 
understanding of nonhuman life must proceed by careful attention to response-and-
surface dependent determinations. These must sometimes be imaginative and creative 
ones; but always, they can only be made in a realm that is culturally informed and 
 168
reverberates with a “quality” or “tone” which, by employing the critical concepts, we can 
take seriously.  
 169
 
Chapter 7 Animals in the Realm of Meaning 
 
The first example in this chapter, Herman Melville’s Moby Dick, introduces the question 
of whether moral descriptions apply to animals. Moby Dick’s narrator, Ishmael, tells us 
that after the first encounter with the white whale, Captain Ahab’s “torn body and gashed 
soul bled into one another; and so interfusing, made him mad”1. He reports that the 
captain becomes “intent on an audacious, immitigable, and supernatural revenge”2. In one 
of his speeches, Ahab cries: 
 
‘it was Moby Dick that dismasted me; Moby Dick that brought me to this 
dead stump I stand on now. Aye, aye’, he shouted with a terrific, loud, 
animal sob, like that of a heart-stricken moose; ‘Aye, Aye! It was that 
accursed white whale that razed me; made a poor pegging lubber of me 
forever and a day!’ Then tossing both arms, with measureless imprecations 
he shouted out: ‘Aye, aye! And I’ll chase him round Good Hope, and 
round the Horn, and round the Norway Maelstrom, and round perdition’s 
flames before I give him up. And this is what ye have shipped for, men! 
To chase that white whale on both sides of land, and over all sides of earth, 
till he spouts black blood and rolls fin out.’3 
 
There are different ways of construing Ahab’s madness which need to be fleshed out in 
order to make sense of his relation to the whale. For a start, monomaniacal Ahab is by no 
means completely morally deranged. Addressing the disgraced black boy Pip, he says 
instinctively: “thou touchest my inmost centre, boy; thou art tied to me by cords woven of 
my heart-strings”4. He also implores his near-mutinous mate like this: “Close! stand close 
to me, Starbuck; let me look into a human eye; it is better than to gaze at sea or sky; 
better than to gaze upon God. By the green land; by the bright hearthstone! This is the 
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magic glass man; I see my wife and my child in thine eye.”5 It also seems that Ahab 
looks upon his men, in all their human variety, as fellow mortals. Clearly, he has richly 
imaginative sense of the strange significance of human life. 
 
We understand that Ahab is “naturally grieved, and that to the quick, with the terrible 
casualty which had overtaken him”6. His character and quest have a meaning beyond his 
relation to the whale:  
 
The White Whale swam before him as the monomaniac incarnation of all 
those malicious agencies which some deep men feel eating them, till they 
are left living with half a heart and half a lung…all evil, to crazy Ahab, 
were visibly personified, and made practically assailable in Moby Dick. 
He piled upon the whale’s white hump the sum of all the general rage and 
hate felt by his whole race from Adam down; and then, as if his chest had 
been a mortar, he burst his hot heart’s shell upon it.7 
 
Obviously, the whale is the surrogate target of Ahab’s existential outrage: 
 
“All visible objects, man, are but pasteboard masks. But in each event – in 
the living act, the undoubted deed – there, some unknown but still 
reasoning thing put forth the mouldings of its features from behind the 
unreasoning mask…That inscrutable thing is chiefly what I hate; and be 
the whale agent, or be the white whale principal, I will wreak that hate 
upon him. Talk to me not of blasphemy, man; I’d strike the sun if it 
insulted me. For could the sun do that, then I could do the other”  8 
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With its “outrageous strength”9 and inscrutability, the Leviathan is an inspired choice of 
metaphor. However, as far as the morally serious Starbuck can see, Ahab’s behavior is as 
barely intelligible as it would be if he were chasing a natural object: 
 
‘Vengeance on a dumb brute!’ cried Starbuck, ‘that simply smote thee 
from blindest instinct! Madness! To be enraged with a dumb thing, 
Captain Ahab, seems blasphemous.’10 
 
Starbuck makes a final appeal to his captain’s understanding as the whale is swimming 
rapidly away from the onslaught. 
 
‘Oh! Ahab’, cried Starbuck, ‘not too late is it, even now, the third day, to 
desist. See! Moby Dick seeks thee not. It is thou, thou, that madly seekest 
him!’11  
 
The fact that Melville uses the whale as a metaphor or device is clear enough. But 
Starbuck and the crew are faced with the man and his mission. At the root of their 
incomprehension is not the opinion that Ahab, blinded by a real wrong done to him by 
the whale, inexcusably puts many lives at risk. Nor do they feel that Moby Dick was only 
doing what he had every right to do, namely defending himself from the harpoons, and 
not seeking men to kill. Nor, again, do they believe that, while the desire for revenge is 
an intelligible response to bad behavior, it is neither worthy of Ahab’s protracted rage, 
nor fair to an animal miscreant whose capacity for vice is circumscribed. These are all 
things that people might say in response to what an animal has done; but they are not 
what Starbuck thinks. 
 
The crew surely would not deny that some sense can be made of visiting one’s anger on 
an animal by killing or mutilating it. There is no obvious conceptual confusion involved 
in hating an animal and wanting its destruction because of what it is like or what it has 
                                                 
9 Moby Dick, p.167. 
10 Moby Dick, p.167. 
11 Moby Dick, p.531. 
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has done. In that precise way, we can make sense of someone taking “revenge” on an 
animal. The difference is that Ahab’s revenge is done in the spirit of avenging a wrong. 
Indeed, Ishmael reveals that “in his heart, Ahab had some glimpse of this, namely: all my 
means are sane, my motive and my object mad”12. Apparently, he is self-deceived about 
the fact he is pursuing, as Michael Leahy would agree, a dumb, instinctive brute.    
 
We might read the novel as affirming this thought. But it might pay to look more closely 
at how Melville draws the relation between Ahab and the whale. “Wild rumors abound”, 
says Ishmael, “whenever there is any adequate reality for them to cling to”13. The novel 
depicts different relations between man and beast. Third mate Flask is said to harbor 
animosity toward the whale, but his desire to kill is more general:  
 
[Flask] somehow seemed to think that the great Leviathans had personally 
and hereditarily affronted him; and therefore it was a sort of point of honor 
with him, to destroy them whenever encountered. So utterly lost was he to 
all sense of reverence for the many marvels of their majestic bulk and 
mystic ways; and so dead to anything like an apprehension of any possible 
danger from encountering them; that in his poor opinion, the wondrous 
whale was but a species of magnified mouse…14  
   
Compare this to Ahab’s opinion:  
 
I will not say as schoolboys do to bullies, - Take some one of your own 
size; don’t pommel me! No, ye’ve knocked me down, and I am up again, 
but ye have run and hidden. Come forth from behind your cotton bags! I 
have no long gun to reach ye. Come, Ahab’s compliments to ye; come and 
see if ye can swerve me.15 
 
                                                 
12 Moby Dick, p.187. 
13 Moby Dick, p.181. 
14 Moby Dick, p.125. 
15 Moby Dick, p.171. 
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In Ahab’s words his adversary is given a character and special kind of agency. It is not 
the species that has offended him but a particular antagonist. Melville builds several 
connections between Moby Dick and Ahab, which are really connections between beast 
and man. With his whale-bone leg he is never allowed to forget that he was dismembered 
by one of the creatures - graphically portrayed over and again by Melville as creatures of 
flesh and blood – he dismembers as a way of life. During the chase he says: 
 
Here’s food for thought, had Ahab time to think; but Ahab never thinks; he 
only feels, feels; that’s tingling enough for mortal man! To think’s 
audacity. God only has that right and privilege. Thinking is, or ought to be, 
a coolness and calmness; and our poor hearts throb, and our poor brains 
beat too much for that.16 
  
Ahab is an embodied and passionate creature like the whale. Yet obviously, Ahab does 
think while the whale does not. Still, Ishmael is at pains to show us why he thinks of 
“spermaceti” not really as fish (which was the then-current biological misperception), but 
as great fish. Ishmael’s meticulous anatomical descriptions explain, amongst countless 
other details, how sperm whales do not have gills, but lungs, like us. As well as diving to 
inhuman depths, the spermaceti must live for the most part close to the surface. Here the 
whales can breathe, rest, play with their young, cruise in great pods, interact, and, of 
course, be hunted. Their bodies both resemble and differ alarmingly from human bodies. 
Ishmael observes that the whales’ “immense magnitude renders it very hard really to 
believe that such bulky masses of overgrowth can possibly be instinct, in all parts, with 
the same sort of life that lives in a dog or horse”17. That they have such lives is indeed 
what Ishmael does claim. Ishmael’s whale is an animal with at least the same sort of 
feeling and intelligence - or intelligent feeling perhaps – as these familiar land animals.  
 
In the film version of Hemingway’s novel The Old Man and the Sea, the great fisherman 
Santiago “talks” with a kind of respect to the marlin with which he is locked in a life and 
                                                 
16 Moby Dick, pp.525-526. 
17 Moby Dick, p.269. 
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death battle. He calls the fish “strong and brave”. Although the fish may be described as 
thrashing about with blind instinct and no understanding, we may want to resist the 
assertion that Santiago is doing little more than reporting the fish’s epic persistence. The 
struggle of this huge and powerful fish is to be appreciated as something marvelous. A 
wonder of nature it may be, and yet Ahab need not see a massive fish like the marlin as a 
great fish, with the same sort of life and agency as the whale. 
 
Contrast Ishmael’s sense of the whale, and the life that is within it, with this report of an 
encounter with squid: 
 
No perceptible face or front did it have; no conceivable token of either 
sensation or instinct; but undulated there on the billows an unearthly, 
formless, chance-like apparition of life.18 
 
The ghost-like squid are a living form to marvel at, but not because they have any kind of 
substantial “life within them”, irrespective even of whether they are sentient. The poet 
Elizabeth Bishop is struck, in a manner similar to Ishmael with the squid, by an encounter 
with the eyes of a “tremendous fish” she has caught:  
 
I looked into his eyes 
Which were far larger than mine 
But shallower, and yellowed, 
The irises backed and packed 
With tarnished tinfoil 
Seen through lenses 
Of old scratched isinglass 
They shifted a little, but not  
To return my stare. 
-It was more like the tipping 
of an object toward the light.19 
                                                 
18 Moby Dick, p.272. 
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With the whale it is different. That is not just because the whale is more complex, but 
because it has a different mode of life. Even so, the whale’s life and bodily form present 
Ishmael with some puzzles. Of the tail, he muses that at  
 
times there are gestures in it, which, though they would well grace the 
hand of man, remain wholly inexplicable…Nor are there wanting other 
motions of the whale in his general body, full of strangeness, and 
unaccountable to his most experienced assailant. 20  
 
He confesses: “Dissect him how I may, then, I but go skin deep; I know him not, and 
never will”21. The whale is as strange a life-form as Nagel’s bat, and easily stranger than 
the Wittgenstein’s lion - the one which, if he could speak, could not be understood. A 
part of Ishmael’s bewilderment has to do with what this unusual and secretive creature is 
like. This is also a perplexity about what, for example, it is expressing when it moves its 
tail like this or that. Another part of his bewilderment, however, is about how its form of 
intelligently expressive living can be manifested in a body seemingly so bereft of familiar 
expressive features. Gaita claims that we are certain that dogs have pain but not so sure 
about fleas: “That is because dogs have faces and fleas do not – not the kind one can look 
into when tending to their wounds”22. Ishmael’s puzzlement is intensified by his interest 
not only in sensation but in a kind of intelligent feeling and knowing:  
 
But if I know not even the tail of this whale, how understand his head? 
Much more, how comprehend his face, when face he has none? Thou shalt 
see my back parts, my tail, he seems to say, but my face shall not be seen. 
But I cannot completely make out his back parts; and hint what he will 
about his face, I say again he has no face.23 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
19 In T. Hughes (ed.), Poetry in the Making, (London: Faber and Faber, 1986),  p.28. 
20 Moby Dick, p.363 
21 Moby Dick, p.363 
22 R Gaita. A Common Humanity, (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 1999), p.268. 
23 Moby Dick, p.363. 
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Things seem different with other animals including those that live in the sea: 
 
Many mariners cherish a very superstitious feeling about seals, arising not 
only from their very peculiar tones when in distress, but also from the 
human look of their round heads and semi-intelligent faces, seen peeringly 
uprising from the water alongside. In the sea, under certain circumstances, 
seals have more than once been mistaken for men.24 
 
It was the humanness of the seal’s face that struck the mariners. Bearing an uncanny 
likeness to the “human paradigm” is one way in which the face of the seal resembles a 
human face. The other way it resembles a human face consists simply in the fact that it is 
also an expressive face, or as Ishmael would say, it consists in the simple fact that it is 
unmistakably a face. 
 
Some might think that Levinas was being obscure when wondered what a face is: 
 
It is via the face that one understands, for example, a dog…I cannot say at 
what moment you have the right to be called “face”. The human face is 
completely different and only afterwards do we discover the face of an 
animal. I don’t know if a snake has a face.25 
 
The snake has no face? But Ishmael’s perplexity is about what a creature can do with its 
“face”. Can the whale wear on its face curiosity or puzzlement, as the snake cannot? Yet: 
“there swims behind it all a mass of tremendous life”26. May we not also look into its 
eyes when we pity it? Ishmael might think so: 
 
So have I seen a bird with clipped wing, making affrighted broken circles 
in the air, vainly striving to escape the piratical hawks. But the bird has a 
                                                 
24 Moby Dick, p.491. 
25 M. Calarco & P. Atterton, (ed.) Animal Philosophy: Essential Readings in Continental Thought, 
(Cornwall: Continuum, 2004), p.49. 
26 Moby Dick, p.327. 
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voice, and with plaintive cries will make known her fear; but the fear of 
this vast dumb brute of the sea, was chained up and enchanted in him; he 
had no voice, save that choking respiration through his spiracle, and this 
made the sight of him unspeakably pitiable… 27     
 
Ishmael seems to be saying that the whale is not pitiable because he wants to cry out and 
can’t, though that too may be an occasion for a slightly different sort of sympathy. He 
finds the whale’s predicament pitiable partly because he has no means at all of calling out 
in pain and distress. His mute agony, Ishmael thinks, arouses and colors our response. 
 
Philosophers like Stephen Clark remind us of what we have learnt about animals since 
Melville’s time. Cetaceans have a complicated sonar communication system that cannot 
be heard by humans on boats. Ishmael, however, may not think that the fact they can after 
all communicate in this complex way must wholly undermine the quality of his pity. The 
agonized bloody spouting of the dying whale is not accompanied by an audible scream or 
cry, and this can contribute to its effect on us, without implying that the pity we may feel 
for creatures possessing audible voices is any the less. Although the whalers knew 
nothing of what science has since revealed, men like Starbuck, who talked of sperm 
whales as dumb things, were still in no doubt that they could suffer terribly, although 
they and everyone else knew they did not grimace or howl.  
 
In the following passage, the narrator contrasts the responses of Flask and Starbuck to the 
killing of an old whale. Ishmael also intimates, through the way he narrates the sequence, 
his own sense of what it means to kill a “great fish”: 
 
For all his old age, and his one arm, and his blind eyes, he must die the 
death and be murdered, in order to light the gay bridals and other merry-
makings of men, and also to illuminate the solemn churches that preach 
unconditional inoffensiveness by all to all. Still rolling in his blood, at last 
                                                 
27 Moby Dick, p.342. 
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he partially disclosed a strangely colored bunch or protuberance, the size 
of a bushel, low down on the flank. 
‘A nice spot’, cried Flask; ‘just let me prick him there once’. 
‘Avast!’ cried Starbuck, ‘there’s no need of that!’ 
But humane Starbuck was too late. At the instant of the dart an ulcerous jet 
shot from this cruel wound, and goaded by it into more than sufferable 
anguish, the whale now spouting thick blood, with swift fury blindly 
darted at the craft…so spent was he by loss of blood, the whale…lay 
panting on his side, impotently flapped with his stumped fin, then over and 
over slowly revolved like a waning world; turned up the white secrets of 
his belly; lay like a log, and died. It was most piteous, that last expiring 
spout.28 
 
A number of times, Ishmael draws attention to the importance of the whale’s spout and to 
the spout’s ability, paralleling our ability, to both inhale air and choke on blood. Upon the 
breathing spout, Ishmael seems to hold, falls some of the burden of our realization of the 
whale’s misery. Ishmael does not regard the spout, or any other part of the whale, as the 
attributive grounds for a mental state. Rather, he seems to be trying to describe and 
convey its role in the make-up of the whale’s expressive powers. 
 
The creation of an animal personality which, like the villain in Westerns, stands out 
amongst its kind, amplifies the effect of Melville’s novel. The fact that the whale is not 
drawn for the reader as a merely physical force or as a “magnified mouse” generates 
some of the drama: “To produce a mighty book, you must choose a mighty theme. No 
great and enduring volume can ever be written on the flea, though many there be who 
have tried it”29. The whale, as we noted, has a metaphorical place in Melville’s mighty 
themes; and yet it must be able to serve as an apt metaphor. To serve it best, it may be 
suggested, it must stand both as a marvel of nature and as a particular kind of life. 
 
                                                 
28 Moby Dick, p.345. 
29 Moby Dick, p.432. 
 179
Far from being an “unintelligent agent”30, Moby Dick has an “uncommon magnitude and 
malignity”, “ferocity, cunning, and malice”31. There is “enough in the earthly make and 
incontestable character of the monster to strike the imagination with unwonted power”. 
 
Nor was it his unwonted magnitude, nor his remarkable hue, nor yet his 
deformed lower jaw, that so much invested the whale with natural terror, 
as that unexampled, intelligent malignity which, according to specific 
accounts, he had over and over again evinced in his assaults.32 
 
While it is this aspect of the encounter that smites Ahab, the effect of it on him does not 
issue from coming face-to-face with an impersonal force of malignity. Rather, what 
makes its mark upon him is an encounter with this whale, with its strange whiteness and 
deformed jaw, in its particularity. It is (in part) this individual, with those features and 
history, that Ahab hates. Moby Dick would not be hated by the captain with the same 
ferocity unless he had acted in something like the way Ishmael, with dramatic license, 
describes it: 
 
No turbaned Turk, no hired Venetian or Malay, could have smote him with 
more seeming malice. Small reason was there to doubt, then, that ever 
since that almost fatal encounter, Ahab had cherished a wild vindictiveness 
against the whale.33   
 
This is how Melville describes the final meeting: 
 
…the White Whale churning himself into a furious speed, almost in an 
instant as it were, rushing among the boats with open jaws, and a lashing 
tail, offered appalling battle on every side; and heedless of the irons darted 
                                                 
30 Moby Dick, p.185. 
31 Moby Dick, p.180. 
32 Moby Dick, p.184. 
33 Moby Dick, p.185. 
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at him from every boat, seemed only intent on annihilating each separate 
plank of which those boats were made34   
  
Retribution, swift vengeance, eternal malice were in his whole aspect, and 
in spite of all that mortal man could do, the solid white buttress of his 
forehead smote the ship’s starboard bow, till men and timbers reeled .35  
 
Again, we might feel that some dramatic license is used to communicate the whale’s 
intentions and rage. Passing up a chance of escape, Moby Dick returns deliberately not 
just to harm, but also to toy with, the whaling men. At one point, when he has the men at 
his mercy, the whaling rowboat between his jaws, he shakes “the slight cedar as a mildly 
cruel cat her mouse”36. There is perhaps enjoyment and satisfaction in his “direful wrath” 
and “infernal aforethought of ferocity”:  
 
More than all, his treacherous retreats struck more of dismay than perhaps 
aught else. For, when swimming before his exultant pursuers, with every 
apparent symptom of alarm, he had several times been known to turn 
around suddenly and, bearing down upon them, either stave their boats to 
splinters, or drive them back in consternation to their ships.37  
 
This is “malicious intelligence” of the “unreasoning” kind. It is the unreasoning malice of 
an animal that makes an impression on those who have seen Moby Dick, and it ignites 
Ahab:  
 
“Commend the murderous chalices! Bestow them, ye who are now made 
parties to this indissoluble league. Ha! Starbuck! But the deed is done! 
Yon ratifying sun now waits to sit upon it. Drink ye harpooners! Drink and 
                                                 
34 Moby Dick, p.521. 
35 Moby Dick, p.534. 
36 Moby Dick, p.513. 
37 Moby Dick, pp.184-185. 
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swear, ye men that man the deathful whaleboat’s bow – Death to Moby 
Dick! God hunt us all, if we do not hunt Moby dick to his death!”     
 
The force of Ahab’s character almost convinces the crew, with the exception of Starbuck, 
that the mission into which they have been co-opted is sane. The task that then befalls 
Ishmael is to reflect on what is sane and what is mad in Ahab and those who would 
follow him in pursuit of, as they think, an intelligent animal agent and wrongdoer:  
 
The long, barbed steel goblets were lifted; and to cries and maledictions 
against the white whale, the spirits were simultaneously quaffed down 
with a hiss.38 
 
Suppose we think that Melville’s story-telling anthropomorphically exaggerates some 
elements of the nature of sperm whales and animals generally. That does not mean that 
any exaggerations he employs are fatal to the sense we might have that Melville has 
taught us something about the concept of “moral behavior” in animals, let alone other 
aspects of intelligent animal life, and that he has done this in the manner in which he has 





The following quotation is from a book called Do Animals Have Rights?: 
 
Some animals, especially those like chimps who live in complex social 
groups, act in ways that we would call virtuous if we saw them in humans. 
Many of these animals look after their own young, sometimes they even 
care for the young of other animals and the old and frail members of their 
                                                 
38 Moby Dick, p.170. 
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group; they seem to show sympathy and concern for one another. Some 
animals have social networks where they reciprocally help one another.39 
 
That looks like a promising beginning to an argument that animals show a form of virtue. 
However, the author of this book, Alison Hills, does not come to that conclusion: 
 
Of course, we can say that certain animals are acting like someone who is 
generous or benevolent, but we should not praise them for acting well 
unless we are also prepared to hold responsible animals that seem selfish 
and violent. We cannot consistently praise bonobos for their peacefulness, 
unless we are prepared to blame chimps for their aggression.40 
 
Like Leahy, Hills believes that animal behavior is sometimes like generosity and 
sometimes seems selfish and violent, but really it is only resemblance, metaphor, or 
analogy. While we “treat children as moral agents in the making”41, we merely train 
animals, “altering their behavior with rewards and punishments” 42 to mould their 
instincts. The claim that animals cannot be described in moral terms is irresistible and 
ubiquitous. Even Singer distinguished normal humans from animals on the basis of their 
reflective rationality, which for him largely defines ethics. Behavior that can be evaluated 
in anything like moral terms is impossible, we think, without a threshold degree of reason 
and reflectiveness. Tom Regan is equally adamant that animals, like children and the 
mentally deranged, are “moral patients” not “moral agents”43 .  
 
Some virtue theorists also deny that animal behavior can be described in terms of moral 
language or virtue. Alasdair MacIntyre says that while animals have phronesis and can 
act on reasons, only humans can develop the independent practical reason44 that is a 
precondition of the practice of virtue. Rosalind Hursthouse claims that “amongst the 
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social animals, both wolves and elephants have patterns of action that resemble our 
charitable or benevolent acts”45. But she says that animals, unlike human beings, cannot 
“contemplate alternatives and decide to change things, or choose to try a new way as we 
can; they are biologically determined, we are not”46. Hursthouse’s thought is that for 
animals the “concepts of ‘a good member of the species x’, and ‘living well as x’…are 
completely constrained by what members and specialized members of the species in 
question actually do”47. Her formula has the implication that “an exceptional [male] polar 
bear that hangs around its cubs offering food” rather than nicking off is “defective”48 and 
fails to flourish. For her, naturalism’s language of excellence and defectiveness is 
biologically evaluative only, and has no moral connotations.  
 
Raimond Gaita has discussed our temptation to rule out, or at least attenuate, the reality 
of human moral behavior and judgment by falling into “a moralistic distortion of 
morality”49. His discussion focuses on Gitta Sereny’s book Cries Unheard, about young 
Mary Bell, who was convicted of the manslaughter of two small boys she killed at age 
eleven. Gaita outlines what gives rise to a philosophical issue:  
 
When children kill children, the horror of it can provoke strong and 
sometimes confused responses that at first appear inconsistent. We 
respond fiercely to what we regard as crimes not only against innocents, 
but also, at the same time, against innocence. More people are inclined to 
speak of the evil of those crimes than they are even of the massacre of 
thousands of adults. At the same time we draw back from the concept of 
evil, partly because it was not the innocence of this or that child but the 
innocence of children that ignited our ferocity, and the killers are children 
too. Furthermore, we hardly know how to attribute to child-killers 
concepts that they must possess if they are to have the intentions necessary 
                                                 
45 R Hursthouse,. On Virtue Ethics. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.209. 
46 On Virtue Ethics, p.220. 
47 On Virtue Ethics, p.221. 
48 On Virtue Ethics, p.220. 
49 Gaita, R. Breach of Trust Truth Morality and Politics,  Quarterly Essay Vol. 16, Ed Feik, C.(Melbourne: 
Black Inc, 2004), p.45. 
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for their actions to be evil. Mary Bell persistently pleaded that she did not 
understand that death is final. When Sereny asked her, “Did the fact of 
their being dead mean anything to you?” Mary replied, “No, nothing, 
because I hadn’t intended…Well – how can I say this now…But…I didn’t 
know I had intended for them to be dead…dead forever. Dead for me then 
weren’t forever”. 50   
            
Cora Diamond would regard such examples - the killing of children by children - as 
presenting a “difficulty of reality”51. In reaching for A.S. Byatt’s word, “spikiness”52, 
Diamond tries to capture the essentially baffling nature of perceived evil such as this. 
“How could a child do such a thing?” is an expression of horror and essential mystery – 
essential because it cannot in principle be alleviated or solved. Yet the incredulity runs 
the risk of being (to use Diamond’s word) “deflected”, or rendered a rational or factual 
problem, and so made mundane. Gaita explains how an ordinary and widespread moral 
confusion may interfere with a clear assessment in the realm of meaning of the (quite 
non-mundane) moral possibilities in the behavior of children: 
 
Anyone whose contemplation of Mary’s life moved them to think ‘There 
but for the grace of God go I’, would, however, withhold a certain kind of 
judgment, the kind we now call judgmentalism – judgment that would 
blame her (bearing in mind all the connotations of that word), that would 
encourage one to point a finger at her and to turn one’s back on her. This 
strikes some people as incoherent: how can one both see (and in that sense 
judge) a situation in a severe moral light while at the same time refusing to 
blame its agent? That, I think, is the effect of a moralistic conception of 
morality.53 
 
                                                 
50 Quarterly Essay, p.45. 
51 S.Cavell, et al Philosophy and Animal Life, (New York: Columbia University press, 2008), p.63. 
52 Philosophy and Animal Life, p.63 
53 Quarterly Essay, p.46. 
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It is true that blame is expressive of a form of understanding that another has done evil, 
but, as Gaita argues, so too is pity, even if to be lucid it must be a severe pity that can 
hold the wrongdoer to account. We may pity Oedipus as does the Greek chorus, “for the 
evil he did on account of ignorance for which he was not culpable”54. Nor should we feel 
compelled on pain of confusion to retract from the horror and incomprehension we may 
feel towards Mary Bell. Diamond would say this is necessarily a moral form of 
bafflement; while Gaita says that “moral terms are necessary to describe the kind of 
horror it is”55.        
 
Quoting William James’s warning about the theorizer’s tendency to oversimplify his 
materials, Diamond remarks: 
 
A moralistic conception of morality – not just a theorizing mind – can lead 
us to say: this (whatever it may be) is what moral thinking in essence is; 
all else is not really moral thinking. The requirements of morality, not just 
the requirements of theory, may seem to lead us away from any 
recognition of genuine variety within moral experience. 56 
 
In a similar spirit, Gaita suggests our thought is all too easily held “hostage to a false 
sense of what the possibilities are”57. Charles Siebert tells the story of an elephant in a 
1916 US traveling circus, who was said to have fatally smashed the head of a young hotel 
janitor. The public’s bloodlust to kill “Murderous Mary” was appeased by Charlie 
Sparks, the circus owner. After considering the option of having Mary electrocuted by 
Thomas Edison, who was testing Westinghouse’s alternating current on animals “in 
hopes of discrediting it as being too dangerous, Sparks ultimately decided to have Mary 
hanged”, which he did from a crane, twice, in front of an audience58. The absurdity of 
treating animal actions as if they were wicked human ones might encourage us to limit 
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the field of possibility and rule out the intelligibility of a moral response to animal 
behavior altogether. 
 
But now, of course, some will say that animals are not children moving towards moral 
maturity. The maturing Mary Bell continued to “hide from the full acknowledgement of 
the terrible meaning of her deeds, meaning that would be revealed to her only in a lucid 
remorse”59. But for this Mary there was - actually and constitutively – this possibility; 
whereas the Mary the elephant is an animal, and being an “animal” she is partly defined 
by the fact that at no time is she capable of reflecting upon meaning.       
 
Not every philosopher rules out moral behavior in animals. In A Treatise of Human 
Nature, David Hume says that:  
 
an action, sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious; why? because its 
view causes a pleasure or uneasiness…To have the sense of a virtue, is 
nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the 
contemplation of a character. The very feeling constitutes our praise or 
admiration.60  
 
When Hume asks, “why incest in the human species is criminal, and why the very same 
action, and the same relations in animals have not the smallest moral turpitude and 
deformity?”61, he answers that we do not feel that animal incest is immoral, just as we do 
not feel that the sapling commits parricide. But this is not the same as saying there is a 
conceptual obstacle to judging that animals can act morally well or badly, as, by contrast, 
there is a conceptual obstacle in judging that they can morally judge others, say, by 
forming a conception of injustice. This, of course, they cannot do. 
  
More common today than Hume’s lenient approach to the question, are approaches that 
turn to science for enlightenment. In “Good Dogs and Other Animals”, the philosopher 
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Stephen Clark wants to disabuse us of the skepticism caused by a swinging of the 
pendulum away from silly anthropomorphism. Clark reports Samuel Johnson’s apparent 
belief that when a savage man “sees another women that pleases him better, he will leave 
the first”62. Johnson’s tradition enabled him to remain enclosed in a “determined 
ignorance” 63 about the common nature of distant human beings. According to Clark, we 
are prone to the analogous view that animals are “moved solely by immediate desire and 
pain”64. We often assume they act through “mere conditioned reflex, not an intelligent 
assessment of the situation”65. But, for example, although it is true that “hunting wasps 
do not really care for their young”, normal primates “recognize each other as individuals 
and have clearly personal relations with their fellows”66. As evidence of this, Clark turns 
to the ethological field studies of Jane Goodall. Goodall, he says, observed a group of 
chimpanzees almost all of whom “ignored or bullied a companion who was partly 
paralyzed”67  (chimps can contract polio). But one particular  
 
chimpanzee, though disliking the smell (and one can reasonably assume) 
as much ‘turned off’ by physical weakness and abnormality as his 
companions (and most humans), did none the less continue to treat the 
unfortunate and lonely ape as his old friend and companion. The impulse 
to friendship was stronger in him than the impulse to despise…He 
preferred one way of acting to another that he might have preferred.68  
 
Clark points out that certain dispositions are not rare but widespread in the animal 
kingdom. These dispositions are not “moral virtues”, since those require the ability to 
assess “sentiments in the light of reason”69 and may be “deliberately acquired”70. They 
                                                 
62 Clark, S. Good Dogs and other Animals: Singer, P. ed., In Defence of Animals (Oxford: Blackwells 
1985), p.42. 
63 In Defence of Animals p.42. 
64 In Defence of Animals p.45. 
65 In Defence of Animals p.46. 
66 In Defence of Animals, p.46. 
67 In Defence of Animals, p.50. 
68 In Defence of Animals, p.50. 
69 In Defence of Animals, p.51. 
70 In Defence of Animals, p.46. 
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are rather “natural virtues”71, involving behavior which is commendable. Elsewhere he 
claims that these animals can be “ethical: that is, they respond to aspects of a situation 
and to features of their kindred, that a good man would also respect”72.  
 
James Rachels’ Created from Animals places even more stress upon the relevance and 
rigor of science, and its priority over anecdote and armchair philosophizing. He tends to 
give greater weight to experimental studies compared to field observations, like those of 
Goodall73. In a 1964 experiment Rhesus monkeys were trained to pull a lever for food. 
The lever was later hooked up to both provide food and also give a variety of other rhesus 
monkeys shocks that observably caused them pain. The experimenters concluded that “a 
majority of rhesus monkeys will consistently suffer hunger rather than secure food at the 
expense of electroshock to a conspecific”74, and that “apparently it is a powerful desire of 
the rhesus monkey that he should not cause suffering to others of his own kind”75.  
Combining controlled experiments such as this, which carefully eliminate confounding 
factors, and the conceptual claim that altruism “might be defined simply as action that is 
motivated by the desire to help others”, and more strongly as “the willingness to forgo 
some good for oneself in order to help others”76, Rachels concludes that Darwin was right 
in his “view of animals as (at least partially) moral beings”77. The common natural 
history of human and animal behavior also gives us “an extra reason (and, one might 
well think, a compelling reason), in favor of interpreting them as analogous”78. 
 
Rachels sees a correspondence between unthinking human moral behavior – altruism or 
compassion for example - and the unreflective behavior of animals. If the former is moral 
behavior, then so is the latter. The former, he alleges, is paradigmatic moral behavior. It 
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is the behavior of a person who simply assists other people without pausing to consider 
whether she has sufficient reason for it.  
 
But Rachels does not question whether there might be a difference between the behavior 
of animals, and unreflective but virtuous human behavior, including that of the “virtuous 
peasant”, who is unreflective yet critically responsive. In reality, what is needed is a 
grasp of the magnitude and the nature of the task of showing that animals can sometimes 
be described in something like moral terms. Opponents of Rachels and Clark, of course, 
will continue to say that the mass of empirical evidence they adduce is beside the point, 
because of their laxity with the conceptual parameters of moral and ethical behavior.  
 
What Rachels and Clark share with their opponents, however, is that they do not engage 
with certain ways of describing animals as moral beings which are only available to us, if 
they are available at all, when we think in the realm of meaning. In this realm, facts about 
behavior are not irrelevant, and are very important; but they seriously under-determine 
the meaning of that behavior.   
 
Moby Dick’s unreasoned malice is impressively awful to those who are witness to it. The 
form of Melville’s writing, though it is about a fictional whale, may be seen as an 
invitation to adopt a different perspective on animal behavior. Not so long ago, 
ethologists were stunned by the discovery of chimpanzees intelligently collaborating in 
the organized hunting of monkeys. Viewers of the footage of the colobus monkey killings 
may have been struck by the evident relish with which the frenzied hunters tore their 
victims apart. Jane Goodall watched a lonely and half paralyzed chimp with polio seek, in 
gentle desperation, the companionship of two healthy chimpanzees, both of whom swung 
away and continued to groom one another. Goodall wrote that during this episode she 
“came nearer to hating a chimpanzee than I have ever done before or since”79. 
 
                                                 
79 M. Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1983), p.121. 
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Simone Weil remarked that “Men have the same carnal natures as animals. If a hen is 
hurt, the others rush up and peck it”80. Weil’s words tell of a terrible animality belonging 
to human beings. They also reveal how different humans and animals are - in particular 
because of what it can mean for a human being to join in the “festival of cruelty”. When 
the scenes of the monkey hunting were shown, it may have seemed to some that what 
was on display was a terrible cruelty belonging to animals, in which what emerged was a 
likeness between that cruelty and human behavior.  
 
Ishmael may be read as saying that Moby Dick is capable of awfulness because, although 
his behavior is unreasoned, it is backed by a mass of tremendous life and intelligent 
feeling. In suggesting to us the possibility of nonhuman cruelty and malice, it is important 
for Melville to depict the whale’s mode of life, the nature of its animality or 
creatureliness; and this he does by way of an astonishingly detailed and sensitive 
“naturalism of the surfaces”. But equally, he suggests to us how an understanding of 
those surfaces can be tied to our critical responses to them, as we weigh the responses of 
Starbuck and Flask to the “dumb brute”, against Ahab’s mad, and Ishmael’s vivid, sense 
of the whale’s life – and we do all this through a critical response to the form of 
Melville’s writing.     
 
We may or may not be critically influenced by Melville’s work, and thus, we may or may 
not apply to animals the terms Melville invests with moral tonality. One philosophical 
reason for refusing to do so is the sense that the concepts are being rendered 
unintelligible. In particular, we may feel they are being anthropomorphically stretched far 
from their natural home. For it is clear in this sort of case, that we are being asked to 
extend ways of speaking from human life to nonhuman life, and so outwards from the 
place where those concepts have their paradigm instances. And the conceptual extension 
does seem to go in that direction even of it is true that it also partly goes in the other – as, 
for example, in Weil’s remark that our sense of human cruelty and wickedness is partly 
informed by the carnal nature we share with animals. (Camus, Coetzee tells us, extended 
his scarifying experience as a child of a hen’s “death cry”, to his sense of the horror of 
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capital punishment81.) It will be helpful then to turn to Cora Diamond’s thoughts and to 
Stephen Mulhall’s commentary on them.     
 
In “Eating Meat and Eating People”, Diamond suggested that our key moral and ethical 
concepts are formed predominantly in the context of human life and from our ways of 
responding to each other. She then suggested that we can “imaginatively read into 
animals”82 such responses as we have first and foremost, and most compellingly, towards 
other human beings. For example, there is the imaginative possibility that “our hearing 
the moral appeal of an animal is our hearing it speak – as it were – the language of our 
fellow human beings”83.  
 
Diamond further developed this idea in her essay “Injustice and Animals”84, where she 
talks of how we may reach for descriptions under a certain “communicative or expressive 
pressure”85. Her Simone Weil-inspired example here is of the need we may feel to 
capture in language the pitilessness and the failure to relent present in the human refusal 
to give up using “them”. This response to the “burdens we place on the backs of 
animals”86, Diamond argues, is one that can be formed, for example, in the light of “the 
desperate cry that might be made by a girl being forced into a brothel”, a fierce cry which 
“comes from the depth of her soul”87. But how might it make sense to extend 
imaginatively some part of the meaning of this peculiarly human cry – the sort of 
“unreasoned, strangely persisting expectation”88 that only human beings can have - to 
animals? Diamond writes: 
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This childlike expectation of good in the heart is not involved when one 
demands one’s rights, but is the source of the cry of outraged hurt when 
injustice is done to one. And, if the idea of a human being as a possible 
victim of injustice is inseparable from the expectation in the heart that 
good will be done to one, how can animals be thought of as possible 
victims of injustice, since animals do not have this expectation of good?89         
 
Her answer, in effect, is that we can hear the echo of this expectation, and the human 
response to it which involves “a kind of love, or loving attention”90, under the expressive 
pressure to communicate the reality of what is done to animals. Elsewhere, Diamond 
talks about the sense of horror and essential incomprehension felt in the face of 
pitilessness to animals, which turns Elizabeth Costello - who is additionally isolated 
because people think that her incredulous, Swiftian reaction to the “animal enterprise” is 
mad - into a “wounded animal”91. Diamond thinks of responses of essential bafflement to 
things in life as involving a “difficulty of reality”, because these things seem to defy our 
thinking them: under the pressure of what we are presented with, we just cannot believe 
that such things should exist. “How can this be!?” is to be taken here as a response which 
necessarily does not look for a solution.  
 
The sense of brutality, horror and incredulity, and the associated echo of the cry of 
desperation and injustice, may be intimated to some readers in the way Dostoevsky 
depicts a scene in Crime and Punishment. Raskolnikov dreams of himself as a child 
walking with his father. They come across a “small, lean, grayish-brown mare” harnessed 
to a huge cart, into which the peasant Mikolka invites six men and a peasant women. A 
drunken crowd gathers to amuse themselves with the spectacle. The mare:  
 
could scarcely manage to move the cart one step at a time, working away 
helplessly with her legs, snorting and cowering under the blows of the 
three whips which were belaboring her mercilessly… 
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 ‘Whip her across the muzzle!’ shouted Mikolka. ‘Across the eyes! Whip 
her across the eyes!’ 
 ‘Let’s have a song, lads!’ someone in the cart shouted, and everyone in 
the cart took up the cry. They started singing a boisterous song, a 
tambourine tinkled, and there was shrill whistling during the refrains. The 
young peasant woman went on cracking nuts and smiling to herself… 
 But by now the poor little boy was beside himself. He pushed his way 
through the crowd to the grey-brown mare, put his arms round her dead, 
bloodstained muzzle, and kissed her, kissed her on the eyes, on the 
lips…Then he suddenly jumped to his feet and rushed in a rage at Mikolka 
with his little fists. But just then his father, who had been running after 
him, caught hold of him at last and carried him out of the crowd… 
 ‘Daddy, why – why did they kill the poor little horse?’ he whimpered, but 
suddenly his breath failed him and the words came in shrieks from his 
panting breast… 
…‘It’s not our business. Come along!’ 92     
 
What should be noticed here is not just the relentlessness of the crowd but the pained 
incredulity of the boy93. In the shadow of the dream, Raskolnikov asks himself if he can 
really kill the old woman with the hatchet and “slither about in warm, sticky blood”94. 
Costello’s wounded feeling of horror is not unconnected with her impassioned awareness 
of animal mortality and vulnerability, manifested in their surfaces and their flesh and 
blood:  
 
She believes, most unquestionably, in the ram, the ram dragged by its 
master down to this terrible place. The ram is not just an idea, the ram is 
alive though right now it is dying. If she believes in the ram, then does she 
believe in its blood too, this sacred liquid, sticky, dark, almost black, 
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pumped out in gouts on to soil where nothing will grow? The favorite ram 
of the king of Ithaca, so runs the story, yet treated in the end as a mere bag 
of blood, to be cut open and poured from.95.        
 
Coetzee places his character’s response to what is done to animals more or less side by 
side in Elizabeth Costello with her sense of obscenity and outrage at mercilessness 
toward living, vulnerable, mortal human bodies. In this passage, she is presented as 
reflecting on a novel which vividly describes how Hitler treated his would-be assassins. 
The captured men face their executioner: 
 
exhausted, shivering, hands in their pockets to hold up their pants, 
whimpering with fear, swallowing their tears, having to listen to this 
coarse creature telling them what would happen when the rope snapped 
tight, how shit would run down their spindly old-man’s legs, how their 
limp old-man’s penises would quiver one last time…One after the other to 
the scaffold they went, in a non-descript place that could have been a 
garage or equally well an abattoir…[then] their sobbings and then their 
writhings, and then their stillness, the slack stillness of dead meat…96 
 
Coetzee provides, perhaps, an example of something Diamond recalls Wittgenstein 
suggesting to us about ethics: placing ideas side by side or pulling them apart to change 
our way of viewing things. In this case, it might be the “placing side by side of ourselves 
and animals as beings to whom justice and injustice may be done”97.  Or, in a less 
morally explicit vein, it could be the juxtaposition of a sense of horror and visceral 
surprise at what can happen to the flesh and blood bodies of animals and people which is 
connected with a reaction to the frailty of their corporeal lives. Diamond also warns that 
we may not decide, in advance of exploring a certain use of a term, whether or not it is 
being incoherently stretched beyond its natural home. She says that, when people feel 
bound to speak in these ways, 
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the question is how far they can mean what they say, in lives formed in 
part by such ways of speaking; and no outside attempt to lay down rules 
for what can be said about animals can take into account the pressures 
from within that life to speak as they do, to make sense of what they say 
within their lives. 98   
 
This appears to be a reiteration of what was said earlier - that no “external” rules can 
restrict our strivings for lucidity in the realm of meaning. In The Wounded Animal, 
Stephen Mulhall draws attention to Diamond’s mention of another of Wittgenstein’s 
remarks. Wittgenstein, asking whether a rose lacks teeth in the same way as a newborn or 
a goose lacks them, offers the reply: “Why, suppose one were to say: the cow chews its 
food and then dungs the rose, so the rose has teeth in the mouth of the beast” 99. Mulhall 
agrees with Diamond that:  
 
words are inherently capable of projection beyond their familiar contexts, 
as if there is always already more to their meaning than is captureable in 
the grammatical rules for particular language games with them. Such 
projectiveness is guided or governed by the existing ways in which that 
word relates to a range of other words, insofar as each concrete, realized 
case of projection is an expression of our willingness to find a point of 
purchase for some proportion of that range of interrelated expressions, 
some specific way in which the relevant word can be seen as bringing 
some inflection of that field of terms into the new context.100  
 
The intelligible projection or extension of a word, such as “malice” or “injustice”, can 
then feel “like a discovery or a revelation of a possibility (at once in and of the words, 
and in and of reality) rather than its essentially arbitrary construction”101. An example 
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Mulhall gives of proper and improper projections of language involves a comparison of 
the words used by primatologist Barbara Smuts in The Lives of Animals and the words 
used by Vicki Hearne. Elizabeth Costello’s philosophical opponent, Thomas O’Hearne, 
declares: 
 
Thomas Aquinas says that friendship between human beings and animals 
is impossible, and I tend to agree. You can be friends with neither a 
Martian nor with a bat, for the simple reason that you have too little in 
common with them. 102  
 
Smuts disagrees. Although she is a primatologist, she contrasts the “objective, replicable 
information” of science with the equally demanding task of learning how to move 
successfully amongst intelligent social animals like baboons103. There, she claims, one 
discovers the nature of “human-baboon intersubjectivity”104. This requires that one give 
in to “the possibility of voluntary, mutual surrender to the dictates of intersubjectivity”105. 
Smuts learns to surrender to “instinct, not as mindless, reflexive action, but rather as 
action rooted in an ancient primate legacy of embodied knowledge”106. She finds herself 
having to negotiate a bizarre “system of baboon etiquette”107, since the baboons will only 
relate to her as a social subject and not a neutral object. At times she is compelled by 
circumstances to yield “as a humble disciple” to their “superior knowledge”108 and expert 
grasp of their world. At other times she is embarrassed by her mistakes about “baboon 
propriety”109 . 
 
Mulhall is sympathetic to Smuts when she concurs with “Elizabeth Costello on viewing 
animals as subjects rather than objects”110. However, he has difficulties with the way 
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Smuts goes about describing these “personal” relations. Smuts, he thinks, makes large 
philosophical assumptions that will arouse the suspicions of skeptics, philosophers, and 
the poetically inclined.111     
 
Smuts says that “personhood connotes a way of being in relation to others”112, and that 
an animal’s “idiosyncratic, subjective experience of us plays the same role in their 
relations with us that our subjective experience of them plays in our relations with 
them”113. Seizing on the claim that animals are “‘persons’ like you and me, who happen 
to be nonhuman”114, Mulhall points out that the “home of the concept of personhood is 
that of human intersubjectivity; and the forms of the interhuman relationships have a 
richness and variety that are absent from interbaboon relationships, and so are absent 
from human-baboon interactions” 115. Smuts, like Singer and others, “seems tempted by a 
misconception of personhood as somehow prior to and independent of our concept of 
human being”116, without realizing that animal personhood “can at best be a pared-down 
analogue of the original concept”117. She fails to see that every activity we share with 
animals – eating, having sex, loafing around, comforting the distressed, sharing a look, 
being in pain – can be “infused with a certain kind of significance”118 in the human case.  
 
According to Mulhall, “the most any gorilla can do is relate to us as an individual gorilla 
of a peculiar kind”119. By her own admission, Smuts is forced to “slough off modes of 
human interaction” and adopt “the prevailing modes of baboon-baboon interactions”120. 
But the difference kinds of “personhood” and individuality in each case mean that the 
whole nature of any possible friendship humans can have with animals is dramatically 
altered.  
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Smuts prefers to rephrase Costello’s claim about there being no limits to our thinking our 
way into the being of an animal – whether it be a gorilla or an oyster - “so that it has less 
to do with the poetic imagination and more to do with real-life encounters with other 
animals”121. She therefore implies that that imagination is not crucial to correcting “our 
own narrow views about who they are and the kinds of relationship we can have with 
them”122. Smuts’ view is opposed to the view whose implications we are now exploring - 
the view that finding out “who they are” is essentially an activity of reflecting 
imaginatively by using a certain range of critical concepts, even if that activity is 
importantly informed by real-life encounters. 
 
This is something that Vicki Hearne is alive to, despite using words that Mulhall thinks 
are “far more extravagant to a philosophical eye than are Smuts’s”123. Hearne, says 
Mulhall, rises “above any such flat-footed claim to literal meaning” and shows “a poet’s 
desire to emphasize the legitimacy of other modes of projection of words”124 .   
 
Both Smuts and Hearne are interested in getting it right and in thinking well about 
animals and ourselves. But Hearne’s primary means of coming to grips with “the reality 
of animal nature”125 and animal “otherness”126  is through the realm of meaning - creating 
and exploring through what Mulhall calls a kind of “mythopoetics”127. This “mythology 
of animal-human relations”128 is built up from reflective tradition, personal encounters, 
and from great and popular literature.129 It is “shot through with ideas of community, awe 
and honor, the sacred and the profane”130. Theories about “animal rights and 
consciousness”131, Hearne thinks, are of little help to a more valuable kind of 
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understanding, because they contribute, again in Mulhall’s words, “virtually 
nothing…towards imagining the personhood of any animal”132.      
 
Mulhall explains that one of Hearne’s main interests in her book  Adam’s Task is to show 
some of the possibilities of our relations with animals by earning the “right to use”133 her 
own imaginative language. A good part of Hearne’s book is concerned with the details of 
what Mulhall calls “a dog-human language game”134  through which animal and person 
come increasingly, as the game is deepened over time through interaction, to understand 
one another. The idea that animals without language and the ability to “mean” anything 
could be participants in a language game, capable of grasping or misunderstanding the 
“meaning”135 of what is conveyed to them, may itself seem flat-footed. Yet the 
terminology used by Hearne involves (at least partially) an extension or projection from 
its human home of concepts that aim to capture the reality of “shared forms of canine-
human life”136.   
 
Mulhall draws a link between Wittgenstein’s builders – who have simple utterances like 
“Slab!” and “Pillar!” - and Hearne’s human-animal language game, which likewise 
incorporates some orders, indicated by “tokens of English” such as “Sit!” and “Fetch!”137. 
Imaginative attention to the detail and context of the dog-human language game may, in 
Mulhall’s view, vindicate Hearne’s extra-human uses of terms like “language”, 
“personhood”, “think”, and “meaning” (and at the same time it may show Leahy’s rebuke 
of Hearne to be insufficiently sensitive to the creation of meaning).  
 
Mulhall regards the chapter in Adam’s Task on training the dog Salty to be a forceful 
example of Wittgenstein’s point about grasping meaning by reading the darkness – the 
relevant background – surrounding words; and this because, while Hearne claims to be 
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“not filling in all the details”138 of the language she uses, she does fill in a good many of 
them. She thereby illuminates “what is usually left dark”, says Mulhall, “in any account 
of language use”139. It is not necessarily more scientific detail that is needed so much as 
detail about the manner of use of language. Hearne’s writing gives us a sense, going well 
beyond the usual mere tokens of human-dog “language”, of “the broader context of the 
particular form of life she shares with Salty”140. What she conveys, according to Mulhall, 
is a “highly complex and specific form of life”141 involving a dog - a form or mode of life 
she partly shares with Salty, who of course cannot speak.      
 
For example, Hearne claims that Salty, after failing numerous times to realize that Hearne 
controls her leash and so being yanked violently head over heels, sits “down to think this 
over, cocking her head in puzzlement, trying to work out the implications of my 
behavior”142. As Salty’s understanding progresses, partly through a good deal of training 
and correction, she learns not only to read aspects of human behavior, mood, desires, and 
so on, but to recognize and respond (or refuse to respond) to Hearne’s intentions143, as 
opposed to merely reacting to cues. Salty eventually grasps that, for example, the token 
“Sit!” can apply in different ways on different occasions and in different places. As the 
dog’s behavior moves well beyond Skinnerian conditioning, Mulhall (following Hearne’s 
lead) entertains the possibility that “Sit!” (etc.) has been transformed “into what we might 
call a highly primitive form of imperative”144.  
 
Perhaps now we might say that Salty can understand the “meaning” of Hearne’s 
utterances. But, if we follow Hearne’s train of thought, it is Salty too who can “mean” 
something - for instance, when she spontaneously and emphatically sits, and in doing so 
modifies the details of her training. Her efforts to communicate may involve, say, 
demanding something or “apologizing”, and are directed intentionally to Hearne, who 
must then respond. Mulhall comments:  
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Now the loop of intention is two-way, and it is Salty who has enlarged the 
context of projection; now both players of this proto-language game can be 
obedient to each other, and to their common language (or can disobey).145 
 
For instance, once Salty is highly trained and obedient, she is surely “making some sort 
of joke”146 when, out of the blue she breaks her training by jumping loudly onto a chair in 
a lively and knowing manner. Hearne thinks of this as an example of “animal humor”147. 
Some might think it is expressed, say, in the way a cat teases a dog with the speed of its 
claws and enjoys the surprised and hurt reaction.  
 
Hearne’s “proto-language” may involve projection from a human base, but the idea that it 
is a sort of language in which players can mean things and respond to what others mean 
is one that people may be compelled under communicative pressure to recognize. But the 
differences are not forgotten. On the contrary, against the first appearances of 
anthropomorphism, the differences are expressed in the extended language itself. In a 
sense, the language of some of these relations is anthropomorphic, but not necessarily in 
a way that obscures “the reality of animal nature, both nonhuman and human”148. “And 
the paradoxes involved in its articulation”, Mulhall says, “are not merely apparent, or 
eventually to be dissipated; they are internal to her sense of the enigmatic, mutually 
educative marvel of kinship between the human animal and her fellow creatures”149.  
 
Hearne, says Mulhall, “understands her relationship to the dog in fundamentally moral 
terms, and finds the dog to be responsive to that understanding”150. While Gaita notes that 
many people will find Hearne’s language “over the top” 151, he claims that what she 
shows is that with animals we can “distinguish between a command issued with rightful 
authority from an act of force”, and “that one must earn a right to command a dog, and 
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that possession of the right depends on earning and deserving the dog’s respect”152. When 
“training becomes more or less accurately describable in behavioristic terms, then it 
brutalizes the animal”153 - just as it would (in a different way) degrade a child to use 
certain techniques of behavior modification. In the same spirit, Mark Rowlands, in 
reporting on his training of a wolf, speaks of the trainer “not as a dominant and arbitrary 
authority whose will must be obeyed at all costs, but as an educator who allows the wolf 
to understand what the world requires of it”154. 
 
Hearne’s important insight is “that freedom is constituted by certain kinds of moral 
relations, rather than simply enabled and enhanced by them”155. It is constituted, for 
instance, by Gaita’s friendship with his dog Gypsy, by the fact he teaches her to be 
trustworthy rather than merely predictable, and by the fact that if she breaches that trust 
the family will feel let down. (He even declares that, “Were it to happen, I believe she 
would know it”156.) Through an “education into citizenship”, Gypsy’s instincts are 
“transformed (humanized, I would say) under that discipline, enabling her to participate 
to some degree in a human form of life”157.  
 
Gaita mentions animal dignity in the context of animal training - or rather, he talks of 
education and humanization. He also discusses the extended concept of dignity – 
extended both in the sense of being projected from human life and in the sense of being 
conceptually complex – in the context of a scene in Coetzee’s novel, Disgrace. Gaita 
thinks that Coetzee effectively invites us, by way of the “grace and power”158  of his 
writing, to extend the concept of dishonoring corpses from humans to dogs. It is only if 
the writing in its specific form becomes alive to us, and it is only if we are critically 
moved by its tone, that we can learn something about the reality of animal “dignity”. We 
might, of course, find the presentation of the idea sentimental or ludicrous.  
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It is therefore be worth reproducing the extract. In it, the central character in the novel, 
David Lurie, who helps at the local animal shelter, refuses to leave the dead dogs at the 
rubbish dump with the hospital waste and other animal body parts because, he says, he is 
not “prepared to inflict such dishonor upon them”159:  
 
So on Sunday evenings he brings the bags to the farm in the back of 
Lucy’s kombi, parks them overnight, and on Monday mornings drives 
them back to the hospital grounds. There he himself loads them, one at a 
time, on to the feeder trolley, cranks the mechanism that hauls the trolley 
through the steel gate into the flames, pulls the lever to empty it of its 
contents, and cranks it back, while the workman whose job this normally 
is stand by and watch. 
On his first Monday he left it to them to do the incinerating. Rigor mortis 
had stiffened the corpses overnight. The dead legs caught in the bars of the 
trolley, and when the trolley came back from its trip to the furnace, the dog 
would as often as not come riding back too, blackened and grinning, 
smelling of singed fur, its plastic covering burnt away. After a while the 
workmen began to beat the bags with the backs of their shovels before 
loading them, to break the rigid limbs. It was then that he intervened and 
took over the job himself... 
The dogs are brought into the clinic because they are unwanted: because 
we are too menny. That is where he enters their lives. He may not be their 
savior, the one for whom they are not too many, but he is prepared to take 
care of them once they are unable, utterly unable, to take care of 
themselves, once even Bev Shaw has washed her hands of them. A dog-
man, Petrus once called himself. Well, now he has become a dog-man: a 
dog undertaker…offering himself to the service of dead dogs.160  
 
                                                 
159 Coetzee, J. M, Disgrace, (Australia: Vintage (Random House), 2000), p.144. 
160 Disgrace, pp.145-146. 
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Melville also wrote about dignity in Moby Dick. In his time, whales were decapitated for 
their valuable oil. Ishmael describes this “desecration”: 
 
The vast white headless phantom floats further and further from the ship, 
and every rod that it so floats, what seem square roods of sharks and cubic 
roods of fowls, augment the murderous din. For hours and hours from the 
almost stationary ship that hideous sight is seen. Beneath the unclouded 
and mild azure sky, upon the fair face of the pleasant sea, wafted by the 
joyous breezes, the great mass of death floats on and on, till lost in infinite 
perspectives. 
There’s a most doleful and most mocking funeral!161  
     
Ishmael’s description of this “hideous vulturism” 162 is imbued with pity for the mutilated 
monsters. As it is when Stubbs, enthusiastically cutting a fresh whale steak, adds “insult 
to injury”163: 
 
It is not, perhaps, entirely because the whale is so excessively unctuous 
that landsmen seem to regard eating him with abhorrence; that appears to 
result, in some way, from the consideration before mentioned: i.e. that a 
man should eat a newly murdered thing of the sea, and eat it by its own 
light.164 
 
We may find that a disciplined pity, as Ishmael displays, is part of the form of recognition 
of the indignity. Gone for Ishmael are the “knightly days our profession, when we only 
bore arms to succor the distressed, and not fill men’s lamp-feeders”165. Now the 
desecration does not even serve a worthy purpose. Once again, agreeing with Ishmael 
requires critical attention to the tone of the writing and its capacity to ring true rather than 
hollow. 
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Gaita points out that for David Lurie “the horror of what is done is the horror of what is 
done to the dogs and that the world he hopes for is a world in which dogs are spared the 
dishonor”166. Although he is on side with Coetzee, Gaita admits readily that some people 
will not agree, “even though they accept without hesitation that dead human beings may 
be harmed”167. Certainly, he is equally ready to stress, the notion of animal dishonor is 
mitigated by “the fact that their individuality is attenuated in a way that shows in the 
impossibility of writing biographies about them”168. With humans, as we see in chapter 7, 
it is different. To “see dignity in faces”, Gaita believes, is connected with seeing “the full 
range of human expressiveness in them” 169. In order, however, to bring out here a related 
“extended or projected” idea, we can turn to another example from Coetzee’s novel, 
Elizabeth Costello.  
 
The example starts with Franz Kafka’s A Report to an Academy. Elizabeth Costello, 
Coetzee’s central character in the novel, tells us that Kafka’s imaginary Red Peter, the 
ape who had been removed from his natural home and who had learnt to speak, gave an 
address in 1917 to the Academy of Science as a “branded, marked, wounded animal 
presenting himself as speaking testimony to a gathering of scholars”170. Mulhall suggests 
that we should see Costello’s citation of Red Peter as highlighting the tendency to assign 
exclusive importance to forms of consciousness that are exemplified by the divinization 
of “reason” in Western culture and philosophy 171. Accordingly, apes are seen in our 
culture merely as dumb brutes or “true primitives” – that is, without sensitivity to their 
reality as that can be explored by attending to questions of meaning in a certain response-
dependent manner. 
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“Kafka’s ape”, Costello tells her son, “is embedded in life”172. He is, amongst other 
things, an imaginative exploration of the mode of being173 of a real “ape that is followed 
through to the end”174. Whether he knew it or not, Kafka the author “stays awake during 
the gaps when we are sleeping”175. His treatment of Red Peter, Costello argues, may be 
contrasted with Wolfgang Kohler’s investigation of the mental capacities of apes, mostly 
chimpanzees. Kohler apparently published his The Mentality of Apes at the same time as 
Kafka’s Report to an Academy. Red Peter and Kohler’s chimps, such as his best pupil 
Sultan, were, Costello says, 
 
captured on the African mainland by hunters specializing in the ape trade, 
and shipped across the sea to a scientific institute. Both Red Peter and 
Kohler’s apes then underwent a period of training intended to humanize 
them. Red Peter passed his course with flying colors, though at deep 
personal cost. 176  
 
Costello then describes in her own words the experiment with Sultan, Red Peter’s 
“prototype”177. In the test, strung-up bananas and crates were left in his pen. Costello 
continues: 
 
Sultan knows: Now one is supposed to think. That is what the bananas up 
there are about. The bananas are there to make one think, to spur one to the 
limits of one’s thinking. But what must one think? One thinks: Why is he 
starving me? One thinks: What have I done? Why has he stopped liking 
me? One thinks: Why does he not want these crates any more? But none of 
these is the right thought… 
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At every turn Sultan is driven to think the less interesting thought. From 
the purity of speculation (Why do men behave like this?) he is relentless 
propelled towards lower, practical, instrumental reason (How does one use 
this to get that?) and thus towards acceptance of himself as primarily an 
organism with an appetite that needs to be satisfied. Although his entire 
history, from the time his mother was shot and he was captured, through 
his voyage in a cage to imprisonment on this island camp and the sadistic 
games that are played around food here, leads him to ask questions about 
the justice of the universe and the place of this penal colony in it, a 
carefully plotted psychological regimen conducts him away from ethics 
and metaphysics towards the humbler reaches of practical reason. And 
somehow, as he inches through this labyrinth of constraint, manipulation, 
and duplicity, he must realize that on no account dare he give up, for on 
his shoulders rests the responsibility of representing apedom. The fate of 
his brothers and sisters may be determined by how well he performs.178   
 
In the book, someone is puzzled by Costello’s critique of “benign psychological 
experiments like Kohler’s”179. Others will surely be puzzled by what appears to be 
Costello’s susceptibility to overt, Kafkaesque anthropomorphism. However, there are 
possibly two ideas imaginatively presented in this passage. One is Diamond’s notion of 
inventively hearing an echo in animals of the uncomprehending human cry for justice. 
This cry is, one might argue, conceptually linked with Sultan’s ape intelligence, including 
particular thoughts and feelings that are intelligibly part of his mode of being: fear and 
confusion at his treatment, a possible desire for companionship and intimacy with apes or 
humans, a wish to escape the pen for the jungle, and so on. One could then read Coetzee 
and Costello as trying to evoke this mode of life. This may be done successfully or not. 
But the important point is that it is an attempt which is made in a particular domain of 
critical thought. 
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The second idea Coetzee gives voice to is that the Kohler type of treatment is “imbecile”, 
because it is conducted in a spirit that treats the animals as “imbeciles”180. For example 
O’Hearne, Costello’s real philosopher debating opponent, argues that even the best 
performing higher apes do not do well in thinking strategically, holding general concepts, 
and communicating symbolically181. “We understand”, Costello counters, “by immersing 
ourselves and our intelligence in complexity”182. By contrast, “scientific behaviorism 
recoils from the complexity of life”183.  
 
Once again, Costello appears to refer both to the mode of living of creatures and to our 
imaginative responses to it or to central parts of it. If Kohler were more of a poet, she 
says, he “would have made something of the moment when the captive chimpanzees lope 
around the compound in a circle, for all the world like a military band, some of them as 
naked as the day they were born, some draped in cords or old strips of cloth that they 
have picked up, some carrying pieces of rubbish”184. The more poetic Kohler would have 
a stronger “feel for the ape’s experience” 185 - which is something we get a glimpse of in 
his perception (as Costello/Coetzee reports it) that their use of the ribbons and junk is not 
for its visual effect but for “the kinetic effect, because they make you feel different – 
anything to relieve the boredom”186.   
 
In her paper “Experimenting on Animals: A Problem in Ethics”187, Diamond supplies an 
example of a possible infliction of indignity. She discusses a way in which animal 
experimentation can desensitize or brutalize the experimenters. She explains that this 
process involves callousness or cruelty towards animals, but not in the sense of 
encouraging such behavior towards animals outside the experiments themselves. Nor is it 
the kind of callousness that need involve insensitivity to pain, though it might also 
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involve that. Here is the testimony, which Diamond cites, of the scientist Sir Lauder 
Brunton who  
 
was concerned to bring out that much experimentation involves no pain to 
speak of, and to illustrate his point he described a dog on whom he had 
made a gastric fistula, and ‘which never showed the slightest sign of pain’. 
Brunton went on that whenever he went to examine the dog it showed 
great delight – just like a dog that has been sitting about the house, and 
wants to run for a walk. When it saw that I was going to look into its 
stomach, it frisked about in the same way as if I was going to take it out 
for a walk.188 
 
It is obvious, says Diamond, that Brunton could not see “the pathos of the case, the 
possibility of its eliciting not, ‘Oh good, no pain’, but, ‘What a miserable life for an 
animal’”189. Though he might appreciate that outside the laboratory it would be 
“deplorable” to “deprive a dog of a normal sort of dog’s life”190, he was blind to the 
significance of what he did to the dog and of its “pathetic” response to him191. Brunton, 
as Diamond says, evidently compartmentalized his moral responses and failed to “bring 
to full imaginative realization what [he]…was doing”192, not just what the animals were 
feeling. If he had done so, he would have seen that the spirit of his actions betrayed a 
total lack of recognition of his subjects as “individual animals with their own lives”193. 
That is to say, Brunton showed, perhaps, the deadness of fibre (as Lawrence put it) that 
amounts to blindness to meaning. 
 
I will discuss one final example in this chapter. As we have seen, Gaita thinks our need 
for others, manifested in various bodily behavior, is a fundamental determinant of the 
“uniqueness and irreplaceability” of human beings. Rush Rhees says: “If one wants to 
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speak of ‘individuality’, all right. It means little more than ‘something that can be loved’, 
I think. In any case, one must speak of it in animals no less than in human beings”194. In 
Gaita’s opinion, Rhees overlooks here what he had elsewhere implied: that love is 
“answerable to standards which distinguish it from its many false semblances”195. And in 
the case of humans, what is central is that it is a disciplined love which partly constitutes 
the idea of, and is also responsive to, something which is unique and irreplaceable. Rhees 
himself, Gaita also thinks196, provided a fine literary example of a critical and 
unsentimental form of response to an animal: to the animal’s dignity, moral capacity, and 
mode of life. The diary entries and letters that make up “The Death of a Dog” in Moral 
Questions reveal Rhees to be thinking from out of a certain lived experience, under a 
certain expressive pressure, about the possibilities of our relations with animals. Gaita 
observes how it seems that “Rhees grieved for his dog as though for a person”197. The 
question naturally arises as to whether Rhees’ grief is ruined by sentimentality or 
anthropomorphism. Consider his depiction of “who” Danny his dog was: 
 
I have never been glad that Danny had the crazy nervous temperament he 
did have. No more than I’ve been glad of my stupid impatience with him. 
But…we came to know each other. And what I mean by knowing him – 
or, if you like, what I mean by him – is not something that I can separate 
from being face to face, again and again, with his crazy excitability, with 
his absolute obstinacy and refusal, with his cussedness in a dozen different 
ways: trying to meet these, trying to get round them, and generally ending 
up worse tempered than he and throwing the lead at him so that he ran into 
the house, and when I got in he was looking at me scared from behind the 
chair. Scared; but only waiting for the first chance I’d give him to come 
and press his head between my knees hard enough to break his skull and 
wag his whole backside. – Gradually, very gradually (over a long slog) we 
came to know one another in all this. He had come to know where he was 
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with me; and I had come to know where I was with him. And each of us 
knew this.198      
 
As in the Hearne example, Rhees finds over time a kind of language and understanding 
with the dog, one that is formed from interaction and mutual response to the “surfaces”. 
He also feels compelled to speak of the dog in moral terms, even though, as we saw 
earlier, he has said that the lives of animals can have no depth, direction, or meaning:  
 
Danny would never have allowed anyone to do to me what I allowed them 
to do to him. I speak from what I have seen him do 199 
 
I have felt put to shame by Danny…He never showed ingratitude, nor 
harbored resentment – (though God knows he had ground enough) – and 
this was not because he was placid and indifferent.200       
 
Again, Rhees’ comments may be disputed, but only in a way that responds to the spirit 
and sense in which they uttered. They are not merely empirical claims. But this creature 
also haunts him, and nearly two years after the dog’s death (in a routine dental procedure) 
he can write: “I do not recover from this loss…Even the word ‘recover’ jars, for I do not 
know what I’d imagine in it” 201. Earlier he wrote this: “I covered half my life with earth 
when I left him. That half that moves now – has no point but to pray and to call often – 
Danny”202; and then this:  
 
Asking questions, trying to get on with this or that side, aspect, of the 
matter – all of this was something I was doing with him, even if he was 
asleep in the corner. He belonged to, was part of every move I was 
making. And I do not know how to move in that way now.203        
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One way in which his grief resembles mourning for a human being is in his need to avoid 
“falsification” 204 and “superficiality”205, partly by being true to Danny. The standards 
internal to proper grief are for him standards that include moral necessity, and he 
perceives the need for devotion to the dead as intensely as he does the need for “devotion 
to the living”206 .  
 
Rhees believes that one kind of false move away from the dead Danny is to try to bring 
about “closure” whilst learning “to keep the memories of him vivid”207, as if it were like 
“remembering a wonderful holiday we had”208. He feels that finding “remedies” 209 for 
grief would be a second leaving behind, and he resists the “tendency to some sort of 
erasing”210 of the dead individual. In some respects, his reflections are like those of C.S. 
Lewis in A Grief Observed211, and there is also some resemblance with these thoughts of 
Simone Weil’s about grief for the human dead: 
 
…in the case of the absence or death of someone we love, the irreducible 
part of the sorrow is akin to physical pain, a difficulty in breathing, a 
constriction of the heart, an unsatisfied need, hunger, or the almost 
biological disorder caused by the brutal liberation of some energy, hitherto 
directed by an attachment and now left without a guide. A sorrow which is 
not centered around an irreducible core of such a nature is mere 
romanticism. 212  
 
Rhees says of Danny after the dog’s death: “What is hard is to stay with him and go on 
living”213; and again, “When I am turned towards him, this life is something going on in a 
                                                 
204 Moral Questions, p.202. 
205 Moral Questions, p.202. 
206 Moral Questions, p.223. 
207 Moral Questions, p.211. 
208 Moral Questions, p.202. 
209 Moral Questions, p.224. 
210 Moral Questions, p.227. 
211 Lewis, C.S., A Grief Observed (Great Britain: Faber, 1976), for example on p.48. 
212 Weil, S Waiting on God, trans. Crauford, E (Routledge, 1951), p77. 
213 Moral Questions, p.203. 
 213
room, I am standing in the open doorway with my back to these happenings”214. To avoid 
a second abandonment - “To learn to walk in such a way that I do not leave him”215  - 
Rhees, like Lewis, talks of “staying with him, turning to him”216. He believes that there is 
sense in which it is not “silly” to say that “he needs me”217. He even speaks of “joining 
him”, not in life, but rather in no “other sense than being dead”218, as if there were a 
certain meaningful way of finding fellowship in death.  
 
Rhees is puzzled by the nature of death. He feels Danny’s “death makes no sense”219: 
 
I don’t understand it; I don’t understand what’s happened. Ever and again 
that last scene: Danny standing up and leaning against my knee while I 
patted his side and pressed him closer to me; he making his half-grunt of 
contentment and assurance, even though he was already feeling groggy. 
Taking him to the next room where the operating table is, he walking 
unsteadily; but then when I said ‘sit’ and ‘down’ he lay down with perfect 
confidence and trust…- The last thing he understood from me was 
‘Down’. I’ve called him and called him since then. But if ‘Down’ was the 
last thing he understood, then…I cannot get it straight nor understand it.220 
 
There is essential bewilderment about the dead dog’s continuing presence and felt reality: 
“I know he is gone; but I do not – cannot – understand the ‘is gone’; cannot compare it 
with anything in any way”221: 
 
And this sense in which he is present – or the sense in which half my head 
and half my body is where he is – this is something which I cannot make 
articulate…- Memories of how he would be here and of things he did: 
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these can be articulate. But the sense in which he is there – not living, as 
he lived in all those scenes and times I remember – but there, and that I am 
half turned towards him. That I cannot make clear or articulate…although 
I do not know what clarification I seek.222    
 
He considers the claim that: ‘What you do in “calling him” is just deluding yourself’”223 . 
If someone were to say to him, “Now you’re forgetting that he has died”224, he thinks, 
they might be making a familiar philosophical point about the implications of death for 
our ethical responses. One reason for thinking that we cannot, as Gaita puts it, act for the 
sake of the dead or consider “the dead the irreducible objects of our love”225  and 
obligations, is that there is no life of any kind, and so no possibility of flourishing or of 
living well. But another reason is that it seems irrational or meaningless to think there is 
an irreducible object, and that this talk of the need to turn to them and of their need for us 
is “the grammatical shadow play of the psychological”226. The “metaphysical emphasis” 
227, Gaita says, pushes us to insist that the dead cannot be the objects of our moral 
responses because they do not exist; or they exist only in psychologically reducible ways, 
such as in “memories”. As Gaita says, there is pressure to give an account of the sense in 
which the dead still “exist”. It is pressure he believes we should resist.   
 
“The Death of a Dog” suggests two possible replies to the skeptic or reductivist who 
believes that the dead only exist in our memory of them. One reply is that there is no 
need to try to show that the dead “exist” in some unobvious way that can be demonstrated 
by rational argument or by clearing away grammatical obstacles to clarity228. Rhees 
himself suspects that attempting to “show” that he has not succumbed to a delusion is to 
have “fallen” into a similar “misunderstanding”229  as his imagined critics. He might 
agree that it should be enough to say that the “non-existent things” like the dead are the 
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object of ethical relations - all that needs to be said is that they are “objects” in a way that 
is connected to the uncontroversial fact that they were once living and now are not. (It is 
obvious that they are not “non-existent” in the same sense in which imaginary individuals 
or future generations do not exist. One might say that it makes no sense to pray for the 
forgiveness of these “people” in the way that a person might for the dead, or perhaps 
even in the way Rhees does, when he prays for the deceased Danny’s “forgiveness for 
having let him be too seldom in my thoughts”230.) In any case, Rhees does not deny what 
his imaginary critic insists upon. 
 
In fact, Rhees emphasizes that the dead no longer exist: “I do not want any shift which 
dims the gulf that is referred to by ‘He’s dead’ – leaving it little more than words on 
paper”231. He would stress the deadness or non-existence of the dead to those who reckon 
him delusional or ignorant of their non-existence. This is because he feels their arguments 
are deflections from the meaning of what it is for someone to be dead, and that includes 
deflections from its strangeness and mystery. This mystery is connected with a sense he 
had of the dog’s presence in life: he claims that “he cannot think of the ‘gulf’ without 
thinking of him”232. The meaning of Danny’s death – as he says, of what he “means” not 
just of what is “meant”233 - is for him fundamentally connected with “the sense of loss”234 
and with his moral relations to him in death.  
 
These responses are connected with what Rhees means by the dog’s “presence” and 
“reality”, and by what he means by “him” even after he has gone. It is a presence which 
Rhees recognizes before and after his death; perhaps the one in the light of the other. It 
appears that for Rhees, his understanding of the individual’s presence or reality is 
enlarged by what he can mean to him both when alive and when no longer living. Gaita 
has argued that our “acknowledgement of need can enable us to see things more truly” 
and avoid “foolish condescension to both human beings and animals”, by making us 
                                                 
230 Moral Questions, p.227. 
231 Moral Questions, p.214. 
232 Moral Questions, p.214. 
233 Moral Questions, p.218. 
234 Moral Questions, p.218. 
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“better placed to understand the real possibilities in relations between human beings and 
animals”235.   
 
Rhees’ account of his relationship with Danny and its suggestiveness about animal 
individuality, may be contrasted with Singer’s reply to Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals. 
In fictional guise, Peter Singer depicts a breakfast encounter between the moral 
philosopher “Peter”, who is to reply to Coetzee’s lecture at Princeton, and Peter’s young 
adult daughter “Naomi”. The story criticizes Costello for her “radical egalitarianism” and 
Coetzee, too, for hiding his own position behind his character’s half-baked arguments 
(though Singer in provides evidence that Coetzee really does agree on the whole with 
Costello). The story Singer tells recapitulates his other work on the moral significance of 
Lockean personhood and future-directed desires, and on the associated idea of ethical 
“replaceability”.236       
 
“Peter” and his daughter, who seem to be vegetarians, are discussing the ethics of who to 
rescue from a burning house: their dog Max or the young child Naomi. Peter tries to 
reassure Naomi by giving two reasons for saving her first. One is that her  
 
whole life is future-orientated to a degree that is inconceivable for Max. 
That gives you much more to lose, and gives an objective reason for 
anyone – not just your father – to save you rather than Max.237  
 
The second reason applies even before Naomi had developed this type and range of 
interests: “I’m your father, of course I would have saved my lovely baby daughter”238. At 
                                                 
235 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.16. 
236 Diamond and other commentators have noticed that Singer and most of the fellow respondents in The 
Lives of Animals misperceive Coetzee’s work as a fictional vehicle for extractable rational arguments – 
“therefore-arguments” as she calls them. Such readings, Diamond thinks, miss the potentially game-
changing ethical ramifications of the central figure and wounded animal which is Elizabeth Costello. It is 
also the case that, in his reply, Singer chose not even to see in Coetzee’s paper – which he says is at the 
same time really interesting and hopelessly muddled - a riveting fictional account of the isolating effects of 
radical ethical beliefs, such as his own about animals. Singer’s interpretation of the stubbornness of many 
of those who have read him to accept the rightness of his conclusions on animals is, of course, very 
different from Diamond’s and Costello’s understanding of such refusal. See The Lives of Animals, p.85. 
 
237 The Lives of Animals, pp.87-88. 
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this stage, the child was strictly (ethically) replaceable. This means that, all things being 
equal, killing and replacing her with another child might have been (depending on the 
wider circumstances) ethically allowable. But Peter thinks the partial feelings of the 
father would have to be taken into account in determining what is permissible.      
 
The situation with Max is comparable to that of the child at the level of development 
where she is conceivably strictly replaceable, but receives indirect ethical protection via 
considerations of side-effects. Peter says that even an anti-speciesist can say that species 
“membership may point to things that are morally significant”239, and “normal humans 
have capacities that far exceed those of nonhuman animals, and some of these capacities 
are morally significant in particular contexts”240. Peter criticizes Costello for seeming “to 
say that their fullness of being is more important than whether it is bat-being or human-
being”241. He then compares both human value and animal value to, respectively, a 
Kahlua container and a soymilk container. The point, which Singer has made elsewhere, 
is that it is not the receptacle, but the value or interests it holds which is ethically 
significant. And, Singer has argued, the significance of that value is the significance of 
something we ought to maximize. As for Max, Peter says: “I’m sure you don’t think 
about what you will be doing next summer, or even next week”242, and furthermore, 
“there are plenty of dog breeders out there who breed dogs to meet the demand”243.  
 
Naomi objects to the suggestion that Max is replaceable, arguing that “if Max were to be 
killed, there would be no more doggy-joy of welcoming me home, being taken for a 
walk, chewing his bone…”244. Moreover, she accuses her father of too much “reasoning, 
not enough feeling. That’s a horrible thought”245. Peter’s reply is twofold. First, he 
argues that the use of the family dog as an example is distracting: “Let’s leave Max out of 
                                                                                                                                                 
238 The Lives of Animals, p.87. 
239 The Lives of Animals, p.87. 
240 The Lives of Animals, p.87. 
241 The Lives of Animals, p.90. 
242 The Lives of Animals, p.87. 
243 The Lives of Animals, p.88. 
244 The Lives of Animals, p.88. 
245 The Lives of Animals, p.88. 
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it, since mentioning his name seems to excite him and distress you”246. He suggests it 
would make for greater clarity to discuss the ethical notion of replaceability in terms of 
anonymous pigs on farms, and reminds Naomi that:  
 
I asked you why painlessly killing is wrong in itself. Our distress is a side 
effect of the killing, not something that makes it wrong in itself.247 
 
Peter’s suggestion accords with Singer’s view that our “partial” relations and affections 
are only ethically relevant to calculations of side effects and not to basic ethical status.  
 
His second reply is that these other consequences still matter:  
 
I don’t mean that everything would be fine if Max were killed and 
replaced by a puppy. We love Max, and for us no puppy would replace 
him.248 
 
At this point, indignation also enters his response:  
 
You know very well that I care about Max, so lay off with the ‘You 
reason, so you don’t feel’ stuff, please. I feel, but I also think about what I 
feel.249  
 
Stephen Mulhall, in his discussion of Singer’s piece, argues that Peter’s distress at the 
“all things being equal” killing and replacing of Max is “incoherent”, since: 
 
if it were really the case that Max’s killing were not wrong in itself, there 
could be no rational basis for anyone, including Max’s owners, to feel 
distressed about it; if they reflected with the appropriate degree of rigor 
                                                 
246 The Lives of Animals, p.89. 
247 The Lives of Animals, p.89. 
248 The Lives of Animals, p.89. 
249 The Lives of Animals, p.88. 
 219
upon their feelings, they would realize that they had nothing to be 
distressed about.250  
 
This is part of Mulhall’s claim that such feelings of distress and the like are modes of 
ethical response. Singer must surely reply that the (moral) rationality of his feelings have 
their basis in the wider circumstances – the pleasures of living with dogs without 
replacing them, for example. Feelings and attachments are subjective things we are prone 
as biological creatures, specifically as human primates, to having and can be considered 
neither rational nor irrational until the ethical sums are worked out. Those sums could go 
either way. So why does Singer have Peter show traces of indignation when he is accused 
of a lack of feeling?  
 
One possible answer is that Peter takes Naomi’s distress to imply that he is being 
“horrible” because he has overlooked the side effects on her of killing and replacing Max. 
But Naomi clearly means that her father does not care for or love Max well enough. So, 
another answer is that Peter is annoyed by the insinuation, not that he has made a rational 
error, or more strongly, is a moral failure, but that he is in some other sense inhuman. 
After all, Peter may think, the kind of model Impartial Observer who is above partial 
feelings and attachments may be ethically irreproachable, but he could hardly be seen, or 
feel himself to be, a family man who loves his daughter and his dog. This is an area, 
perhaps, that extends into what Singer (and Anton Leist) calls the “nonrational pockets of 
human life”251.  
 
In contrast to Rhees, the kinds of love, caring, friendship, and attachment defended by 
“Peter” and by Singer have no internal standards, no false or counterfeit forms, and 
require no thoughtfulness or lucidity in response. The idea that Rhees might replace 
Danny is unthinkable to him - not in Singer’s sense of replaceability, but in the sense that 
another dog could ever take his place, insofar as that implied that he might ignore or 
                                                 
250 The Wounded Animal, p.65. 
251 A. Leist, & P. Singer, (eds.), J. M Coetzee and Ethics: Philosophical Perspectives on Literature, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2010), p.5. 
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forget Danny and what Danny meant to him. Also, it is unthinkable to him that he might 
straightway get another dog: 
 
I may begin by thinking that I do not want to continue my life without a 
dog. – But then: to try to have another dog would mean: deserting him.252  
 
It is important here to say that this does not imply that Rhees conceives of a dog as 
irreplaceable in the same way as a human being. Gaita’s thought is apposite:  
 
I know of no one whose dog would be treated as equal to a seriously sick 
infant. If someone did treat their dog like that I would not think of them as 
a pioneer of ethical thought, but as someone whose sentimentality had 
made them wicked.253   
 
Although he treats his dog in many ways as if he were a person, none of what Rhees 
avows in his diary entries is inconsistent with these words. 
                                                 
252 Moral Questions, p.211. 




Chapter 8 Individuality 
 
The realm of meaning offers a further way of reflecting, beyond the normal 
considerations of logical reasoning, on what is real and what only appears to be so. In the 
previous chapter, some examples of how such thought might apply to animals were 
given. Partly, these sorts of examples show why we can only clarify the nature of animals 
by attending to the ways we can respond to, and reflect upon, both human and animal 
life. In this chapter, I will further consider the contrast between humans and animals by 
focusing on the ways in which we might discover what kind of individuals humans and 
animals are, or what kind of “individuality” they have. This discussion continues an 
elaboration of one way in which we might determine the difference between “us and 
them”. 
 
To prepare the ground for discussions about individuality, let us briefly review the nature 
of this mode of thought about meaning as Raimond Gaita has developed it. Such thought 
is distinguished strongly from the more impersonal and rational forms of thought, for 
amongst its requirements is that we think from the position of living, and having lived, 
our lives as a certain kind of creature. To think well like this we must think, not as 
uninvolved observers, but as affective creatures in media res, making use of our 
particular characters, imagination, experiences, languages, and cultural resources. A 
disciplined literary imagination has some resemblance (and continuity) with this kind of 
thinking. 
 
The requirement of thinking in the midst of life is not at odds with the claim that when 
we think like this we are just as interested in reaching what is true or real as we are in 
other modes of enquiry, including those which are not markedly informed by feeling. 
Those philosophers who believe in a strictly rational approach – one not informed by the 
way we are moved and that aims for the sort of convergence in belief that exists in 
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science – cannot therefore lay claim to an exclusive method of telling what is fake or 
false from what is genuine or true. And with our particular subject matter – a subject 
matter that inevitably involves questions of meaning and value - thought that pays no 
attention to tone and resonance is no good way at all of finding out and reflecting upon 
things as they really are.  
 
But thought in the realm of meaning is also distinguished from other personal forms of 
thought, and even cultural products and language, which, though they claim that 
cognitive activity is partly constituted by feeling, do not stress the specific cognitive 
character the “understanding of the heart” can have. This cognitive character is made up 
of critical responses that describe things variously as sentimental, banal, self-indulgent, 
hollow, pompous, and so on. The avoidance of qualities like sentimentality is usually 
associated with what we call depth or insight; the presence of such qualities may render 
something shallow and frivolous.  
 
Further, these qualities are not merely causes of bad thinking or expression; they are 
forms that such cognitive failure can take. Sentimentality and banality, then, are what 
makes an idea false or untruthful. This means that ideas and thoughts cannot be assessed 
in this mode of thinking without attention to their particular forms. To dismantle the form 
or presentation, perhaps in order to rationally review it, would be necessarily to destroy 
or change its content and throw out the subject matter. That is because it would thereby 
dismantle its “tone”, “tenor”, or “resonance”, which is discerned in those critical 
responses that impart cognitive character to this form of reflection.         
 
Thinking well in the way described is not so much to think purely rationally. Rationality - 
logic, clarity, coherence, factual accuracy, and the avoidance of disabling emotion and 
ego - are all vital constituents of thought informed by the critical categories. Without 
logic, consistency, and certain facts, moreover, those categories could hardly exist. Still, 
there is good reason to say that it is more appropriate to call someone who thinks well in 
the realm of meaning thoughtful, lucid, or perceptive, rather than rational, logical, or 
expert. Rosalind Hursthouse thinks that genuine ethical understanding, which for her 
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means wisdom, is not yet available to (say) a twelve year old child, unless it is unusually 
precocious. For there is, she says, 
 
something absurd about attributing such deep, value-embodying reasons to 
children (or indeed mentally handicapped people) who, if they can be said 
to have values at all, do not have values which are yet their own.1  
 
Hursthouse says that children of a certain age may “have personalities, they may have the 
natural virtues, but they do not yet have character traits; their characters are forming but 
not yet formed and settled”2. And if Gaita is right, wisdom is not possible until later in 
life because it requires inwardness, or a disciplined responsiveness, that involves trust in, 
and responsibility for, a critical conceptual vocabulary that is only established when we 
are properly or fittingly moved. In this manner, ordinary people are individuated in a 
more strikingly important way than an artistic genius, president, or movie star.  
 
If this is right, then there appear to be, as Gaita has also argued, consequences for 
philosophy. In particular, this personal but disciplined mode of reflection seems to 
promise an enriched and altered conception of the discursive. Philosophical reflection 
within the realm of meaning is enriched because, while it remains methodical and 
expansive, and informed by the principles of rationality, a good part of its subject matter, 
its direction, and in some cases the value of its style, are recast by this form of thought. 
Chapter 7 contained examples of thinking within the realm of meaning from various 
philosophers, some of whom exemplified such reflection in their way of attending to their 
subject matter, and some who did not practice, or who rejected, this way of thinking.  
 
From this perspective – which is shared implicitly by most people - much mainstream 
discursive activity appears to miss the seriousness of ethical thought. Sometimes it even 
appears comical or crude. A sense of the comic is evident in Cora Diamond’s comparison 
of Singer’s and Regan’s arguments concerning the rights of animals with those in 
                                                 
1 R. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.142. 
2 On Virtue Ethics, p.145. 
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Laurence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy defending the “rights of homunculi”3. Great respect 
for “receptacles of value”, or even “subjects-of-a-life”, hardly seems the product of 
serious reflection. 
 
It might be countered that philosophical “seriousness” cannot be determined outside of 
purely rational argument and justification. A person who thought this, might be 
impressed by the escalator-logic in Singer’s foundationalism, much as Hobbes was awed 
when he studied the unlikely cogency of Euclid’s proofs.4  
 
However, we are not bound to regard Singer’s understanding of ethical thought as more 
than a logical game played by some rational primates. Perhaps it logically possible some 
creatures could think like this, while taking seriously the logic of such language. But 
given that no-one is logically compelled to take any notice of it, there seems to be no 
reason why, even in philosophy, they should be awed by it as Thomas Hobbes was by 
Euclid - though they might be grateful for philosophical reasons.                
 
In their personal lives, (virtually) no-one uses moral language simply to justify 
themselves to other rational primates. In reality, we do speak as if some ways of 
responding are shallow and we try to avoid them. We try to be people who are thoughtful, 
where this does not mean merely being rigorously rational. As Gaita says, no-one is 
convinced by an argument in philosophy that something which is horrible or banal is after 
all morally and intellectually respectable. People may entertain such things, but usually 
they do so merely for the sake of discussion, or else because they are abnormally 
predisposed to those conclusions.5  
 
We have looked at some reasons for saying that the way we are seriously engaged with 
meaning in our lives is itself, as Bernard Williams puts it, a form of “getting it right”6. 
                                                 
3 Diamond, C. The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy and the Mind, (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 
1995), p.333.  
4 P. Singer, The Expanding Circle, Ethics and Sociobiology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p.88. 
5 R.Gaita, A Common Humanity (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 1999), p.178. 
6 B. Williams, Philosophy as a Humanistic Principle (Moore, A.W ed.), (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2006), p.202. 
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Moral philosophy, Williams says, must attend to our serious concerns and to what speaks 
“in a real voice”, and so it should: 
 
introduce our ordinary concerns in a humanly recognizable form. Of much 
philosophy purportedly about ethical or political subjects (and other kinds 
as well) one may reasonably ask: what if someone speaking to me actually 
sounded like that?7    
 
In these words, Williams gestures toward a sort of thought and discussion in which 
people try to be serious and get others to be and stay serious, by appealing to certain 
standards of appraisal related to what “rings true” or “sounds right”. Singer believes that 
the form of these concerns can be relocated to a zone free of tone, style, or resonance. 
Either that, or if the content cannot be relocated without destroying real and peculiarly 
human concerns, then it belongs to important but “nonrational pockets of the private”8.  
 
These pockets, Singer thinks, are not best treated by philosophy with its concern for truth, 
but by a literary domain in which form is crucial to “content” – a domain that is 
noncognitive. No-one would deny that in literature “form” is essential to the whole point 
and value of reading and writing of a poem or a novel. But Singer’s is a very different 
way of construing the nature of the cognitive content in literature.  
 
The sort of serious face-to-face discussion alluded to by Williams is readily recognizable 
from ordinary life. For example, it occurs in conversations about crises or big events in 
life. And it occurs when people are greatly moved by something they have seen or read. 
Consider two friends, ordinary people, who have just read the same book – Moby Dick 
perhaps. Having both received from it “a kick like a mule”9, to quote Vicki Hearne, they 
are anxious to discuss with one another the way it has shed light on the meaning of 
                                                 
7 Philosophy as a Humanistic Principle, p.206. 
8 A. Leist, & P. Singer, (eds.), J. M Coetzee and Ethics: Philosophical Perspectives on Literature, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2010), p.5. 
9 V. Hearne, Adam’s Task: Calling Animals by Name (New York: Akadine Press, 2000), p.6. 
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certain things – say, the preciousness of human life and the strangeness of intelligent 
animals.  
 
Some will say that what is of fundamental ethical and philosophical interest in this classic 
– such as its treatment of race, human equality, and nonhuman sentience - must be 
capable of being removed from the arrangement and tenor of Melville’s words and given 
over to moral experts. Yet it does not enter the minds of these two friends that this is 
would be appropriate to what they might learn from the book. In fact, they concentrate on 
the specific and stirring words Melville chooses, on the rhythm and tone of his sentences, 
and the way these affect them. They view each another as capable of responding, not 
simply with literary sophistication, but with genuine thoughtfulness to the book, seeing 
each other as capable of making judgments about sentimentality and cliché, and of 
avoiding the temptation to be sucked in by the book’s literary status. Each of them 
responds to the book, and to one another, from out of their own lives and experience. 
Each sees the other as potentially having something serious to say (about this book and 
about other things) and is open to being moved and changed by their partner’s personal 
contributions and revelations.  
 
Although a serious discussion of this sort might not happen every day in a person’s life, 
and may in fact arise infrequently, it is nevertheless a familiar sort of conversation. The 
question now arises: what concept of individuality is adequate to our understanding of 
what these two friends – two people who take forms of expression like Moby Dick (or 
whatever else) to have the right kind of seriousness for the revelation of things of real 
value and meaning – are doing? There is need, in other words, for further clarification of 
what it means for them to speak seriously from their experience and to be accountable to 
one another - that is, to be responsible for what they say and reveal.  
 
The nature of their critical responses as individuals is connected with the ethical notion of 
individuality. But before we explore Gaita’s conception of ethical individuality, let us 
review some of the ways in which a few of the other philosophers discussed in this thesis 
take individuals to be important.           
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In Singer’s eyes, individuals are important because they are either of two possible kinds 
of “receptacles of value”: non-persons, which are fully replaceable receptacles, and 
Lockean persons, which are not fully replaceable receptacles of value on account of their 
forward-looking preferences but which nevertheless have value as part of a utilitarian 
calculus. Reacting to the seeming injustice, or perhaps the indignity, of regarding beings 
as mere receptacles of value, rather than as individuals in a more ethically robust sense, 
Tom Regan argues that having the properties of a subject-of-a-life has anti-utilitarian 
consequences, and confers upon such subjects equal inherent value and rights. James 
Rachels argues that it is richness and complexity, provisioned by mental and relational 
sophistication, which gives individuals moral worth and importance10.  
 
Despite Cora Diamond’s warning that these sorts of arguments “attack significance in 
human life” to the detriment of our understanding of humans and animals, such 
philosophers persist with their criticism of the “doctrine” of human specialness, rejecting 
it as the remains of discredited religion and suspect philosophy. Such overtones they 
perceive in, for example, Kant’s notion of “‘intrinsic worth, i.e., dignity’, which makes 
them [humans] valuable ‘above all price’; while other animals ‘…are there merely as a 
means to an end [which] is man.’”11 The general view that results from this criticism is 
encapsulated in James Rachels’ term, “moral individualism”. According to this term, 
Rachels says, 
 
what matters is the individual characteristics of organisms, and not the 
classes to which they are assigned. The heart of moral individualism is an 
equal concern for the welfare of all beings, with distinctions made among 
them only where there are relevant differences that justify differences in 
treatment.12   
 
                                                 
10 J.Rachels, Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism, (Oxford: Oxford University  
Press, 1991), p.189. 
11 Created from Animals, p.221. 
12 Created from Animals, p.222. 
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According to Singer, Regan, and Rachels, it may happen, and in fact it is the case, that 
humans often warrant greater protection in some circumstances, but not on account of 
their being of a human kind.    
 
James Rachels helpfully summarizes these views on what has come to be known as 
speciesism, first by quoting Singer:         
 
The racist violates the principle of equality by giving greater weight to the 
interests of members of his own race when there is a clash between their 
interests and the interests of another race. The sexist violates the principle 
of equality by favoring the interests of his own sex. Similarly the 
speciesist allows the interests of his own species to override the greater 
interests of members of other species. The pattern is identical in each 
case.13     
 
Rachels then distinguishes between unqualified speciesism, which takes the “bare fact 
that an individual is a member of a certain species”14 as relevant moral grounds for 
recognizing inequality, and the somewhat less implausible varieties of qualified 
speciesism, which ground species membership in “other differences that are 
significant”15.  
 
No matter how logically or conceptually sophisticated, qualified speciesism seems to be 
vulnerable to the so-called argument from marginal cases. For, as it is argued, there is no 
obvious reason why mere membership in a group characterized by morally relevant 
properties should ground equality when the individual in question lacks those properties. 
That is so even for McNaughton’s contention16 that it is only of mentally incompetent 
human beings (not chimpanzees) that we can intelligibly say they have suffered the 
misfortune of failing to acquire certain capacities. For it is only because they belong to 
                                                 
13 Created from Animals, p.181. 
14 Created from Animals, p.183. 
15 Created from Animals, p.184. 
16 David McNaughton, ‘The Importance of Being Human’ in D. Cockburn (ed.), Human Beings 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 79. 
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our kind that there is this conceptual difference. And what, it is said, is the deeper 
relevance of belonging to this group? 
 
In a science fiction vein, Rachels argues that it is absurd to exclude from the province of 
equality an “unusually gifted chimpanzee [who] learned to read and speak English”17. 
Nor does it seem very plausible, he argues, to consider morally unequal someone who has 
a very different body to ours. To illustrate the point, Rachels cites the example of Eando 
Binder’s story “The Teacher from Mars”, in which the alien person was “seven feet tall, 
thin, with tentacles and leathery skin”18. The example recalls Bentham’s famous 
comment upon the moral irrelevance of “the number of legs, the villosity of the skin, or 
the termination of the os sacrum”19.        
 
Rosalind Hursthouse has raised two possible replies to the Singer/Bentham line of 
argument. The first is Mary Midgley’s “moderate form of specieisism”20 which, 
Hursthouse explains, claims all of the following: “race in humans is not a significant 
grouping at all…species in animals certainly is”; the “preference for one’s own family 
and one’s own species is a natural preference, and not, like race-prejudice, a product of 
culture”; and these two preferences, unlike racial preferences, are an “‘absolutely central 
element in human happiness’ without which we could not live a full human life”21.  
 
This “moderate” form of speciesism is the kind that is modeled on “familyism”. Most 
people, of course, would find it natural to say that, while all human beings are equal, it is 
not wrong to give preference (in a way not necessarily sanctioned by two-level 
utilitarianism) to the well being of family members over strangers. If “moderate” 
specieisism is taken to be essentially analogous to this, then it seems to imply that 
humans and animals are moral equals, and that what justifies our preferential treatment of 
humans over animals is a kind of “family-like” relation.  
                                                 
17 Created from Animals, p.187. 
18 Created from Animals, p.183. 
19 P.Singer, Practical Ethics (2nd ed.), (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.56-57.  
20 R.Hursthouse, Ethics, Humans and Other Animals: An Introduction with Readings(Philosophy and the 
Human Situation),  (London: Routledge, 2000), p.117.  
21 Ethics, Humans and Other Animals, p.128. 
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It is conceivable that this view might find it morally permissible to treat the family dog 
(whose relation implies special moral duties) as the moral equal of a non-family human 
stranger, and even find it morally acceptable to save the dog over a human stranger in a 
life-boat situation. If there is no such entailment, then it must be that “species” is a more 
powerful ethical relation than “family”, even though it is no basis for any other and 
deeper kind of inequality.   
 
It is not clear that someone like Tom Regan should be much worried by this line of 
argument, given that he accepts the existence of special ethical ties. For one thing, he 
himself has said that it is not only permissible, but obligatory, to give preference to a 
normal human being over a dog in a life-boat situation; and moreover, that it is a duty to 
allow a million dogs to perish in order to save just a few normal human beings from 
drowning.22 This follows from the “worse-off principle”23, conjoined with the assumption 
that the dog is harmed less than normal humans by death. But the main reason Regan’s 
theory need not be too troubled by “moderate” speciesism is that it can continue to claim 
that (certain) animals and humans are equal in the more basic sense of having the same 
“inherent value”24, a value which, Regan concludes, grounds their possession of moral 
rights.  
 
On the other hand, even “moderate” speciesism is a form of speciesism, and so arguably 
exposed to the various counterarguments that have been well rehearsed. Rachels, for 
example, would ask the proponents of moderate speciesism why it is morally 
unacceptable, and inherently opposed to human happiness and fullness of life, to look 
upon a teacher who just happens to come from another planet as in every way our moral 
equal. This observation leads to the next reply to the familiar kind of argument against 
speciesism. 
 
                                                 
22 T. Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p.325. 
23 The Case for Animal Rights, p.308.  
24 The Case for Animal Rights, p.236. 
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The second reply, rejecting the accusation of speciesism altogether, is developed by 
Hursthouse herself. In Beginning Lives, she claims that indeed it “would be viciously 
speciesist” to treat aliens as “a source of food and energy, as though they were just like 
plants or hens or cattle”25 just because “they are not human beings”26. Suppose, she says, 
the aliens are “persons” like us and that not “every member of the species is a person 
throughout its life”27. Assuming that “infanticide and the extermination of the senile” is 
wrong in the case of humans, then it would surely be “vicious speciesism”28 to kill infant 
or senile aliens if the aliens “as a species are persons”29. 
 
The aliens-as-persons thought experiment makes it clear, Hursthouse believes, that 
“having two legs or being warm-blooded” are not “morally relevant”30. And it also allows 
us to see, she contends, that it is not speciesist to link species to some morally relevant 
conception of personhood. It is being a “species of persons” that counts31. The kind of 
specieisism that is objectionable might well be, to use her words from a different context, 
just like “interplanetary or interstellar racism”32.  
 
Clearly, this will not do as a complete reply to Singer and Rachels, because although it 
avoids one instance of (interstellar) prejudice, it does so by virtue of what they would see 
as speciesist prejudice against the rest of the earth’s sensitive inhabitants. However, the 
other component of her argument in Beginning Lives concerns the importance of being a 
“person”. Though Hursthouse supports Kant in thinking that personhood captures 
something “really important” about human beings which sets them apart from “most [?] 
other things living on this planet”33  – such as the fact that humans are “rational and self-
conscious”34  - she rejects narrow or overly technical conceptions in ethics of “person”. 
 
                                                 
25 R. Hursthouse, Beginning Lives (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p.103. 
26 Beginning Lives, p.103. 
27 Beginning Lives, p.104. 
28 Beginning Lives, p.104. 
29 Beginning Lives, p.104. 
30 Beginning Lives, p.247. 
31 Beginning Lives, p.95. 
32 Beginning Lives, p.102. 
33 Beginning Lives, pp.94-95 and 221. 
34 Beginning Lives, p.95. 
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Furthermore, she argues, surely “no one can have thought that the person/non-person 
distinction could solve” questions about the treatment of animals, infants, fetuses, the 
senile, and the retarded35. The category of “person”, as it used in philosophical and 
bioethical debates is, while initially helpful, too limited for this task. It is very difficult to 
feel that individuals like fetuses are “part of our moral community” 36 or are our “moral 
equals”37.                   
 
Could we think it viciously speciesist to treat the aliens as we now treat animals - wicked 
in the same way it would be wicked to eat human infants? Only if, she says, their 
 
members are naturally prone to the same sorts of emotions and tendencies; 
if they want, enjoy and find satisfying the same sorts of things, if they are 
subject to the same sorts of temptations, fears and failings, if they respond 
to the world and each other in the same sorts of ways as we do.38  
 
The narrow conceptions of “person”, and perhaps “subject”, badly miss the “central 
importance to morality”, Hursthouse argues, of the “neo-Aristotelian emphasis on the 
complex ways we feel, act, and react (in relation to ourselves and to others and to the rest 
of the world)”39.  
 
But neo-Aristotelianism raises a further complication, she claims. For while we can see 
sense in saying that “having two legs” (and much more besides of a biological sort) is 
morally irrelevant, we are “led to reflect on the role that these biological facts about us 
play in our physical and psychological life, the extent to which they determine what 
flourishing is for us”40. The conceptual part the body plays in the kind of lives and 
thought that we seem to have will be taken up shortly.             
 
                                                 
35 Beginning Lives, p.127. 
36 Beginning Lives, p.253. 
37 Beginning Lives, p.257.  
38 Beginning Lives, p.249. 
39 Beginning Lives, p.250. 
40 Beginning Lives, p.255. 
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Hursthouse dubs the stage in a human life in which flourishing is possible “our major 
stage”41. The major stage approximates to what most of us naturally think of as becoming 
or being a person.42 This is a stage, one might say, that children are developing towards 
and that the senile are receding from. Specifying the major stage, or what it is to be a 
person, “would form a very significant part of moral philosophy, for it would involve 
specifying what is needed for maturity”43:  
 
Maturity is emotional or psychological as well as intellectual, and it is part 
of our concept of it that with maturity comes wisdom. The sort of wisdom 
it brings is not the sort that can be learnt entirely from books or lectures, 
but the sort that comes from experience of life, and it is wisdom about life. 
And this is precisely the wisdom which, according to neo-Aristotelianism, 
is fully possessed only by the fully virtuous human being.44 
 
This does not mean that only the fully virtuous pass through the major stage and are 
persons. It does mean, on her account, that the concept of the major stage, and thus of 
human life, is dependent on considerations that are “what we call moral 
considerations”45. On her account, flourishing is both conceptually and causally 
connected partly with the exercise of virtue and therefore the possession of ethical 
understanding. The major stage of maturity “distinguishes us as a species from most if 
not all terrestrial animals”46: “We think our entering it and persisting in it is of the 
greatest importance and significance, to the point where, when human beings do not go 
through it, or decline from it before they die, we think this is a tragedy, even if they do 
not suffer at all.”47 This is a kind of tragedy that does not and cannot occur in animal life. 
 
Although some of the points Hursthouse makes allow for (and are occasionally 
suggestive of) the possibility of exploring notions of “individuality” and ways of talking 
                                                 
41 Beginning Lives, p.256. 
42 Beginning Lives, p.257. 
43 Beginning Lives, p.257. 
44 Beginning Lives, p.258. 
45 Beginning Lives, p.258. 
46 Beginning Lives, p.257. 
47 Beginning Lives, p.257. 
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about kinds of individuals in Gaita’s “realm of meaning”, Hursthouse does little to 
develop them in that way. Despite her more humanly engaged position, therefore, she 
does not in the same way account for the seriousness we encounter in ethical reflection 
only in the mature stage of a human life. She may well be, however, right to say that 
gaining a better understanding of the “mature” stage of human life – what it is to think as 
adults who can speak seriously with one another – is a very significant part of moral 
philosophy.  
 
We have previously noted the tendency of naturalism or neo-Aristotelianism - sometimes 
by contestable recourse to theory - to restrict through its emphasis on flourishing the 
sense we can make of moral understanding and the importance of individuals. But we are 
not obliged by naturalistic argument to accept that the exercise of our best judgment 
about what is significant must be tied so strongly to our flourishing as morally mature 
thinkers or seen in the light of the flourishing of others. So, for example, we might have a 
conception (or conceptions) of “us and them” that is determined fully without being 
subject to any naturalistic constraints.  
 
The idea now to be explored is that Raimond Gaita’s work offers a more serious 
conception of “individuality”. The initial point to make is that this conception of 
individuality is not reducible to numerical distinctness, to individual features and 
histories, or to charismatic or creative personalities that might impress us with a “star 
quality”. Instead, it is the  
 
individuality we express when we say that each human being is unique 
and irreplaceable, in a sense that can never be conveyed by appealing to 
individual features, and not just to those who care for them, but unique 
and irreplaceable period.48  
 
                                                 
48 R. Gaita, The Philosophers Dog (New York: Random House, 2005), p.78. 
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This sort of individuality is connected with what Hursthouse calls the mature and “major 
stage” in an individual’s life. And yet how this is worked out is vital to a proper 
understanding of individuality in its most important form.  
 
One thing that Gaita hopes to show is that there is a better conception of a fully mature 
individual which we can recognize - one in fact, which is entirely familiar to us as soon 
as we reflect on it. He performs this task by reminding us of what we know implicitly, by 
way of several examples. The thrust of these examples is readily graspable, even if the 
cases are hardly everyday occurrences in our own lives. One of them is an example of a 
woman he calls M, who was in mourning for her dead child. In describing the case of M 
and other cases, Gaita aims to show that moral philosophers routinely overlook, and even 
tacitly rely upon without realizing it, this particular conception of individuality. They 
therefore fail to see, as Diamond has also pointed out, what “sets the stage” for more 
overt moral considerations.49 Gaita sets up his example in this way: 
 
M was watching a television documentary on the Vietnam War which 
showed the grief of Vietnamese women whose children were killed in 
bombing raids. At first she responded as though she and the Vietnamese 
women shared a common affliction. Within minutes, however, she drew 
back and said, ‘But it is different for them. They can simply have 
more.’…M did not mean that whereas she was sterile they were not. Nor did 
she mean that as a matter of fact Vietnamese tended to have many children. 
She meant that they could replace their children more or less as we replace 
pets.50   
 
Gaita does not want to make any empirical claims about the ubiquity of this kind of 
racism or about racism’s causes. Nor is his focus the complex variety within what we call 
racism, including those instances of racism which have something in common with more 
mundane kinds of blindness to individuality and meaning. For example, it may well be 
                                                 
49 R. Gaita, Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception (2nd ed.), (London: Routledge, 2004), p.340. 
50 A Common Humanity, p.58. 
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true and important that we are often prone to forget or ignore the individuality of 
foreigners or refugees in a way that has resemblances to cases of racism. Or again, we 
may be similarly tempted, when we confront shallow or dim-witted people, to 
occasionally forget that they are essentially no different to ourselves in a more 
fundamental sense. That is certainly important, Gaita would say, to our ability to treat 
others as our equals.  
 
Yet Gaita’s special interest is in the way philosophy is illuminated by cases in which 
nothing has been ignored, suppressed, or temporarily lost sight of. For M’s particular 
brand of racist blindness implies that it is in the essential nature of the Vietnamese to 
have impoverished inner lives. This means M thinks that everything they do and think is 
different, even when at a superficial level their emotions, thoughts, and reflection look 
the same as they do to her in people of her own kind. Presumably, that was why M at first 
responded as she did, before drawing back - a reaction which would be inconceivable 
both to her and to us if she were confronting instead the emotional expression of a 
nonhuman ape. Gaita puts M’s position like this: 
 
‘They’ can do and feel almost anything we can except not as we do, not as 
deeply as we do. We grieve, but they ‘grieve’, we are joyful, they are 
‘joyful’, we love and they ‘love’, we feel remorse, they feel ‘remorse’ and 
so on. And through this denigration of their inner lives runs a denigration 
of how it is possible for them to think and reflect, because central to our 
conception of the states that compose the inner life is a distinction between 
their real and false semblances. We distinguish real love from infatuation, 
real grief from maudlin self-indulgence, and that we do so is fundamental 
to our sense of the kinds of states they are – to their very existence. The 
inner lives of blacks and Asians are placed in inverted commas by white 
racists because they cannot believe there could be any depth in them.51      
  
                                                 
51 A Common Humanity, p.63. 
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From M’s point of view, the Vietnamese can have powerful emotions and responses but 
they are not able to be incisively moved by anything. They have no access to the terms of 
appraisal which we use to ascertain when we are moved in a fitting and proper way. They 
are incapable of saying with a certain meaning that they have misjudged something as 
perceptive that is really romantic or pompous. For M, this kind of human has no ear for 
tone, timbre, or well-pitched expressions, and is necessarily oblivious to ideas that can 
“ring true” when articulated in certain ways. She could not see any point in ever asking 
one of “them” for serious counsel, or in giving it to them. While she can talk, laugh, and 
perhaps even cry with them, M cannot view them as participants in a domain where 
significances can be discussed; she cannot view them as individuals who can ever be 
genuinely insightful about things that really matter.  
 
Therefore, as Gaita says, she does not think that they are shallow.52 As natural as that 
thought is, it could make no sense to her to say that they are frivolous. To be shallow or 
frivolous; to have a chance of being worth listening to when certain questions arise; to be 
someone with whom one might share valuable intimacies; to be a person you might talk 
to at the risk of appearing superficial – to be all such things implies that M finds it 
conceivable that they can use a range of expressive responses that make a person serious 
and thoughtful, or superficial and dull, about matters of significance. 
 
What this means is that M could not think that the limitations in the inner lives of 
Vietnamese people are a tragic misfortune or a cause for pity. In her eyes, they have lost 
nothing; in her eyes, this is just how they are and how all of them are born. Necessarily, 
she would see no point at all in discussing Moby Dick with them, as the two friends did 
when they treated one another as potentially (which is a condition of them being let 
down) clear-headed and serious conversational partners from whom they could learn by 
being moved. We can have no such discussions with “them”, M would think, because 
these others essentially lack a unique perspective on the world, of a kind that requires the 
possibility of certain forms of expressive and critical response.          
 
                                                 
52 A Common Humanity, p59. 
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Gaita asks how it is that M sees the Vietnamese as different and answers that her essential 
mistake in understanding is not an empirical one caused by faulty observation, 
information, or generalization. Furthermore, hers is not the logical mistake of failing to 
apply psychological predicates consistently from case to case; nor is her mistake a 
straightforward psychologically motivated one, even though it might have psychological 
causes. In Gaita’s opinion, most people assume that racism of this kind involves powerful 
emotions that distort or disable rational thought. Singer, for example, does not so much 
think that racists have made a mistake about the nature of blacks (or Vietnamese), as that 
they are psychologically unable or unwilling to apply moral principles consistently to 
what is obviously true – that blacks have for all intents and purposes the same interests 
and inner lives as whites do. It is hardly likely that he would present racists with the sort 
of empirical-philosophical argument that he presents “speciesists” with in Animal 
Liberation – showing that blacks are sentient - in the course of his argument for the equal 
consideration of interests. Instead, what he aims to do is show that the racist mistake is 
essentially a mistake of rational thought.  
 
The essential nature of M’s failure to understand, Gaita argues, is that she finds it 
unintelligible53 that the Vietnamese could express any lucidity or depth of understanding 
in their thoughts, their actions, and their lives. She is incapable of perceiving the fullness 
of their behavior. She gives their behavior the wrong complexion. The sense of her 
finding it “unintelligible” must be distinguished from the sense in which it is 
unintelligible that rocks feel pain or that Clever Hans horses can do advanced 
mathematics. As we shall see, the type of unintelligibility that applies to M’s thought has 
to do with her finding it impossible or senseless that the Vietnamese could be thoughtful 
and expressive as we are about meaning and the concepts that define meaning’s realm.  
 
The lives of the Vietnamese have a kind of meaning, M thinks, but not the kind of 
meaning that is associated with the tragedy and comedy we find in our lives. They can 
possess understanding, but not the ever-deepening sort. Her sense of all this being 
impossible in the lives of these other humans is of a conceptual kind, but it is the kind of 
                                                 
53 Good and Evil, p.334. 
 239
unintelligibility that can only be grasped by someone who has an implicit sense of what 
goes on in the “realm of meaning”. It is not, therefore, any kind of “rational” error.  For 
M, the sense in which the Vietnamese could not unintelligibly have her kind of 
understanding occurs only inside the realm of meaning. It is the same sense in which we 
would find it unintelligible that a “face that looked like the Black and White Minstrel 
Show’s caricature of an Afro-American face could express the magnificence and misery 
of Othello”54. Gaita summarizes the situation of the Vietnamese, as they appear to M, by 
saying that for her they exist in a very different “conceptual space”55 in which some 
things are not seen as possibilities. However smart they may be, whatever the complexity 
of their inner lives of reflection and emotion, they move only in tone-free, style-free 
zones. They are, then, necessarily on the outside of a certain community of thought, 
discussion, and interaction.    
 
Commenting upon a thought of Stanley Cavell’s, Gaita argues that this kind of racist 
would not say that blacks or Asians are not human beings56. A slave owner, too, could 
consider his slave to be a human being and not just in a narrow biological sense – say, in 
the meaning scientists give to homo sapiens.  As in the case of M, the slave owner does 
not deny that the slave has sophisticated emotions, or that she can reflect on and shape 
her life and projects, or that she can have conversations in a human language, or that she 
can have certain strong and complex relationships. Because she can talk and argue and 
take up an attitude to various things she can, the slave owner thinks, “mean” things when 
she says them. In this sense, her life can have “meaning”. Yet her life, from his point of 
view, cannot have the other kind of meaning that Rush Rhees identified and which Gaita 
has explored at length – the kind of meaning that arises from a responsiveness to life that 
is disciplined by range of critical concepts like sentimentality.  
 
At best, then, the slave’s life has for this kind of slave-owner an “attenuated meaning”, 
and she is naturally thought by people who think like this as not quite human, or less than 
                                                 
54 Good and Evil, p.334. 
55 Good and Evil, p.341. 
56 Good and Evil, p.158. 
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fully human57. Both the slave owner and M, in Gaita’s words, suffer from “meaning-
blindness”58. And while it is true that we can all ignore or suppress the fact that others by 
nature have full access to a life of disciplined responsiveness, M and the slave-owner 
have forgotten nothing, for the obvious reason that they never could see some races of 
human beings as possessing such a life in the first place.   
 
Philosophers often do not recognize the fundamental importance of Rhees’ distinction 
between “meaning” and meaning – that is, meaning in the reduced or attenuated sense 
and meaning in the richer, full-blown, absolutely mature sense. Nor do they adequately 
distinguish, as Gaita says, between rationality on the one side and lucidity on the other. 
Kant is one of his key examples. But even when a more humanly engaged form of 
understanding is centre stage, as it is in virtue theory, there may be a failure to bring out 
adequately the meaning of what Hursthouse referred to as the sort of “maturity” or 
“wisdom” which is only acquired in the major phase of a life.  
Consider, in this respect, what MacIntyre says about the requirements of independent 
practical reason. To have this ability, he argues, we need to possess desires and 
directedness to the good, and be capable of “reasoning together with others” 59and being 
put to the question. Each individual, Macintyre says, 
 
has a history that is peculiarly her or his own and to invite an individual to 
make her or himself intelligible to us, perhaps as a preliminary to 
justifying her or his actions, is to invite that individual to tell us as much 
of that history as is needed.60  
 
And, again, he says: 
 
It is by having our reasoning put to the question by others, by being called 
to account for ourselves and our actions by others, that we learn how to 
                                                 
57 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.174. 
58 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.174. 
59 A. MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues (London: Duckworth, 
1999), p.107. 
60 Dependent Rational Animals, p.149. 
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scrutinize ourselves as they scrutinize us and how to understand ourselves 
as they understand us. When others put us to the question and call us to 
account… [they] invite us to make ourselves intelligible to them… [and] 
intelligible to ourselves.61 
 
What is it, in MacIntyre’s view, to be put to the question and to meet the questioner by 
making ourselves intelligible to them? Well, in contrast to animals, the developing human 
child “moves beyond its initial animal state of having reasons for acting in this way 
rather than that towards its specifically human state of being able to evaluate those 
reasons, to revise them or to abandon them and replace them with others”62. When we 
have this kind of rationality, in combination with the directedness that comes from being 
an affective animal, we exhibit our “individuality”63. 
 
From Gaita’s perspective, MacIntyre points to a significant part of the difference between 
human and animal behavior, but even so, he does not show just how great that difference 
is. For example, it is not just that animals are distinguished from mature human beings by 
lacking (amongst other abilities) an “ability to evaluate, modify, or reject our own 
practical judgments, to ask, that is, whether what we take to be good reasons for action 
really are significantly good reasons”64. That sort of ability certainly does distinguish 
human beings from all nonhuman animals, but it does not distinguish human beings in 
the eyes of the racist – those that he sees as less than fully human or not human like us - 
from human beings of his own kind. What distinguishes the two kinds of human being is 
something which, as we saw, transforms Macintyre’s sort of reflective thought and 
action. Even if the slave-owner thought of the life-story of a black person as constituting 
a biography, insofar as the black person could give an account of herself and make her 
life and experiences intelligible, it would not be for him the sort of biography which 
revealed a distinctive character and view of life which is available to whites. Only the 
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possession of an ever-deepening and individuating responsiveness, according to Gaita, is 
connected with the recognition of individuals as unique and irreplaceable. 
 
However, that is not all there is to the concept of being “unique and irreplaceable” on 
Gaita’s view. The way that M responds to the behavior and inner lives of the Vietnamese 
has further consequences for her view of their individuality. For a start, because (she 
believes) they cannot think about the deeper meanings of life, they necessarily lack an 
understanding of the essential content of the realm of meaning as we ordinarily perceive 
it. For example, humans who by constitution cannot be seriously thoughtful or sober, 
cannot grieve and love their children as irreplaceable. They cannot, as M can, be moved 
by the ethical necessity – where this sense of necessity is not merely a refusal or a moral 
sense of duty - of not replacing their children.  
 
That is, M believes that the Vietnamese are unable to say, “I cannot and will not” replace 
my children with others with the same meaning as we can. And they cannot (to her way 
of thinking) be critically moved by the idea of withholding names from them, even 
though they do of course give their children names, and even though they consider 
naming an “important” activity associated with much feeling and discussion. What they 
cannot do is understand what it really means to give children names and not replace them 
with other children.   
 
But also, although she regards herself as different in kind from them, someone like M 
cannot think it possible for her or any other person like her to grieve for, or love, the 
Vietnamese in certain ways. They cannot haunt her or fill her with joy as someone who 
can be a unique perspective on the world could haunt or delight her. When she uses their 
names or asks them “who” they are, she does not do so with the same expectation of 
response and engagement. Thus she cannot regard them as being unique and irreplaceable 
in the way she thinks that white people are.  
 
Gaita thinks of this as the attachment-based element of individuality. He thinks it shows 
in the powerful and ungrounded need we have for each other; but in this case, it is a need 
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that is informed by our understanding of the way that others can cohabit the same space 
of dialogue. They are “one of us” to the extent we can recognize that they may be needed 
by others and responded to in myriad ways, but always as others who have in common 
the kind of a life in which a an unreservedly thoughtful understanding can be sought and 
shared. They belong with us, we think, in a kind of community of equals or fellows.         
 
Some people will think that this kind of inner life is a colorful projection of our attitudes 
onto the objective reality of human capacities and features. The sense of “objective” that 
applies here is Williams’ “convergent” or “vindicatory” sense that might in principle see 
all normal human beings agreeing on what is the case with respect to the reality of 
behavior, whatever their personalities or cultural backgrounds. However, the point of 
view we are pursuing claims that the reality of others, the kind of individuals they really 
are, has two distinct senses.  
 
One sense is the previous one in which we non-inferentially identify “objective” but 
expressive properties and capacities. These might include conscious states, rationality, 
personhood, and practical reasoning. The other, is the sense in which these expressive 
features are completely changed by the critical make-up of our responses. When this 
happens, because of how it happens, the “objective” behavior does not provide “grounds” 
for a different perception of individuals. Rather, such expressive behavior is a part of this 
new perception, and therefore it is a conceptual aspect of the notion(s) of individuality. 
The way we understand behavior in each sense, on this view, is connected to the earlier 
discussion of Wittgenstein’s remark about an attitude to a soul, and to the associated 
interdependence of object and response in concept formation. To explain this, and its 
implications for animality or creatureliness, we will need to continue with Gaita’s 
development of this theme. 
 
Gaita quotes Winch quoting Simone Weil: 
 
The human beings around us exert just by their presence a power which 
belongs uniquely to themselves to stop, to diminish or modify each 
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movement which our bodies design. A person who crosses our path does 
not turn aside our steps in the same manner as a street sign, no one stands 
up, or moves about, or sits down again in quite the same fashion when he 
is alone in a room as when he has a visitor.65   
 
Weil also provides a contrary image in the form of Achilles pushing away Priam as if an 
“inert object were there touching his knee”66. After citing these examples, Gaita argues 
that Weil has not illustrated what she thought she was illustrating, but rather something 
else. What she does illustrate very well, he thinks, is the kind of attitude towards a soul 
that is a part of the concept of human subjectivity and the understanding of it, because 
such attitudes are forms and conditions of recognition.  
 
The outcome of this picture is one way in which human beings can be present to us – a 
way that through a kind of intersubjectivity distinguishes them from inert objects, of 
course, but also from bats and whales and other creatures with different forms of 
subjectivity. We do not generally respond to an animal that enters the room as we do a 
human being. But neither would we respond in the same way to an animal as to a human 
which we regarded as less than completely human. These represent different forms of 
intersubjective understanding. 
 
There are many ways in which we would respond (built up from an indefinite array of 
cultural and natural elements bound together) to the less than fully individual human 
being as different from a nonhuman animal, even a sophisticated animal like a 
chimpanzee. These responses are conceptually connected with what we take the other – 
in this case a less-than-fully-individual-human other - to be like.  
 
For example, these responses are the conditions of thinking it intelligible to ask the less 
than fully individual human beings whether they have made plans for their children after 
they die, or to feel that they have been trying to humiliate us, or to try to clarify what they 
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meant by a comment they made, or to explain to them a personal anecdote or joke or 
children’s song, and so on. This could be one of the forms in which a sense of their 
“present-ness”, or their “otherness” would take, and it is inseparable from the input of an 
“attitude towards a soul” in the sense that pertains to the Simone Weil quotation. It might 
be similar to the way we react, without active reflection, to children who have mastered a 
good deal of language - we do not respond them as we do to children who are acquiring 
maturity as they move towards life’s “major stage”. 
 
What Weil has not shown here, Gaita argues, is the sort of attitude to a soul that gives rise 
to concepts, and to understanding, in a richer sense. This is a kind of attitude to others 
that gives the meaning of “soul” a very different intonation. When we respond in this 
second way to human beings, the discussion continues, we discover a striking way in 
which they can be present to us. This is the way in which the two friends who were 
discussing questions of meaning responded to one another as community members of a 
shared “space of possibilities”67. In that zone, the participants responded to one another 
as individuals who can not only make themselves intelligible to one another, or can 
clarify their meaning and ask for clarification, or can put others to the question and be put 
to the question themselves (as MacIntyre puts it) - in the way that this could happen 
between the kindly slave owner and his slave. More than this, it is the kind of shared, 
interactive space in which individuals can appeal to one another in a certain spirit, with 
words like, “Be serious, this is important”, “Can’t you see how this really matters?”, 
“You can do better than that – don’t be so shallow”, and so on. 
 
Gaita quotes Wiggins’s reference to the “alterity, the otherness of the subjectivity of 
others”68. An example used by Diamond and Gaita of a kind of gestalt shift in perception 
is an essay by George Orwell, in which Orwell reported being unable to “shoot an enemy 
soldier who was running holding up his trousers”69. The changed apprehension, which 
had been forgotten or blacked out by the circumstances, was registered in the switch from 
seeing the soldier as a thing to be shot at, to seeing that “he is visibly a fellow creature, 
                                                 
67 A Common Humanity, p.59. 
68 Good and Evil, p.171.  
69 A Common Humanity, p.48. 
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similar to yourself”70, and to be moved by a sense of moral necessity in which one 
cannot, will not shoot.  
 
This is the same capacity of meaningful response, perhaps, which the Captain of the 
Rachel, whose son was lost at sea, appealed to in Ahab, without success; but in this case, 
the recognition of the onlookers that Ahab is in the same domain of life and 
understanding, came out in the despair and incredulity they felt towards Ahab’s refusal to 
be touched by another person’s humanity. They either knew (as Starbuck did) that Ahab 
had this active capacity – had in fact a vivid and impressive awareness of life’s terrors – 
or else they saw him as someone who could be deeply touched by a father’s desperate 
love and a son’s mortal peril.  
 
Another form of recognition is the sense of mystery we can experience at certain points 
in human life, perhaps most especially at human birth and death. This is a sense of 
irreducible mystery, perhaps bafflement, that does not demand an answer or a resolution 
because, rather than being an empirical or metaphysical response, it has a different 
structure and import. What it identifies is the emergence or departure of a fellow creature 
which can be seen as sharing with us a certain form of life through its own unique view 
of the world. 
 
David Malouf’s novel, An Imaginary Life, provides an illustration of how basic and 
arresting this response of ours to the reality of another’s presence or, to the nature of their 
alterity, can be. The poet Ovid has been exiled from Roman civilization to a wild, harsh 
land inhabited by a primitive tribe. These uncivilized people are pre-occupied with 
survival and engage in very little art or play, lacking the freedom to transcend the laws of 
necessity and enter a new world of richer possibilities.71 But their limited though 
recognizably human lives are nothing like the life of the wild thing the poet encounters. 
                                                 
70 A Common Humanity, p.48. 
 
71 D. Malouf, An Imaginary Life (London: Chatto and Windus, 1978), p.67. 
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The Child, as Ovid calls him, has been raised by animals, probably wolves that “must 
have something in their nature which is kindly, and which connects with our kind”72.  
 
When Ovid encounters him, the Child appears to be a creature that is not like other 
human children and yet is uncannily like them. What is it? For it seems to be human and 
animal at the same time. Perhaps because of this, the tribe is frightened of him, and 
violently so; partly for the same reason, Ovid is fascinated and protective of the creature, 
whatever it is. Ovid reports on his encounter shortly after the Child is caught: 
  
I untie his hands and leave the bowl, listening at the door for him to drag 
himself over the rushes and sup it up, snuffling like an animal in his 
hunger. He whimpers but does not cry. His eyes remain dry and nothing 
like a human sobbing ever comes from him, none of that giving of oneself 
over to tears that might release the child in him…To comfort himself, 
quite shamelessly, as some children suck their thumb, he excites himself 
with his hand to a series of little shudders, as I have seen monkeys do.73 
 
At first, Ovid says, 
 
We spend hours simply staring at one another. And I have no idea what 
feelings might be at work in him. He shows no sign of interest in anything 
I do…He stares but does not see.74 
 
The wolf-boy is an enigma:  
 
What is his country? What is his parentage? At what moment did he push 
out into the world, under what star sign, with what planet in the ascendant, 
                                                 
72 An Imaginary Life, p.10. 
73 An Imaginary Life, p.73. 
74 An Imaginary Life, p.74. 
 248
in what ephemeris of the moon? And if he doesn’t know these things can 
he ever know who he is or what his fate in to be?75  
 
Although the creature has a human form, his unknown origin and nature defeats Ovid’s 
ability to determine the kind to which he belongs. For present purposes, it is important to 
see that the poet is not asking himself biological or taxonomical questions, or merely 
seeking to discover in the creature capacities for this or for that. If that were so, Ovid 
might wish he had some training in the natural science of the day. But he does not wish 
for expertise. Is the Child, he needs to know, a developing child on its way to full human 
maturity, or is he less-than-fully human?  
 
Ovid asks these questions in a non-empirical spirit, and the uncertainty of his own 
responses is connected with his perplexity. It deeply troubles him. As he says: “I must 
know that he can dream. I must assure myself that he can smile, that he can weep”76. 
Ovid then undertakes the task of finding out what sort of creature this is, not in a 
straightforward empirical way, but by seeing if it is possible to  
 
reveal to him what our kindness is, what our kind is; and then to convince 
him that we belong to the same kind. It is out of this that he must discover 
what he is.77  
 
Ovid wants to know what space or community of possibilities this creature – who seems 
healthy enough – moves in.   
 
Eventually (if unstably), Ovid is struck by the boy’s emergent humanity: 
 
I am aware of a separate centre of energy in the room that disturbs my 
thoughts, that sets up eddies that beat like waves of light towards me and 
break against the edge of my consciousness. The room, I know, is filled 
                                                 
75 An Imaginary Life, p.89 
76 An Imaginary Life, p.74 
77 An Imaginary Life, p.77. 
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with emotions that are not mine only, thoughts, not mine, that leap into the 
still damp atmosphere of a late morning where I sit scribbling and the boy, 
taut as a spring, watches out of his corner – the beginnings of a 
restlessness of mind, of body, that is the stirring in him of renewed life.78       
  
Franz Kafka provides an even more bizarre example of a switching, shocking awareness 
of alterity. Its strangeness may be instructive in more ways than one. Like the example 
from David Malouf, Kafka suggests how patterns of attitude and response to another can 
make them present or real to us in different manners. Kafka’s odd short story strains 
credulity by presenting us with a nonhuman body which has remarkable expressive 
powers. In Kafka’s A Report to an Academy, Red Peter learns to speak and behave just 
like a normal human being in order, he tells us, to obtain a kind of freedom, albeit one 
that seriously changes his nature. When he reports to the Academy he shows an 
awareness of the conceptual impossibility of his task: to convey to the audience what it is 
like to be an ape - but in words, and from a critical perspective, that has a meaning which 
necessarily alters the nature of that animality. Indeed, Red Peter speaks, perhaps, with the 
subtle irony and knowingness of a person who could explore ad infinitum the meaning of 
the injustice perpetrated against him, the nature of his present and former animal selves, 
and so on.    
 
At first, the men on the ship who have captured him treat him as people treat animals. 
They do not just treat him badly; they respond to him as a creature, an intelligent one, of 
a different kind. He does not have for them a human presence. Indeed, he lacks a less 
than fully human presence, the kind that M perceived in the Vietnamese. Kafka then 
conveys the astonishing change in the ape’s otherness when from the cramped cage, and 
having drunk schnapps like a performing animal, Red Peter says of himself – he narrates 
his own tale – that he  
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threw the bottle away, not this time in despair but as an artistic performer; 
forgot, indeed, to rub my belly; but instead of that, because I could not 
help it, because my senses were reeling, called a brief and unmistakable 
‘Hallo!’ breaking into human speech, and with this outburst broke into the 
human community, and felt its echo; ‘Listen, he’s talking!’ like a caress 
over the whole of my sweat-drenched body.79     
 
While Kafka expresses, in this gestalt shift, something of the idea of the kind of creature 
that is “one of us”, as that perception is conceptually mediated through our responses, he 
raises in effect the question of the body’s role in this perception. The “body’s part in the 
constitution of our concepts and…what we have made of the body in the realm of 
meaning” 80 is of course one of Gaita’s themes. Gaita thinks that our expressiveness, 
which is linked to our creatureliness, is thoroughly informed by what we can make of it 
in the realm of meaning. Our sense of the body, of course, is interdependent with our 
responses to it, but not our responses to something that is inaccessible and can only be 
speculated about or passively inferred. He thinks, as we saw, that everything important is 
“on” the body’s surface, and that it is through a  
 
kind of naturalism of the surfaces deepened by literature that we explore 
our creaturely nature. We make something deep of the surfaces.81  
 
But just as our responses are involved in the conceptual construction of our sense of 
difference and kind, so too does the body place limits on the possibilities of 
intersubjective otherness. We have seen this already in the example of thinking it 
unintelligible that certain faces, like caricatures of black faces, could have any expressive 
depth. But that means it is not intelligible that a chimpanzee, with a chimpanzee body and 
face, could express the depth of understanding that Red Peter has of himself and of life – 
of the fact, for example, that he is, albeit a bizarre, outsider, a fellow in a common 
                                                 
79 F .Kafka, The Complete Stories (Nahum Glatzer, ed.), (London: Vintage Books, 2005), p.257. 
80 The Philosopher’s Dog, pp.190-191. 
81 The Philosopher’s Dog, pp.200-201. 
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domain of thought. The same goes a fortiori for a mouse or a machine82, neither of which 
can be full-blown subjects of a biography or called to seriousness.            
 
If it were possible to treat Red Peter as one of “our kind”, we would necessarily not treat 
him as a super-intelligent member of the same “kind” as other chimpanzees. That does 
not imply that he must be reclassified from pan troglodytes to homo sapiens. In Kafka’s 
story, Red Peter is provided with a “half-trained little chimpanzee” and he takes “comfort 
from her as apes do”83 . We can glimpse why this is bestiality – and rather more like 
Diamond’s earlier mention of chacun a son gout with gorillas – without, in Red Peter’s 
case, necessarily thinking that it occurs between different species.  
 
But we would not respond to Red Peter in the way that James Rachels implies - that is, as 
to an “unusually gifted chimpanzee”84. Rather, our usual conception of this ape would be 
turned upside down should he express a “desire to attend university classes”85, and our 
relation would be altered in as many ways as we can respond to what he now says and 
does. The indefinitely many ways our attitude to him could change would give rise to a 
different sense of his otherness – a sense which is formed from those attitudes - and a 
totally changed perception of what and who he is. That can be registered in the way we 
use and respond to his name, and feel the need to give him one that is suitable. The 
meaning of his sister’s name, Red Sally, the “dumb Red Sally”86  as Costello says, who 
was shot in Africa, is quite different.    
 
Gaita believes that  
 
we cannot – necessarily cannot – tell in advance all that will count as 
looking and behaving like us. We have to see how we respond.87  
 
                                                 
82 A Common Humanity, p.271. 
83 The Complete Stories, p.259. 
84 Created from animals, p.187 
85 Created from animals, p.187. 
86 J. M Coetzee, Elizabeth Costello:  Eight Lessons (2nd ed.), (Melbourne: Knopf, 2003), p.69. 
87 A Common Humanity, p.269. 
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What he says implies we have to have a certain type of experience, interaction, or 
engagement with others and their creatureliness in order to be able to describe (not: 
“ascribe” things to) them. This is what Ovid experienced when he began to investigate 
face to face whether or not the Child was one of his own kind or other than that kind, by 
seeing if he could begin to laugh and weep and mature just as we do. It also means we 
cannot be sure whether aliens, like the teacher from Mars, are “one of us”, creatures who 
respond as we do, or whether they simply have highly sophisticated intelligences and 
emotions. We cannot be sure how many legs or how much “villosity of skin” will bear 
the conceptual weight we may try to place on them.  
 
There are additional limits on what can count as “one of us” that relate to the content of 
the realm of meaning. The reason for this is that the matters we find serious in life are 
significantly tied to elements of the human condition, like our mortality and vulnerability. 
It would be impossible to think of these things as we do if, rather than being frail and 
short-lived animals, we typically lived comfortably for millions of years. And, as Gaita 
argues, our understanding of, say, sexuality and love must be able to be expressed in 
certain ways for it to count as understanding. For example, the expression of love in the 
realm of meaning requires tender caresses88, and that requires that we have “surfaces” 
and the instinctive reactions with which to express and receive such love and affection. 
 
Our animality or creatureliness, characterized by our participation in the realm of 
meaning and giving rise to a singular form of individuality, is on Gaita’s account the 
condition of its attachment-based component. Only by possessing a certain kind of body, 
it can be argued, is it possible to express the extraordinary need we have for other 
individuals; and it is a further condition of this expression that we can express it toward 
bodies that can acknowledge and return our neediness and emotional connection. No 
doubt, these relations are characterized by potential bodily responses to other bodies 
which can occur in countless ways, such as: the tender love, joyousness, and pity of a 
                                                 
88 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.199. 
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woman for a newborn or unborn child 89; the shocked compassion people have for parents 
with visibly aging hands and faces; the confusion and horror felt in the presence of 
human corpses and violence inflicted on human bodies; the pleasure of sharing a meal, 
laughter, or a joke; the bodily expressions of grief, commiseration, jealousy; and so on. 
As always, our judgment that these possibilities of need and attachment are rightly 
defining features of a conception of “one of us” and of “us and them” - of our distinctive 
individuality - will wait on our critical responses, created by cultural forms and the 
perspicuous judgment of others, and, at the same time, on the discriminating separation of 
sentimental relations from worthy and valuable ones.    
 
One of the fundamental points made by Diamond in “Eating Meat and Eating People” is 
that the character of morality is determined thoroughly by its “sources” and by what lies 
in the background. In particular, the seriousness of its character is related to how we 
speak about the kind of thing a creature is, and principally to what counts as “one of us”. 
We have been looking in this chapter at some of the ways in which certain beings are 
“unique and irreplaceable”. Gaita’s view is that this conception fundamentally informs 
morality, without grounding it. 
 
In other words, we must see individuals in a certain light if we are to recognize the evil of 
wronging them, or if we are to appreciate the way remorse alters our understanding of 
murder. To appreciate the dimensions of these aspects of morality, we need not only to 
see other people as unique perspectives on the world, but connected with that, to see them 
as appropriate objects of certain ungrounded and strong relations and responses (naming, 
not eating, loving, grieving) which humans have as the unusual animals that they are and 
which no-one can imagine rejecting. This helps explain and inform our feeling of 
morality’s seriousness, and our belief that it is more than just an activity for rational 
primates seeking fulfillment.              
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For morality, if Gaita is right, is not only informed by this highly complex notion of 
individuality, it is also vital in further deepening our conception of individuals as unique 
and irreplaceable, or indeed - in a way only possible through moral response - as 
unconditionally precious. This is the kind of otherness and preciousness that is illustrated 
by the Samaritan’s compassionate sense of his neighbor.   
 
Gaita’s further point is that many moral philosophies covertly rely upon this notion of 
individuality. For example, the way MacIntyre and Hursthouse describe individuality has 
much of its force only if a great deal is taken for granted, such as what we are doing when 
we educate children into a mature and “individuated responsiveness”. We may read and 
rely upon this background without knowing it. Philosophy which does not allow for it 
may then be exposed to Gaita’s form of parody, which itself relies upon a tacit appeal to 
the common and often unnoticed acceptance of the “sources of morality”: 
 
‘My God what have I done? I have violated the social compact, agreed 
behind a veil of ignorance.’ ‘My God what have I done? I have violated 
rational nature in another.’ ‘My God what have I done? I have diminished 
the stock of happiness.’90    
 
The lampoon is not circumvented by language such as “receptacle of value”, “subject of a 
life”, and “creature with complex capacities”. Even the more complex sense of 
“individual” possessed by meaning-ignorant philosophies, while not necessarily worthy 
of the kind of send-up found in Tristram Shandy, will not escape parody designed to 
bring out the full seriousness of our sense of other human beings. 
 
Stanley Cavell, as Gaita notes, referred to the slave owner’s sort of meaning-blindness as 
soul-blindness91 because the slave owner could not treat his slave on equal terms as a 
fellow creature or human being, even if she was treated as a human being and not an 
animal. That is, the slave owner could not see that the slave has full and equal 
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individuality. The meaning of “soul” in this context is not empirically or metaphysically 
based; the word also has a resonance that captures what human beings have and animals 
lack, namely, the sort of individuality that allows us to say “a man loses half his soul the 
day he becomes a slave”92.  
 
Gaita’s philosophical approach is connected with an understanding of the individual not 
widely shared in animal ethics. In order to further flesh out this difference, we can review 
some common objections in the light of this alternative approach as it has been presented 
above.  
 
The Diamond/Gaita approach denies that the category of species per se is part of our 
conception of individuality. Suppose, then, the objection to speciesism is amended so that 
instead of targeting homo sapiens it asserts the moral irrelevance of “bodies of a certain 
type”. That amended criticism would then point to the arbitrariness of having a certain 
sort of animal body and creaturely behavior within a vague range (which might or might 
not include Red Peter and the teacher from Mars). But the problem with this amended 
objection is that it still assumes that certain bodies and expressive capacities, conceived 
in a way all rational people can understand, are “grounds” for ethical conclusions. For the 
importance of these bodies and their expressiveness/creatureliness can only be 
determined in the realm of meaning. Indeed, that mode of understanding can greatly 
change our sense of the reality of those creaturely bodies and what they are capable of.        
 
Imagine next an amended version of what Richard Arneson has called the “Singer 
Problem”93. This amended version has two parts. The first, a version of the argument 
from marginal cases, claims that it is both obvious, and problematic for Gaita’s approach, 
that some human beings have not acquired, or will not acquire (e.g. due to brain damage), 
the capacity for lucidity, and are in no way unique perspectives on the world. In that way, 
they are like animals. It may also appear to some, like Tom Regan, that Gaita’s approach 
is an objectionable form of perfectionism.  
                                                 
92 A Common Humanity, p238. 
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The second part of this version of the Singer Problem is that there are obviously people 
who have attained very different degrees of lucidity and wisdom. Some are simply 
shallow, some are virtuous peasants, and some are reflectively wise and innovative. Some 
are like Eichmann, some like Socrates or Jesus, and most are in between. Given the 
emphasis on being a unique perspective on the world, aren’t we compelled to recognize 
differential tiers of moral value or individuality? So, Gaita’s view appears to encourage 
elitism.    
 
Martha Nussbaum argues in Frontiers of Justice that there is a big difference between 
retarded human beings and normal chimpanzees at similar mental levels94. She says that 
in the case of the former, but not the latter, we can recognize that certain kinds of activity 
and flourishing have been lost due to misfortune. There are “species norms of 
flourishing”95. That shows in the different attitude we have to retarded human beings 
when they, say, smile or react to music; and also in our inclination to try to get them to 
engage, as far as they can, in characteristic human activities. Retarded humans are 
unfortunate, normal chimpanzees are not.  
 
Nussbaum is right to say that retarded humans are “not a lower kind that we set off from 
the human kind”96. But the important thing is to correctly describe the way in which the 
retarded are “one of us” and not of a different or “lower” kind. It is not primarily that 
there are different species norms of flourishing defined in part by ethical evaluation. 
 
Here, there seems to be a kind of attitude toward souls that marks a sense of “the 
difference”. For example, our responses of shock and dismay at the relative 
inexpressiveness on the faces of the severely retarded, and also our joy when they do 
something recognizably “human” (as in the Ovid example), may be seen as forms of 
recognition of beings that may possess a certain kind of inner life. Clearly, there are 
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Harvard university Press, 2007), p.192. 
95 Frontiers of Justice, p.163. 
96 Frontiers of Justice, p.191. 
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certain biological/animal conditions of responses like this, such as having a certain kind 
of body and being born of human parents. (Ovid is unsure of the wild child’s parentage 
and that is part of his confusion.) 
 
But once again, these are responses which are made in a particular way to particular 
creatures – we have here responses that help determine the nature of a sort of inner life 
and, interdependently with that, responses to the indefinite and important ways we may 
relate to, and have need of, others. When such responses help determine the intelligible 
possessors of a rich inner life, even if contingently they have not attained it or cannot 
attain it, and when they are the intelligible recipients of the associated needs and 
attachments that are an essential part of a conception of individuality – then we are 
responding to them as beings who are unique and irreplaceable. Whatever their level of 
development, therefore, they are “one of us”. 
 
This understanding of what the severely retarded essentially are is not in any way 
grounded in our sense of mature human beings who possess an ever-deepening 
responsiveness or in their presentness. On the contrary, that understanding is already 
there in our responses to certain creatures but not others – for example, in our critical 
responses to the retarded human versus the equally intelligent chimpanzee “inmates” in 
Singer’s Dutch institution. In a more imaginative setting, that understanding is also 
evident in Ovid’s confusion about the nature of the Child; it is there again (in a way) in 
Kafka’s puzzlingly “human” chimpanzee.  
 
Our reactions to real and imaginary case are connected with the way we recognize the 
nature of creatureliness and bodily expressiveness – a recognition that is not grounded or 
inferred, but is conceptually built up in the realm of meaning from the mass of 
background responses to certain kinds of bodily forms.  
 
James Rachels argues that the right way to see other individuals is described by ethical or 
moral “individualism”. This view, influenced by modern science, Darwinism, and a 
strand of Enlightenment reason, recommends that we turn upside down our understanding 
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of the earth’s individuals, so that we begin to see them atomically - according to the 
“individual characteristics of organisms”97 - not our sense of the kinds to which they 
belong. Yet the way we describe individuals in the fullest possible manner, shows why 
this will not result in the most serious understanding of their reality. 
 
Bernard Williams argues the only question there is for us about other animals is how 
those animals should be treated: 
 
This is not true of our relations to other human beings, and this already 
shows that we are not dealing with a prejudice like racism or sexism. 
Some white male who thinks that the only question about the relations 
between ‘us’, as he puts it, and other human beings such as women or 
people of color is how ‘we’ should treat ‘them’ is already prejudiced, but 
in the case of other animals that is the only question there could be.98   
 
Something in this is surely right. On the other hand, it needs to be stressed that how we 
are to treat others may depend crucially on what we are to make of “them”. Our sense of 
how we should treat “them” may well be, as in the human case, interdependent with some 
more basic critical responses, such as those discussed in the last chapter.  
 
Cora Diamond argues that we “cannot point and say, ‘This thing (whatever concepts it 
may fall under) is at any rate capable of suffering, so we ought not to make it suffer’” 99. 
We have made more of animal life, she argues, than rules about harming “sentient 
things”: we do not simply think it morally wrong to cause pain to things-capable-of 
suffering; rather, our sense of this moral wrongness emerges from and is characterized by 
other background conditions.  
 
In contrast to Williams, Diamond wants to stress that moral claims about animals only 
make good sense when they are correctly placed in the mass of ways we have of 
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responding and living. For these “sources of morality” help determine, in a way not 
reducible to differences and properties (even while being partly conditioned by them), 
what various creatures “are”. And what animals are for us will be different from what the 
Vietnamese were for M. Additionally, a better understanding of “them”, or of what they 
might be, gives further detail to what “we” are through a contrast in the realm of meaning 
with “them”. For these reasons, we should look further at what we share and what sets us 
apart.      
 
Gaita says that human beings are “individuals in a way that nothing else that we know in 
nature is”100. The most fundamental reason for this is that the lives of animals have no 
meaning.101 What, then, could he mean when he admits that some animal lives have 
attenuated meaning?102 For animal lives do not have meaning in the same way as the 
lives of M’s less-than-fully humans might be said to have attenuated “meaning” - by way 
of their capacity for reflection, rationality, and so on. 
 
However, Gaita does not mean that the sort of individuals which animals essentially are 
can be determined wholly outside the realm of meaning. Gaita’s claim that animal lives 
have an “attenuated meaning” is, perhaps, connected with his other claim that animals do 
“emerge from their species character”, albeit “in only an attenuated way”103. He thinks 
that at least some animals have a kind of individuality that is to some degree like ours.104  
 
This type of animal individuality, he thinks, is also under-determined by species 
characteristics and capacities (even while being importantly and partly formed by them). 
Animal individuality also is not about animal cleverness and “personality”, such as 
people might see in a (real) Clever Hans, a Phar Lap, Tarzan’s chimpanzee, Cheeta, or in 
the ape who delights scientists by learning how to get more termites by modifying the 
tool making process. So what might animal individuality consist in? 
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Any meaning which can be found in animal life is not the sort which is fundamental to 
human individuality. Nevertheless, meaning may emerge from certain response-and-
surface dependent descriptions, which allow animal individuals to begin to emerge from 
their species’ characters. Something like this can be seen in the examples from Rhees, 
Coetzee, Melville and others. 
 
Neither science nor traditional philosophy is the right mode of thought for such critical 
reflection. Both necessarily miss much of what may be most serious about “them”, and 
our relations with them. They cannot tell us whether humans are simply more intelligent 
animals or whether there is an “abyssal distinction between human and nonhuman 
animals”105. Nor can they illuminate, in Mulhall’s words, our “uncanny intimacy” and 
fellowship with them.106 
 
Recognizing the expressiveness and creaturely potential of animals requires an 
“imaginatively rich sense of the surface”107, and it is only out of recognitions and 
relations such as these that a substantial and irreducible conception of their individuality 
could come into view. Or perhaps it is better to say “conceptions” – first, because there 
are many different animals, even amongst the higher animals; and second, because there 
are no prescriptive rational limits on what we may make of the different “species”, or 
better, of the different sorts of creatures - which does not mean there are no rational or 
factual limits at all, for there are many. 
 
Reason has been given for thinking that serious reflection about meaning and value must 
be human-centered in a non-pejorative sense. And a reason has also been suggested for 
saying that our reflection about animal life must be in a sense anthropomorphic, again in 
a non-pejorative way. But this is a special sense of “anthropomorphic” – not the familiar, 
crude one that rests on illegitimate assimilation of animal to human life - which is needed 
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precisely because our thinking well in this area must begin from “us”, in media res, from 
the kind of creatures we are.  
 
The fundamental reason for recognizing a type of thinking which we do as human beings, 
and by reference to human life, is that it makes no sense at all to think well by 
abandoning the sense we make of things as particular animal beings. To abandon this 
position is to lose the very critical concepts we need to distinguish, where questions of 
meaning are concerned, what is real from what only appears to be real. This, in fact, is 
the most important point to agree with in Diamond’s argument: that the theories of Singer 
and Regan, in the way they attack significance in human life108, also attack the only 
means we have of truly understanding nonhuman life. 
 
So there is a case for saying that most of what is important about animals and their 
individuality must be seen in relation to us, and in the light of the special significance and 
nature of human life. “Humor” in animal behavior was a previous example of how this 
might work, but the general idea is more extensive. It applies to the concepts of animal 
dignity and moral behavior, and it runs through Diamond’s and Gaita’s writing on 
animals. Consider Gaita’s claim about “humanizing” his dog Gypsy by educating her into 
being a trustworthy family member109. Practices like naming animals, befriending them, 
and burying them, only make sense against the backdrop of the human practices of 
naming, friendship, and burial. Consider also Diamond’s discussion of seeing certain 
animals as “fellow creatures”110. She reminds us that we sometimes see certain animals, 
not merely in biological terms, or as vermin, or as sources of entertainment but, for 
example, as fellow creatures that have an independent life of their own, and which “may 
be sought as company”111. But whether or not we see them this way depends upon 
whether we can find ways of expressing a sense of them that is not sentimental or self-
indulgent. That is why we may need, for example, to turn to literature and poetry. 
 
                                                 
108 The Realistic Spirit, p.325. 
109 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.42. 
110 The Realistic Spirit, p.328. 
111 The Realistic Spirit, p.329. 
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Unsentimental compassion for animals, perhaps like that expressed by Ishmael, need not 
just be for their pain and suffering, but for the fact that they are vulnerable and mortal. 
More precisely, we gain an awareness, through critical responses like Ishmael’s to the 
animal world around him, of the fact that animals are vulnerable like us, and that we 
share part of our own creaturely condition with them. This thought illustrates one aspect 
of Williams’ suggestion that our thinking (of this sort) must start “from here”. In this 
case, “here” is our place as one animal amongst others, with respect to whom we can 
notice and form ideas which overlap, diverge, and intersect with our ideas about human 
life. 
 
Another form of recognition of what “they” are, touched on in the previous chapter, is the 
sense of wonder and feeling of strangeness that they are both like us and unlike us. In The 
Philosopher’s Dog, Gaita suggests that the sense of mystery that surrounds our 
perception of animals is not borne of philosophical skepticism about what they are like on 
the inside. It is more to the point, he thinks, to regard it as an intimation of surprise that 
arises by reflecting on the meaning of our respective lives. Here is Gaita talking about his 
dog Gypsy’s love of ferociously attacking cats. He feels it is the: 
 
apparent absence of a psychological dimension in Gypsy’s drive to kill 
that is so disturbing and makes her seem so other to us, so much a 
different kind of being. The occasion for such perceptual shifts – from 
seeing her as one of us, a member of the family, to seeing her as wholly 
other in her animal nature – are not always dramatic. The sight of her 
sniffing another dog’s urine could do it. Or the sight of her staring quite 
vacantly into space, clearly without a thought in her head. Or, as Yael [his 
wife] once put it, ‘seeing this thing with a tail walking through the 
house.’112   
 
Thomas Mann has a related sense of his dog, Bashan: 
 
                                                 
112 The Philosopher’s Dog, p.66. 
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Extraordinary creature! So close a friend and yet so remote; so different 
from us, in certain ways…I speak of these things only to show how under 
stress of circumstance the character of a near friend may reveal itself as 
strange and foreign. It is dark to me, it is mysterious; I observe it with 
head shakings and can only dimly guess at what it might mean. And in all 
other respects I understand Bashan so well I feel such a lively sympathy 
for all his manifestations!113 
 
Discussing the bewildering “horror of what we do to animals”114, Cora Diamond makes a 
parallel point. She says that there can be: 
 
equally a sense of astonishment and incomprehension that there should be 
beings so like us, so unlike us, so astonishingly capable of being 
companions of ours and so unfathomably distant. A sense of its being 
impossible that we should go and eat them may go with the feeling how 
powerfully strange it is that they and we should share as much as we do, 
and yet also not share; that they should be capable of incomparable beauty 
and delicacy and terrible ferocity; that some of them should be so mind-
bogglingly weird or repulsive in their forms or in their lives.115       
 
Perhaps the “extraordinary felt character of animal life in relation to our own”116 is 
discernable in the scientist E.O. Wilson’s report of his encounter with Kanzi, the young 
bonobo whose signing ability was studied by Sue Savage-Rumbaugh. Wilson’s presence 
initially scared the young ape, but then Kanzi, curious, 
 
drifted back over to me. This time, having been coached by Sue Savage-
Rumbaugh, I imitated the flute-like conciliatory call of the species, wu-
wu-wu, wu, wu…with my lips pursed and what this time I believed to be a 
                                                 
113 T. Mann, Stories of a Lifetime: The collected stories, Vol. 2, (London: Mercury Books, 1961), p.93,96. 
114 S. Cavell et al., Philosophy and Animal Life (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), p. 60. 
115 Philosophy and Animal Life, p.61. 
116 Philosophy and Animal Life, p.61. 
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sincere, alert expression on my face. Now Kanzi reached out and touched 
my hand, nervously but gently, and stepped back a short distance to study 
me again (Wilson accepts a cup of grape juice.) I flourished a cup as if 
offering a toast and took a sip, whereupon Kanzi climbed into my lap, 
took the cup, and drank most of the juice… 
The episode was unnerving. It wasn’t the same as making friends with the 
neighbor’s dog. I had to ask myself: was this really an animal? As Kanzi 
was led away (no farewells), I realized that I had responded to him almost 
exactly as I would to a two-year old child – same initial anxieties, same 
urge to communicate and please, same gestures and food-sharing ritual. 
Even the conciliatory call was not very far off from the sounds adults 
make to comfort an infant. I was pleased that I had been accepted, that I 
had proved adequately human (was that the word?) and sensitive enough 
to get along with Kanzi.117          
 
Wilson’s feeling of being unsettled involves a three-way contrast of this ape’s life with 
human life and the life of certain intelligent animals that are not great apes. This seems to 
be a further way in which our sense of different beings intersects with, and is influenced 
by, their relation to other creatures. Wilson does not just portray a scene in which he 
encounters the chimpanzee as something more than an inert object – that is, as a 
particular sentient one. Rather, his “record of an engagement”118 with another creature, as 
Costello puts it, may be seen as emerging from richer possibilities of critical response. 
One might imagine someone who has had this experience going on to talk about things 
which arose in the previous chapter – perhaps dignity, moral capacity, and forms of 
attachment. These modes of response both reveal and are a part of an animal’s “reality”, 
as Diamond explains: 
 
                                                 
117 Quoted in S. M, Wise, Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals (New York: Perseus 
Publishing, 2000), p.155. Of course Wilson’s sensitive description of his encounter with Kanzi is at odds 
with his general scientistic view that philosophical ethics will eventually be replaced by sociobiology. His 
description demonstrates how our basic human responses to animals are prior to intellectual theory.  
118 Elizabeth Costello, p.96. 
 265
To attend to the reality of animals, in this sense, involves seeing both the 
ways in which they are ‘with’ us (an expression of which is ‘one breath 
permeates us all’), and the ways in which they are strange and other. In 
discussing the Greek notion of what it is to ‘belong with’ some other 
being, Richard Sorabji notes a point from Plato: that to ‘treasure others 
because they are like us’; we can ‘belong with’ what is unlike us. Such a 
combination of awareness of animals as ‘other’ and recognition of their 
‘belonging with’ us is strikingly found in D.H. Lawrence: animals, who 
have their strange unknown lives, are inhabitants of this earth, linked to us 
by the ‘strange planetary phenomenon’ of life. Lawrence remarks on the 
gift we are given when we are able to become aware of the ‘delicate 
realness’ of these other beings.119     
 
There are, then, many possible “background sources” in our relation to our moral 
responses to nonhuman animals. A conception of their kind and their kinds of 
individuality, which arise in part from our responses to them, might be a requirement of 
making sense of morality as it applies to them, when it is more richly and imaginatively 
conceived than it is on traditional moral theories. As Diamond and Gaita have argued, 
these theories tend to distort our understanding of both human and animal life by 
overlooking the ways that this understanding is situated in contingent forms of human 
living and cultural life, while (because of the critical elements in that understanding) not 
being confined to any single form of living or culture. As in the human case, our 
conception of animal individuality informs, and is informed by, what we can take morally 
seriously in our relation to them. 
                                                 
119 C. Diamond, Slow Cures and Bad Philosophers: Essays on Wittgenstein, Medicine, and Bioethics 







The fact that there cannot be, as we learn from Wittgenstein, any a priori constraints 
prescribed by philosophical theory on our ethical thinking (although, of course, the 
principles of rationality and “the facts” are important aspects of determinations of 
meaning) gives us reason to suppose that great innovation and creativity may be possible 
in ethical thought. That is why critics like O’Neill and Singer are wrong to say that the 
approach to ethical value adopted in this thesis is inherently conservative. As has been 
noted, there are limits on our moral thinking apart from rationality and ordinary facts that 
are provided by critical concepts like sentimentality; but these concepts exist from a point 
of view inside what Gaita has described as the realm of meaning.  
 
This is the point of view which as human beings we ordinarily have, and it determines 
our conception of the nature of ethics at its most serious, at the same time as it defines 
our conception of what it is to think well about ethical questions. It is from within this 
outlook that we understand the importance to ethics of human individuality. But even 
from this viewpoint, there seems to be great freedom in the meaning and value we can 
find.  
 
Effectively, this is the point made by Cora Diamond when she criticizes Bernard 
Williams’ attack on animal rights arguments.1 She agrees with Williams that our thinking 
must be anthropocentric or human centered, in the particular sense that it must not “drive 
us to ‘get beyond humanity’”2 and its resources for thinking well. The thrust of 
Diamond’s position on injustice and animals, however, is quite radical in its opposition to 
common beliefs about humaneness and animal welfare. So too (to a lesser extent) is 
Gaita’s suspicion that we may come to see that what was, and still is, distorted, 
                                                 
1 C. Diamond, Slow Cures and Bad Philosophers: Essays on Wittgenstein, Medicine, and Bioethics (Elliot, 
C. ed.) (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), p.142. 
2 Slow Cures and Bad Philosophers, p.142. 
 267
unimaginative, and even revolting in our treatment of animals, was already present in the 
wide-spread conception our society has of what are called “humane” and kind practices.3  
 
Diamond denies that any revisionist thoughts can only be found from the point of view of 
the universe. Just the opposite, for such innovative thoughts are fully “grounded in 
human moral thinking” 4. Gaita makes a similar point, when he argues that even if we 
accept that our thinking about value depends upon the contingencies of human living, and 
even if (furthermore) we agree that human beings are like nothing else in nature, there is 
still great freedom for creative and progressive thinking about animals and the natural 
world: 
 
Our concepts which mark the states of the inner life – in the thin sense that 
merely refers to states of consciousness and the richer sense which enables 
M to distinguish ‘us’ from ‘them’ – are therefore profoundly 
anthropocentric. I hope that my discussion has shown that that need not be 
a bad thing. It can be consistent with a disinterested love of the natural 
world and also with regarding species other than human beings as morally 
our equals. It is consistent with all that is edifying in the ringing rebuke by 
Enlightenment thinkers against the arrogance of supposing that we human 
beings are at the centre of the universe. It is consistent in other words with 
anything that is properly found edifying in the attacks on ‘speciesism’.5     
 
As a matter of fact, such a view, which recognizes the fundamental significance of human 
life, has resources for creative discoveries about the meaning of the nonhuman world that 
are just not available to theoretical modes of thought. A dramatic recent example of this 
is Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello and the “radical egalitarianism” that is implicit in her 
infamous comparison of the animal enterprise with the Holocaust. When Singer’s 
character “Peter” called Costello’s view a “more radical egalitarianism about humans and 
                                                 
3 R. Gaita, The Philosophers Dog (New York: Random House, 2005), p.37. 
4 Slow Cures and Bad Philosophers, p.142. 
5 R. Gaita, A Common Humanity (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 1999), p.269. 
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animals…than I would be prepared to defend”6, he was, in effect, criticizing as too 
radical a view which appears to be formed out of the very approach to ethics which 
Singer has criticized as inherently doomed to conservatism.  
 
In many other ways, this alternative approach can be more, rather than less, radical than 
familiar theories about animals and humans. Although it is dependent on certain cultural 
resources, it can say things of an indefinitely complex and diverse variety. It can, more 
interestingly and deeply than “theory”, significantly change our understanding of the 
nonhuman world and elements of the human world too. Of course, that does not mean 
that what we actually discover in this sort of fully-fledged reflection will be radical and 
revisionist. It depends on what we can make thoughtful, perceptive sense of, when we are 
thinking in the more fully engaged fashion – that is, with a responsiveness to experience 
that is disciplined by the critical concepts. And what we can make sense of will hang 
substantially on our engagement with the animal world and on the particular forms of the 
ideas – their tone and style - which can be found in literature and philosophy, in the 
words and actions of other people, and in other places. Sometimes we may find that, as 
Rush Rhees found when writing about his dog, Danny, that our experience with animals 
demands that we speak of them, not just as our companions, but as our friends; at other 
times, we may find, as Ishmael found when confronted by the squid, that such terms 
simply do not fit the case because the kind of life present in the animal we are facing is 
too foreign to us and too limited. Or again, we may be struck as E.O. Wilson was struck 
by the strange otherness of some animals, in ways that can be deepened by exploring in 
the realm of meaning what it is for an intelligent animal to have a particular kind of 
individuality. 
 
In the light of the preceding discussion, two points of contrast can be made between the 
traditional mode of thinking and theorizing, exemplified in the work of Singer and others, 
and in the work of many of their critics, and the alternative approach to humans and 
                                                 
6 J. M. Coetzee (et al), The Lives of Animals (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), p.86.   
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animals, developed by Diamond and most fully by Gaita. The traditional approach 
overlooks two things.  
 
The first is the way we talk about humans and animals, not as different species or as 
creatures with certain properties which may or may not engage with moral principles (for 
example, as replaceable or non-replaceable “receptacles of sentience-value”), but as 
different sorts of creatures in a manner which is often encapsulated in a phrase like “us 
and them”. This sense can involve the “mass of ways” we have of critically responding to 
humans and animals. Such response-dependent conceptualizations are not merely feelings 
as “emotivism” might understand them; nor are they “relative” to, say, the art forms they 
may be responses to. Yet, from the point of view of Diamond and Gaita, speaking 
seriously of “us and them” is the only way in which we can see human life and animal 
life as it really is. Perhaps those who wish to attack the notion of human specialness have 
a point. But in order to make a fair judgment, it is necessary to understand the alternative 
position that Diamond and Gaita provide. 
 
The second thing the traditional methodology does not seriously engage with is the 
particular way this alternative approach recasts our sense of thinking both 
anthropocentrically and (with that) anthropomorphically - from within human life, 
amongst other animals, and with many of the resources of various cultures at our 
disposal. Singer and others assume that such an approach is irrational, nonrational, or 
noncognitive; it cannot show us how things really are. As a result, they do not take 
seriously in their philosophy the possibility that there is a better and deeper way of 
thinking in and upon ethics and, furthermore, that this way of thinking will have certain 
consequences for the content of our thought about what matters.  
 
This way of thinking has, as Gaita has argued more fully than anyone else, a cognitive 
character that is determined by a range of critical concepts, or forms of speaking and 
appraising, which we can all recognize from our own lives. These concepts pick out kinds 
of cognitive failure or success that only exist when the form of an idea is inseparable 
from its content. Such ideas have a tone or “quality” which can only be understood by 
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beings who are fully in touch with certain forms of expression, and living the kind of 
lives which, again, we can recognize (as M could not) as essentially accessible to all 
people.     
 
This has certain consequences for the content of ethics and meaning because, when we 
allow for this other way of reflecting and understanding, we can reclaim our prior sense 
of what it is possible to take seriously, rather than trying to extract from it rational 
arguments or propositions which fatally distort it, or else relegating it to a “nonrational 
pocket” of the personal. And one thing we are forced to take seriously, from a position 
that stresses sobriety, perceptiveness, and thoughtfulness, is that human beings are a 
singular and irreplaceable sort of animal, and that, to a large extent, our sense of 
nonhuman animal life is serious and convincing only when we do not relinquish our 
peculiar creaturely vantage point.  
 
Furthermore, the disciplined, critical elements that necessarily characterize this sort of 
lucidity or perceptiveness – that make this thought, in fact, lucid and perceptive rather 
than merely aesthetically “refined” – have a kind of universality, even if they do not 
allow for convergence in argument of a kind that can be vindicatory. These terms of 
critical appraisal, only identified in, and by, the “realm of meaning”, are present in a 
common area or community of understanding and discussion.  
 
Despite the fact that such critical thought, compared to many familiar and disciplined 
forms of reflection that often serve as a model for reason as such, is internally dependent 
upon culture to a startling degree, it is not, as O’Neill and Singer tend to argue, merely 
“relative” to art, to specific discourses, or to cultural values. In fact, this distinctive form 
of thought in a sense transcends the cultures, with their multiform languages and ways of 
speaking, which must conceptually inform it. Gaita argued this case in A Common 
Humanity. There are, he said, 
 
disciplines which look to science for a prototype of the kind of inquiry that 
will reveal things as they really are, and there are disciplines which look 
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more to art for a model for it…Reflection that always aspires to separate 
cognitive content from form that it takes to be rhetorical and emotive, and 
reflection that respects the inseparability of form and cognitive content 
both seek to be universal, but differently. The former will try to purify 
thought of everything that it takes to be local, which will, of course, be 
almost everything that resonates in a natural language.7 
 
There are implications for detailed and philosophically expansive reflection about 
animals and humans. Such reflection must, if Gaita and Diamond are right, take into 
account a form of human thought which has seemed to be lacking in universality and 
objectivity. In fact, it has seemed to philosophy far too limited by culture and by our 
animal condition or creatureliness. That is the case for Singer. Singer, as we know, by 
stressing our primate heritage, has thought of us as apes who have chanced to step, albeit 
haphazardly, onto the escalator of reason, allowing us to do philosophy and ethics and 
create sophisticated cultures.  
 
But Singer thinks our animality, and the ways we are moved by language and cultural 
forms, is a constant threat to the exercise of our reason. We are ever-ready to jump off the 
escalator and back into animal life. He thinks the essential sense in which a perspective 
discovered in media res is a threat is that reason is not, in any domain, constituted by our 
responses, even though it is often affected and conspicuously driven by them. Thus, he 
and many other philosophers aspire to a kind of philosophy that is best carried out, as 
Gaita has well put it, in a tone-free zone.  
 
Bernard Williams succinctly expressed the way in which philosophy typically does not 
take seriously the tone, “quality”, or “effect” of words or of various forms of expression 
when he wrote of 
 
                                                 
7 A Common Humanity, pp.283-284. 
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the spirit of one analytic philosopher who (in actual fact) said to another 
when they were trying to write a book together, ‘Let’s get it right first and 
you can put in the style afterwards’.8  
 
The problem with that, of course, is that not taking seriously - in the right way - how 
something sounds or strikes us will not allow us to identify what is at stake in discussions 
about humans and animals. We must think in this way, not because we are doomed to 
remain enclosed in a perspective limited by our affective human condition and culture, 
but because a culturally informed and creaturely perspective is the only one which gives 
us the critical mode of reflection adequate to investigations of this sort.  
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